Less interest in the Pacific?

I wonder if it could be the impersonal nature of a war at sea? We relish the stories of our veterans, and they are a prize, but when we look at, let's just say Taffy 3 at Samar, we look at it from an equipment point of view. The Johnston was lost as well as the Hoel, Sammy B, St. lo, and the Gambier Bay, but could you tell me without looking how many men were lost. A ship sinks, it becomes a sunk ship, not 300 lost sailors. When a Pilot shoots down an enemy plane, he shot down an enemy plane, not the pilot flying it. When we talk about the war in the Pacific, we are talking mostly weapons platforms, not personnel.

 

Point One: The Japanese DID attack parts of the US - Hawaii, Midway, Aleutians, and even some minor bombing and shelling of the west coast. If the Japanese had won at Midway, there would have been nothing much to prevent them to attacking right up the Aleutian chain to the North American mainland. Then you would have seen a far greater emphasis on the Pacific War by the US.

Point Two: There was legions of Japanese sympathizers among the Indians, and the British knew it. India could have easily become a puppet regime like Thailand was.

Point Three: If some battles had gone Japan's way, they certainly could have taken the time to bring China under rule.

Point Four: Again, if the Japanese had won at Midway, they could have finished off New Guinea, and completely isolated Australia and New Zealand. Say goodbye to a lot of commonwealth troops that fought in Europe.

Point Five: The Japanese made some terrifying advances in bio-warfare, and I doubt they would not have hesitated using it if they'd managed to create a delivery system.

Point Six: Until Midway, the whole war was in doubt in the Pacific. Not until the invasion of the PI did even Nimitz begin to see victory.

It all comes down to proximity. The British talk about the Pacific war because they were involved in it. The Germans talk about it insofar as submarines going to and from Japan. The Russians only cared about the PTO when they realized they weren't going to get any spoils of war if they didn't act damn fast after the first A-Bomb.

To the US, Australia, and New Zealand, the PTO mattered a LOT. It was on our doorsteps.

 

Incorrect. The Japanese did not have the logistics capabilities to go further than what they historically did. And consider this; the US with all of its capabilities in 1944 and 1945, ignored any serious planning to attack Japan through the Aleutions.

Point Three: If some battles had gone Japan's way, they certainly could have taken the time to bring China under rule.[/QUOTE]

And then what? Japan was on borrowed time and it had to win the war by middle 1944 or it was doomed.

True to some extent. Instead of Guadalacanal in Aug 1942, say hello to Midway invasion in July 1942.

But was it a war winner? And if the allies respond in kind to this type of warfare, even without a nuclear weapon?

Source? Once the Mariana's were taken, the JCS knew it was just a matter of time before the Japanese were going to be beaten.

True

True.


But I also like reading about the Pacific war as it also was a war with an exotic nature.

 

Syscom, you are using hindsight, which you cannot do in this case.

If it weren't for five, fateful minutes at Midway, the Japanese would have won, and we would have lost probably all of our Yorktown class carriers. Think of no Enterprise throughout the rest of the war. Midway would have then been a land base from which to launch regular attacks on Pearl Harbor. Doing that they could have taken the Hawaiian Islands, where any Japanese forces could have been self sufficient for a long time. Remember that the bulk of the people in Hawaii were Japanese natives. The Japanese take Hawaii, and visions of the US west coast being shelled by major fleet units would have been a reality.

So thereby denying naval support to the allies for New Guinea. Guadalcanal never would have happened. What would the US have had? The Wasp and the Ranger which were in the Atlantic, and the Saratoga already in dry dock from torpedo damage.

That five minutes at Midway shaped the war in the Pacific. Just about everything the allies were able to do, was because of that. Four major IJN carries lost with almost all of their veteran air crews.

The Japanese were very good at living off the land, which they did in China quite a bit, and could have done anywhere else providing no immediate interference from the US.

 

Are you suggesting that a Japanese victory is possible?

 

Possible but not certain. After Pearl Harbor, Java, and Coral Sea, the US Naval strength was precarious. If the Japanese had won at Midway (and perhaps taking Hawaii), American naval strength would have been laughable to the IJN combined fleet. The British would have been on their own in the Atlantic, because the idea of San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco being shelled and bombed almost at will by the Japanese in 1942 would have demanded all possible naval units to be redeployed to the Pacific. The US would have had no perimeter in front of it's home soil. Just submarines with bad torpedoes in 1942

Now take away most of the US presence in the Atlantic, and the U-Boat war might have been a different issue.

All of the US capital ship building capability was mainly on the east coast. Imagine Germany gaining the upper hand in the Atlantic because of a very limited US naval presence. Taking a new ship out of Norfolk or Newport News would have been iffy at best. A target rich environment for U-Boats.

On the other side, the Panama Canal would quite probably have been in ruins early on with no one to contest the Combined Fleet.

Ever watch the old BBC TV show, Connections? History is a lot like that.

 

There are a couple of flaws here, not ignoring the importance of Midway in the least. But the numbers for the Hawaiian population is incorrect. 1/3 of the population was of Japanese decent, of that only 10% were born in Japan. The rest of the population was made up of native Hawaiians, Filippinos, Chinese (the largest Asian segment), and white Americans (the smallest group) in the civilian population.

However there were many thousands of military persons, and Hawaiian National Guard (not counting the Navy) stationed in Hawaii, and Hawaii is an importing island for foods.

When it was sparsely populated by the native Hawaiians it was fully self-supporting. When the population swelled with pineapple and sugar cane workers, it imported about 70% of its grains, and nearly 90% of its non-fish meats. It has no oils, no refineries, and very limited arable land which wasn't already in sugar and pineapple production. While those crops could be replaced, that isn't an "overnight" proposition, by any stretch of the imagination. Don't forget that the Chinese and Filippinos on the islands aren't going to welcome the invading Japanese with open arms any more than the Americans. Hawaii would be a dumb move for the Japanese to make as an occupation spot. No resources (which they need badly), and a hostile populace.

I just don't buy Hawaii as a viable target under any circumstances. It is still 3,000 miles away from the American west coast, and that isn't an easy jump for an Imperial Navy which has NO OIL!

 

Much of what Hawaii imported, food wise, was for western palates. Sugar and pineapple growing was a cash crop, not a sustenance crop.

True, the population wasn't going to roll over, but the lack of a naval presence, and Japanese aircraft and surface ships doing what they could have done, would have made things interesting. And they could have taken their sweet time doing it, because nothing would have been coming from the States.

I stand corrected on the number of Japanese natives. Would US authorities have sent them to the US mainland camps if the Japanese had won Midway?

Actually, the Japanese had plenty of oil. It was called Borneo. Without the US navy to make life miserable for Japanese shipping, the fleet would be in a sweet spot. A large enough refueling depot might been maintained on Midway, Hawaii blockaded, and life on the west coast miserable.

 

Gromit,

On Japan winning the war, the short answer for why this is essentially impossible...

During the war the US produced 303,713 aircraft, Japan 76,320

The US produced 8,812 major navel vessels, Japan 589

The US produced 33,993,230 gross tons of mechan shipping, Japan 4,152,361

The US produced 88,410 tanks and SPGs, Japan 2,515

The US produced 12,330,000 rifles, carbines, Japan 3,570,000

The US produced 2,614,000 machine guns, Japan 450,000

The US produced 257,390 artillery pieces, Japan 13,350

The US produced 102,100 mortars, Japan 7,800

The US produced 4,123.2 thousand of metric tons of aluminum, Japan 361.0

The US produced 2,149.7 millions of metric tons of coal, Japan 184.5

The US produced 396.9 millions of metric tons of iron ore, Japan 21.0

The US produced 833.2 millions of metric tons of crude oil, Japan 5.2

The US produced 334.5 millions of metric tons of steel, Japan 24.1

Source:

The Library of Congress World War II Companion by David M. Kennedy

 

Which, if Japan controlled the seas, means absolutely zilch. No use if it's not where it's needed.

My hypothesis is that Japan controls the Pacific after Midway, and Germany will have a freer reign in the Atlantic because of a severely reduced US Atlantic Fleet.

So this mountain of arms, which DID NOT EXIST IN 1942, is going to be sitting in warehouses for a long time.

But understand, I never said Japan would surely win. I gave it a possibility. One certainty would be the war lasting more years than it did.

 

The US produced 8,812 major navel vessels, Japan 589

 

How many did they produce up to June 1942? Thats the point. How many were produced after that time, would have been a lot of targets trying to get from Newport News or New Orleans, or even Mare Island in two oceans controlled by the Axis.

Let go of what the history books say, and look at what could have been.

 

Incorrect. You are making an assumption about loosing all three carriers which is highly unlikely. And you are giving the Japanese amphib capabilities they never had in the first place. In fact youre projecting US fleet capabilities from 1945 upon the IJN to make them seem far more formidable. And assuming the Japanese did win Midway, just what were they going to do to exploit it? Launch 1000 mile bomber raids upon Oahu with impunity?

Read Parshalls book "Shattered sword" for the true details of the battle of Midway. The IJN didnt loose all their aircrews. And stay away from that over used quote "five minutes". It was more of "five hours".

Are you suggesting that Midway had plenty of fresh water and food?

 

Say Japan wins at Midway and destroys all three carriers. Within 6 months the US launches its first converted ocean liner carrier, every two months they produce another. Japan has NO capacity to invade Oahu, one of the most well defended island in the pacific. The most it does is delay the war a few months. Japan cannot last, industrial might will eventually win. It had a navy but it had no means to replace it.

Combined in 1941 and 1942 US produced 2,398 major navel vessels, from 1939-1942 Japan produced 168

 

Understood. But in my scenario, Japan had far fewer loses to replace.

2398 major naval vessels? I wonder what that stat considers a major naval vessel. Certainly not major fighting vessels.

 

Bull on Borneo, it was a minor player in the petroleum world, and the NEI fields were so successfully sabotgued by the Dutch and their local workers as the withdrew, the Japanese never got back to 100% production until 1944. And then they had no tankers with which to transport it. They have to take those fields without loss to have the oil, and they have to have the oil to look at Hawaii. I just don't buy the goods you are attempting to sell.

Not taking anything away from your "vital five minutes" here "Gromit801", but Midway would be a worthless atoll to take for a base of operations to attack Hawaii. If you haven't already read Shattered Sword by Jon Parshall and Tony Tully, do so. This book is, probably the finest book on the subject of the Battle of Midway (at least from the Japanese point of view). New research, debunking of old myths, and insightful analysis of the results of the battle are contained in the book.

When reading it, an interesting consequence of the battle comes to light. We have all heard that the Japanese has some of the most highly trained and battle-tested carrier pilots in the world, and that the real loss at Midway were those pilots, not so much the carriers themselves. The book's research show how much of a fallacy that is.

Actually, the bulk of the pilots survived. Midway cost Japan fewer pilots than at Santa Cruz, and about the same as at the Eastern Solomon battles, and the meat grinder of the Solomons took even more pilots, about ten times the pilots that Midway did. All these early losses were the highly-trained pilots before the pilot training program diluted their quality. Though Midway might have begun the decline, it certainly was not significant in terms of the numbers of pilots lost. The book points out that, more importantly, the cadre of trained mechanics and other aircraft servicing personnel was far more horrific and costly. Japan was a highly un-mechanized society, and those that knew a bit about engines and other machinery were in terribly short supply. Especially on Kaga and Soryu, almost all these trained personnel were wiped out. These were the truly difficult personnel to replace, and the sad (not for us) story of the decline of the Japanese Naval Air Force really was due more to poor aircraft maintenance and the resulting aircraft reliability than anything else.

Parshall and Tully also point out that the Japanese carrier divisions (two-carrier groups of similar Fleet carriers) were a highly-developed weapons system that had evolved together and gained efficiency. Wiping out Japan's two most experienced carrier divisions at Midway "blunted the spear point" of Japan's thrust to gain victories over we Americans and "force" us to call it quits and grant Japan her conquests.

The carrier division of Shokaku and Zuikaku (CarDiv 5) was always the least efficient of Japan's main three carrier divisions, and after Midway there was never more than a pick-up team of misfit conversions to fill in the loss of CarDiv 1 (Akagi/Kaga) and CarDiv 2 (Hiryu/Soryu). I can't recommend this book highly enough.

The invasion of the Hawaiian Islands is a non-starter, and rather unrealistic, not that they absolutely could not do it or attempt to, but that their troops, shipping, naval and air forces were fully committed to the objectives they really needed to take. These operations involved relatively short transits from advanced bases like Formosa and Indochina, and even so it took several round trips to get all their troops ashore in Malaya, Philippines, etc. Don’t forget that Hawaii is 2000 miles from the nearest Japanese base (Kwajalein) which is also an importing island, and a sustained operation over that type of distance would mean canceling most of (if not all) their other invasions, to gain not a drop of oil. There were quite a few among the Japanese staff who were concerned that they were stretching beyond any defensive line they could expect to hold with the territory they already had in their sights.
Therefore the Pearl Harbor attack was approved as a "raid", not as an occupation. Likewise, Wake Island and Guam were attacked and occupied (this cut the transpacific cable to the Philippines and Australia), but Midway was not even in the original plans. Some Japanese staff officers after the war blamed the Japanese defeat on "over-stretching" beyond their defensible perimeters.

So while the Japanese were concerned about Pearl Harbor, they could not allow that campaign to distract them from their real goals; i.e. getting the oil and rubber they needed from southeast Asia. At that point in time the Japanese Army and Marines were really extended to the stretching point. In addition to holding actions in China, they dispatched troops to Indonesia, Malaya, French Indochina, Burma, and the Philippines. The Japanese commander in the Philippines was somewhat disgraced because the American/Filipino resistance at Bataan disrupted the Japanese timetable, when forces were still tied up in the Philippines which were scheduled to be committed elsewhere.

In order to aid and assist our own Atlantic fleet, Yorktown had departed Pearl Harbor on Hitler’s birthday, April 20th, 1941 in company with Warrington (DD-383), Somers (DD-381), and Jouett (DD-396); headed southeast, transited the Panama Canal on the night of 6 and 7 of May, and arrived at Bermuda on the 12th of May. From that time to the entry of the United States into the war, Yorktown conducted four patrols in the Atlantic to protect convoy shipping. One must remember that there were, (Dec. 7,’41), only three carriers were in the Pacific. Enterprise (CV-6), Lexington (CV-2), and Saratoga (CV-3). While Ranger (CV-4), Wasp (CV-7), and the recently commissioned Hornet (CV-8) were in the Atlantic, Yorktown departed Norfolk on 16 December 16th, 1941 and sailed for the Pacific, her secondary gun galleries now bristling with new 20-millimeter Oerlikon machine cannons. She reached San Diego, Calif., on Dec. 30th, 1941 and became flagship for Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher's newly formed Task Force (TF-17). The Yorktown was sort of caught in a "tweenie" move when Pearl was struck.

And it simply must not be forgotten that the Essex was already in the process of construction by that time, as was the Bon Homme Richard (re-named the Yorktown), the Intrepid, and the carrier which came to be named Hornet (after CV-8 was lost). And let us not forget that after the feasibility of the "baby flattop" was demonstrated with the Long Island in early 1940, America produced at least another hundred of these CVEs in the war years alone. I believe the Tinian was the last of her type launched in late 1945 (CVE 123), but never fully commissioned as the need was gone. The Japanese had no hope in hell of ever matching or even equaling the USN production from 1940 on when the "two ocean Navy" was approved and funded.

As to the Panama Canal, allow me to point out that the Canal was far from an "easy target", the Japanese may not have known about all of it, but they were certainly aware of most of the defense installations. That is because in "mock attacks" called "Fleet Problem(s)" the USN assessed the vulnerability of various American installations to carrier launched air attack. As an example, during Fleet Problem IX, in January 1929, Captain Joseph M. Reeves demonstrated the power of carrier aviation when he launched a mock strike of seventy aircraft from the USS Saratoga on the Panama Canal. "The planes struck without warning in an attack deemed so effective by the referees that they ruled the locks at the Pacific end of the canal destroyed." However, even though the western locks were put out of commission, the Saratoga was ruled located and "sunk" by land based aircraft by those same referees. This mitigated some of the concern as to an air attack from any Asian power (read Japan), it would be "cost in-effective" and only a temporary inconvenience to the USA. I doubt the Japanese were unaware of Fleet Problem IX of the USN.

That one exercise did increase the anti-air battery installations, the first "quick raise" torpedo nets, and the cables strung above the canal to interdict low-flying aircraft. It also started the search for a replacement system of emergency closure of each lock system which dated from before WW1. This eventually became the SIP7 (Special Improvement Project #7) which was an improvement on the existing pre-1920 system. The conversion to the SIP7 was begun in 1940. This allowed each lock (starting at the Gatun Lake, the first one in place) to be closed in seconds (30) by either electro-hydraulic or in minutes (10) with back up hand pumps. The final SIP7 lock protection adaptation was complete in mid-1942 (two weeks after Midway).

At the beginning of 1939 the bulk of the garrison defending the Canal was divided between two separate sectors that were about as far apart organizationally as they were geographically. The Pacific Sector had a slight preponderance of force. Assigned to it were the 4th Coast Artillery Regiment, the 33d Infantry, and a battalion of the 2d Field Artillery. At the opposite end of the Canal, in the Atlantic Sector, were the 1st Coast Artillery Regiment and the 14th Infantry. Antiaircraft units made up part of both coast artillery regiments. In addition to these troops assigned to the sectors, certain units were directly under the commanding general of the Panama Canal Department. These department troops included air units-the 19th Wing (composite), with about 28 medium bombers, 14 light bombers, 24 pursuit planes, and a few trainers and utility planes. Plus a regiment of combat engineers, together with Signal Corps, quartermaster, and ordnance units, and other service and administrative detachments. The total strength of the garrison-sector as well as department troops-came to approximately 13,500 men. To the Army garrison was given the mission of protecting the Canal against sabotage and of defending it from positions within the Canal Zone. Close-in defense was thus an Army responsibility except for two specific tasks: that of providing an armed guard on vessels passing through the Canal, and that of maintaining a harbor patrol at the entrances to the Canal. Both of these tasks were entrusted to the Navy and Coast Guard, along with its primary responsibility for offshore defense.

Plans for protecting the Canal against sabotage during an international crisis of this sort had been drawn up in Panama and given constant study ever since the spring of 1936. Now, steps to put them into effect were quickly taken. Three basic measures had been provided for: first, the installation and operation of special equipment in the lock chambers, designed to detect underwater mines and bombs and to prevent damage from this cause; second, the restriction of commercial traffic to one side of the dual locks; and third, the inspection of all ships before they entered the Canal and the placing of an armed guard on vessels while in transit through it. Reinforcements had been arriving in Panama in a steady stream. At the end of January 1940 the strength of the garrison stood not quite at 19,500 men; by the end of April it had risen to approximately 21,100. This build up continued so that when the Japanese attack on Hawaii came, there were nearly 58,000 troops on guard in -the Canal Zone, in the Republic of Panama.

The "locks" and "canal" systems themselves were designed to function without electric power (1900s), and only by water pressure. The electric "donkey/mules" engines were incorporated much later, replacing real animals and very small generating plants. The loss of a power plant would only slow down, not stop the canal. It was generally powered by gravity and water pressure, not electricity.

Without the small local electric plants, the system would and could still function all the time even if slightly slower. They might be more vulnerable these days to "electric" destruction of the input, but since all the locks were developed to work with simple gravity flow of water, and mechanical motion of the lock gates themselves, I don't see how it would be a major problem in the forties. Until the local power-plants were "back on line", the Canal would have fallen back to using real biological mules (as they were originally), instead of the electric motored "mules".

But all of that is of no import, General Marshall and Secretary Stimson decided to restrict Canal traffic for an indefinite period; "for the purpose of effecting repairs." in late 1940, this was when the SIP7 system began being implemented. What this amounted to was an exclusion of Japanese shipping through the canal; all other vessels were permitted to pass through after close inspection and the placing of American personal onboard. So, as early as July 1941 all ships were being boarded and inspected before they were "escorted" through the canal, and no Japanese ships were allowed to transit the canal. When they were re-routed the Japanese Embassy protested they received a very noncommittal reply from Acting Secretary of State Welles, who had been informed by the War Department of its intentions and who was in complete accord with them.

Then you have to factor in that the War Department; which had administered the Canal Zone and the Canal since 1904 when it was started and then completed by the Army Corps of Engineers in 1914. They had always thought of ways to protect it from sabotage by both air attack and "enemy shipping". And they had been in complete control of the Zone. The crews of ships transiting the canal were removed all during "The Great War", and the ship was manned by USN/USCG personnel, and guided by a USN "pilot" at the helm after complete inspections and before entering the canal proper.

This policy was relaxed during the inter-war years, but re-instituted in 1939. It was during early 1940 that all European Axis "friendly" ships, or ships flying occupied nations flags were barred from using the canal, completely. Any "suspect" ship was "de-crewed" and held for 24 hours with armed guards on the ship to be certain it held no secret "stowaways".

After 1940 few Polish, Belgian, Dutch, Norwegian, Vichy French, Austrian, or Danish flagged ships transited the canal without extensive inspection and crew removal, period. This also excluded the Indo-Chinese flags which had been occupied by Japan with the "nod" of the Vichy French. By an odd extension, this also excluded the flags of the Soviet Union merchant marine for a time, as they had that "non aggression pact" with Hitler for a time. And all Japanese were fully barred before July 1941 but now the Soviet shipping was allowed! However, their merchant fleet was being used in the Black Sea, the Caspian sea, and the northern areas, and any ship flying the Soviet flag would have been highly suspect after June of 1941.

Let’s see, Midway is a barren atoll of no worth as a forward base without outside supply (something the Japanese couldn’t provide), Hawaii is beyond their reach, both in terms of man-power, transport, supply, and support warships. The Canal cannot be "laid waste", and the west coast cannot be attacked by ship or air.

 

I was thinking about that today.

I think that the battles in Europe had the "glamourous" (for lack of a better word) heavy infantry and armor battles, backed up by thousands of heavy bombers and fighters. And it was fought in a semi urban environment in cities and countryside that were familiar to generations of westerners.

The Pacific on the other hand, was an occasional naval battle and occasional land battle fought by light infantry, fought in exotic locales that few people have heard of.

It might be a bad comparison, but if I was comparing sports to the 2nd world war, Europe was the classic US football game. Well understood by everyone and continual battles and action. The Pacific war was like a marathon soccer game. Boring for the most part except for the intense excitement of a battle from time to time.