Mansteirn's Elastic Defense Feb - March 1944

TiredOldSoldier · Aug 26, 2015

I do not think the 1942 and 1943 Kharkov disasters were due to "junior officers" failings. Lack of willingness to risk Stalin's wrath by going to the defensive by commanders was important but mostly it was not detecting the significant German reserves building up on the flanks of the advance in time. I suspect the red army had a lot less communications equipment than the Germans so, even if the local commanders had been free to react they may have lacked the means to do so effectively.
In 1944-45 two thing schanged usually the Germans lacked local reserves capable of major counterattacks and the introduction of "logistical stops" created a lot less opportunities for them. The 1944-45 red army didn't resort to the sort of "give all available fuel to a Kampfgruppe and try one more push" tactics that were so common in German late 1941 operations, and they had no need to take such risks that would play unto the German strengths (high quality low level leadership/initiative), while multiple attacks and reinforcing success played into the late war German weakness (brittleness of the "non elite" divisions), and so the steamroller brought them to Berlin. The red army nonetheless did conduct some spectacular long range operations to create the various historical "pockets" and in the final campaign against the Japanese.
"Elastic defence" could be effective as it allowed limited in the initial shock better and put the mail line of resistance out of range of the massive Soviet artillery so partly negating it's effectiveness, but troops are at their most vulnerable when pulling back and ran the of the attacker generating sufficient "momentum" to shatter the defender is high.

LJAd · Aug 26, 2015

The Germans never had sufficient mobile forces for an elastic defense,that's why the theory of the elastic defense which Manstein presented his readers after the war,was a non sequitur .

Triton · Aug 26, 2015

LJAd said:

The Germans never had sufficient mobile forces for an elastic defense
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That is true - after Kursk.
I am sure, Hitler misjudged the successes in spring 1943 and he, again, saw the Red Army as exhausted. He just couldn't understand how they could cope with the losses of 1941. He claimed 28000 (!) destroyed tanks when he visited Mannerheim, And, although successful, the Stalingrad operation inflicted 3 times the losses for the Red Army compared to the Wehrmacht. So he still hoped, that the Wehrmacht could conquer Moscow in 1943 and negotiate a favourable peace with Stalin.

LJAd · Aug 26, 2015

It was already so on 22 june 1941,when they committed some 25 mobile divisions with 4000 tanks for Barbarossa .

In 1941,the Germans did capture 13400 tanks (qualified as BEUTE): it is unknown if these were intact,damaged or destroyed : probably a mixture .

Kursk was for Hitler a defensive attack with limited aims .

Triton · Aug 27, 2015

Well, they had enough forces to conquer large parts of the european part of the Soviet Union.
In 1941, the Wehrmacht was vastly superior in strategy and tactics, in the quality of the soldiers and the even in logistics. After the experience of World War 1, when Russia simply imploded in 1917, it was an easy prediction that this time, victory would be even easier and faster.

Manstein hoped, that a few "Charkows" would exhaust the Red Army and show, that victory even against an inferior Wehrmacht was very far away if not even impossible. Stalin was a very cautious leader and shyed away from big risks. he always feared a long war and do the job for the Western allies.

patriceXXI · Jun 5, 2017

Its worth noting that an "elastic defense" never existed, see the Battle of the Korsun–Cherkassy Pocket - Wikipedia

And the Kamenets-Podolsky pocket - Wikipedia

The latter manstein was able to circumvent the encirclement of the 1st panzer army only to be relieved of duty for the poor strategic footing of army group south, which was due to hitlers "hold ground at all costs" doctrine. In both battles you will see that Hitler intervened in the corps level command of each battle to the detriment of the German forces.

Stalin learned to trust his generals after the successful winter offensive and kharkov/Crimean disasters

Jesica · Jan 10, 2018

steverodgers801 said: ↑

Again, the Kharkov attack only worked because the Soviets played right into his hands. If the Soviets had not advanced so far and spread their troops out when they were at the end of their logistics the losses would have been less.
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You are wrong. You can see why looking at the evolution from Map 5 to Map 7 from 'The german defeat in the east' by Earl Ziemke:

After the failure of 'Wintergewitter' Manstein's forces were ill and his last remaining offensive-capable force was First Panzer Armee. His northern flank was an improvised ad-hoc kampfgruppe known as 'Armeeabteilung Fretter-Pico', plus the remains of Sixth Armee: 'Armeeabteilung Hollidt'. Now First Panzer Armee was deep south, while the main soviet thrust was deep north. Soviets by no means elected Manstein's desired path. They aimed for a large encirclement of the complete Heeresgruppe A (which is by the way, the original objective of 'Uranus'). Ziemke states in page 67 of his book:

'The offensive was to go deep--to the lower Kalitva, the Donets, and the Derkul. When the planning began Southwest Front had the First Guards and Fifth Tank Armies. Subsequently First Guards Army was enlarged, then split--its right flank becoming Third Guards Army--and Voronezh Front's Sixth Army was attached.' So we can see soviets planned to strike deep.
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Now Manstein instead of luring his enemy to attack where he wanted, acted accordingly shifting his forces, playing a castling. He strengthened Fourth Panzer Armee so it could hold the line while First Panzer Armee was extracted from the Caucasus and settled ready for a strike on the deep south flank of Group Popov. He also received key reinforcements he didn't expected nor did have in mind at the very start of the soviet thrust. This is explained by Ziemke in pages 90 and 91:

'Manstein Castles to the Left
The Soviet tide was at the flood. But, though momentum might still carry it far, new influences were coming into play. Army Group Don, now South, had conducted its retreat without excessive loss of strength or decline in morale. It had shortened its line and had freed itself of the responsibility for defending Army Group A's northern flank. In SS Panzer Corps it had a fresh, powerful--though somewhat erratic--striking force. The Russians, on the other hand, although they had carved out vast stretches of territory, had still not attained their primary objective, the destruction of the German armies in the south. In recent weeks, as glowing opportunities for cheap successes beckoned them at every turn, they had shown an increasing tendency to follow the line of least resistance.

In Operations Order 4 of 12 February 1943, Hitler had taken another step toward stopping the offensive. He had told Army Group South to establish a firm front on the Mius-Donets line and close the gap between Armeeabteilung Lanz and First Panzer Army. Harking back to one of the proposals Manstein made in January, he talked about creating two new "attack armies," one behind the Army Group South in the vicinity of Pavlograd and the other on the Army Group Center south flank. The plan was, to say the least, Utopian. It ignored the fact that the Russians were still rolling at full tilt and that the question was not simply one of closing gaps in the front and then going over to the offensive with two widely spaced armies.

But, in ordering seven fresh divisions from the West transferred to Army Group South by the end of the first week in March, Hitler did provide Manstein with the means to brake the Soviet advance and possibly, given a little luck and a great deal of skill, to seize the initiative.

On the afternoon of 17 February, Hitler, with Jodl, Zeitzler, and a retinue that included the Fuehrer's personal cook, arrived at Army Group South headquarters in Zaporozhye. Hitler's visits to the front, even as distant as an army group headquarters, were rare. In this instance the reasons that brought him there were also unusual. On the one hand, he longed to put an end to the winter's string of defeats; on the other, he had learned the full import of Manstein's 6 February proposal concerning the supreme command and he had all but made up his mind to hand Manstein his dismissal.

If he had any doubts, Hitler discovered that the situation of Army Group South was truly, as one general described it, "hair raising." On 18 February Soviet tanks were thirty-six miles east of Zaporozhye, and there were no German troops in between. From the Armeeabteilung Kempf right flank to the left flank of First Panzer Army a 110-mile gap afforded the First Guards Army and Sixth Army open roads to the south and west. They had cut the railroad east of Dnepropetrovsk, and First Guards Army's tanks, those east of Zaporozhye, were, for a day or so, in a position to bag the top German command. On the east, Soviet Third Tank Army and Fifth Shock Army had broken through the Mius line at separate places.

The time was obviously not appropriate for getting rid of a field marshal, and Hitler quickly became absorbed in planning. Moreover, he wanted and needed a big success that would attract worldwide attention and no doubt sensed that Manstein was the man who could get it for him. Manstein, however, insisted on first closing the gap between Armeeabteilung Kempf and First Panzer Army. Kharkov, he argued, could wait but the army group could not survive if the gap remained, particularly since the spring thaw, which might start any time, would for several weeks rule out any attempt to close it. Hitler refused to give in, and in the end an accident decided the argument. On 18 February the SS Totenkopf Division reported that its vehicles were stuck in mud east of Kiev, and Manstein persuaded Hitler that if SS Panzer Corps had not been able to hold Kharkov with two of its divisions, it would certainly not be able to retake it without the third.

During the night of 18 February the train carrying Headquarters, Fourth Panzer Army, arrived in Zaporozhye. Hoth had turned his front on the Mius over to Armeeabteilung Hollidt the day before, after being ordered to transfer to Dnepropetrovsk. At the Army Group South headquarters Manstein outlined the army's mission orally to Hoth. He told him he intended to create a new Fourth Panzer Army in the gap between Armeeabteilung Kempf and First Panzer Army. Hoth's first assignment would be to stop the First Guards and Sixth Armies east of Dnepropetrovsk and throw them back across the Samara River. Von Mackensen would stretch his left flank west and northwest to narrow the gap. Fourth Panzer Army would be given two panzer corps headquarters, two panzer divisions, and two infantry divisions from Armeeabteilung Hollidt and First Panzer Army; and it would take over from Armeeabteilung Kempf the Headquarters, SS Panzer Corps, with the SS Divisions Das Reich and Totenkopf. Manstein intended to provide three or four more infantry divisions later.

Before he left Zaporozhye, Hitler, on 19 February, called in Kleist and directed him to evacuate as many Army Group A troops as possible from the Taman bridgehead and transfer them to Army Group South. In the next eight days 50,000 men were airlifted out of the bridgehead, and by 6 March the number had risen to 100,000. But the gain for Army Group South was less than it appeared because the planes could carry only troops, not weapons and equipment.

Even though Hitler's decision to rectify the mistake of sending nearly a half million men into isolation on the Taman Peninsula came too late, Army Group South was able to extract at least one important dividend from the disasters of the previous months. Since December 1942 the OKL had supplied reinforcements to Richtofen's'.
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It is now clear that in fact, Hitler was planning to get rid from Manstein, but the present situation was so dangerous that he was clueless to what to do and simply let Manstein freedom to start his castling and plan his famous backhand bow. The last statement also note that Luftwaffe was somewhat relieved for the counter-strike, and events would show that Richtofen's planes were key for success.

So your theory about elastic defense depending on knowing of where to expect an attack is destroyed by Manstein's castling. The example of Bagration is vague since Manstein wasn't in command and the Luftwaffe presence was extremely limited thus depriving Heeresgruppe Mitte from vital reconnaissance. One of the principles of elastic defense is to gain at least local air superiority, and since that didn't happen on 22 June 1944, we can't call that an elastic defense.

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Mansteirn's Elastic Defense Feb - March 1944

TiredOldSoldier Ace

LJAd Well-Known Member

Triton New Member

LJAd Well-Known Member

Triton New Member

patriceXXI New Member

Jesica New Member

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