More capable: Panzer Division 1941 or US Armored Division 1944?

For deep, long range operations?
I ask this question because it's when both countries fielded their best troops.

(Providing that the Panzer Division 1941 had German 1944 weapons, of course)..... Let's say two Panzer IV long barreled battalions with a company of Tiger I?


For the Panzer Division 1941 (updated with 1944 equipment)

IE.
One battalion of SPW mounted Panzergrenadiers and three batteries of self propelled artillery (2 battery 105mm Wespes, 1 battery 150mm Hummel). Two battalions of mortorized artillery remain.

& Infantry is similiarily upgraded with German 1944 panzergrenadier & panzerpioneer equipment.

 

Do you mean the US Heavy Armored Divisions like the 2nd or 3rd? Or the Light Armored Divisions Like the 4th or 6th?

 

The regular armored divisions.

 

The 4th and 6th AD then.

 

Yes, with all the American advantages over the Panzer division (fully mechanized artillery 105mm, all Armored infantry regiments mounted on halftrack), better engineering, etc.) and disadvantages (inferior tanks and SPW, personnel quality & doctrine, etc.)

 

Each was a leader in it's field for it's time. Could the American Armored division of 44 have existed without the German Panzer division of 41...why would it? Evolution through conflict.

Both used roughly the same operational doctrine. Patton was as true to the concept of blitzkrieg as Rommel was. I would argue that Germany could only have wished for the industrial capacity to produce a fully mechanized force in 41. The Americans learned their lessons well and incorporated a greater element of tactical aviation than did the Germans...which given the revolutionary make up of the Panzer Division in 41 is saying somthing.

I believe the training standards in the Wermacht were greater than in allied armies (Before anyone jumps on me for that let me say I'm Canadian and I DO throw us into that statement as well...even though it annoys me to do so (patriot you know)...but hey fairs fair and those Germans were some tough SOB's to be sure). It took the Western allies from June to May to do what it took the Germans only a few months to do. And that was with numerical and air superiority and the Soviets hammering away from the East.

My preference materialy would be for the American Division. It was uniform in it's mobility, self sufficient and could call upon a much higher degree of firepower and logistical support than could the Panzer Division. The Americans had a better rationalization scheme than did the Germans. Almost all armored (tracked) vehicles were based on a similar chassis so would not tax logisitics as badly as the Germans who realy had to many different models in use at once.

I'd go with the American...my 2 cents!

 

Comparing a hypotetical formation like your panzer and a real life one is nearly impossible but as the teoretical TOE of the 1944 division did not change much from 1941 a 1944 comparison assuming the levels of training common to 1941 makes sense.
So we have:
US Armoured division:
3 x Combat commands each made up of roughly one battallion of armour, one of infantry and one of fully mecanized arty. Support elements like AT, AA and engineers (roughy one batallion of each) was split amongst the CCs with the first two (CCA and CCB) getting the lion's share while the third (CCR) was slightly weaker.
Standard German division (assuming such a thing exists):
2 Batallions of medium armour (Panthers an Pz IVs no tigers as these were army assets for most of the war)
4 Batallions of infantry only one of which has armoured half tracks
3 batallions of artillery (one tracked) of 105 and 150mm guns
1 armoured recon batallion
1 Combat engineer batallion
1 AA batallion (this is where the 88s are)
1 Anti tank batallion (that may have either towed or tracked guns).
The division usually fought as kampfgruppes, roughly equivalent to US task forces, which varied from batallion to regiment in size. My impression is this was sometimes by choice (as when a full strength division split for advancing on parallel roads) and sometimes dictated by events (as when all surviving tanks and APCs were grouped in a KG that acted as a fire brigade for the rest of the division or even for the whole corps the division belonged to).

The similarities are great. If we assume full strength units the German formation is a slightly larger and more capable formation, it has less tanks (2 battallions + the Stugs in the PzJ batallion and ACs in the recon batallion) but more infantry and is more capable of long range operations by itself. The US division was designed expecting that the Infantry would follow on weels so the large gaps between the panzer spearheads and the PBI that were common in german operations would never happen.

BTW I think the strongest Heer Panzers on paper where the 1942 AGS (case blue) ones that received one additional panzer batallion by stripping the ones in AGC and AGN.

 

Combat Command actually is the American Kampfgruppe. The Combat Command had no fixed TO&E and the division commander had complete power over how the division's battalions would be distributed in each of the combat command. For example 4th Armored Division almost always fought with just two Combat Commands and one of them would be substantially larger, controlling the majority of the division's supporting assets in order to complete the main objectives while the smaller combat command supported it. The use of Task Forces proliferated in the 3d and 2d Armored Division because the heavy divisions were too big for just three comabt commands no matter how you cut it, and they needed attatched infantry from other divisions to fight effectively in any case so a TF structure is natural.

 

I'd rate an American Armored Division to be more capable in equipment for long range independent operations because of superior mobility, due to the mechanization of its artillery, better and more plentiful radios, and enough armored halftracks to protect all of its motorized infantry. The Panzer Division was nowhere close to having the kind of artillery and close air support an American Armored Division possessed.

 

--------->industrial capacity


Now who would've predicted that conclusion

 

How fully motorized was the German formation?

In combat didn't the US divisions usually have significantly more attached units?

By 44 I'm not sure that an experianced US division had much if any inferiority troop wise compared to the Germans. A "green" German unit from 41 probably would have had such an advantage over a "green" US unit in 44 especially in the NCO and junior officer areas.

 

There are some who would argue some basic presumptions;
The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and ... - Google Book Search
The German Army of WWII was basically the German Army of WWI with armour and totalitarian discipline. They are generally accounted as quite good at what they did. I guess I would have vote for OUR GUYS and not just for nationalistic reasons-they had learned quite a lot and had the superior manufacturing base and supply. If the German Army were "the Spartans of Central europe" the allied formations learned much-and even surpassed-their "teachers."
JeffinMNUSA

 

If we compare the two with typical corps slices (that is normally attached units) then the US division is easily far more capable.

The German 1941 division would have had two or three (usually two) battalions of tanks each with three companies of 17 to 22 tanks each for a total of about 150 tanks in the division.
There would have been two regiments of panzergrenadier with one battalion equipped with armored half tracks for transport. The other three would have been in a mix of two wheel drive and four wheel drive trucks and motor vehicles.
The divisional anti-tank battalion would have had a mix of towed AT guns and one or two companies of self-propelled AT guns like the Marder. There would also be one company of 2cm AA guns in the unit usually.
The divisional artillery would have consisted of almost entirely, or entirely towed guns with typically two battalions of 10.5cm and one of 15cm guns. SP artillery like the Wespe and Hummel were rarities in 1941.
The engineer battalion was orgainzed more as assault infantry than as a construction unit and as such was generally used in that role.
The division reconnissance battalion had typically one or two armored car companies and two or three infantry companies in either motorcycles, light vehicles, or light half tracks.
The division also had typical supporting services, all motorized.
Often attached was either a Heer or Luftwaffe 8.8cm battery or battalion mostly for anti-tank use rather than as flak. Artillery attachments were iffy at best. Additional engineers for bridging or construction might get attached if called for.

The US light armored division of 1944 had three tank battalions of four companies each. These had a total of 52 tanks giving the division about 175 total AFV. Each battalion had far more maintaince assets than its German counterpart. For example, each battalion had more recovery vehicles than the entire German panzer division had typically.
There are three battalions of armored infantry. These have vastly more heavy weapons than their German counterparts have (except machineguns) and are completely mounted in armored halftrack vehicles.
The artillery component is three battalions of 18 105mm guns each on self propelled chassis (M7s).
The mechanized cavalry squadron had four troops (companies) with a mix of armored cars and infantry mounted in jeeps. These had an extraordinary amount of heavy weapons for their size in a mix of machineguns and mortars. There was a light tank company of 17 M5 and a cannon company with 8 M8 MGC.
The engineer battalion is primarily a construction unit and is heavily equipped with mechanized construction equipment including bulldozers, cranes, dump trucks, road graders, etc. Their primary function is to ensure that the division can cross obstacles like rivers and to open and repair roads in the division's rear to allow supplies forward.
There are also typical division services available all fully motorized in off-road 6 x 6 trucks etc.
Typical 1944 attachments might include:
A 155 mm SP battalion of M12
One or more artillery battalions (towed or SP)
An SP automatic AA battalion with 32 M15 and 32 M16 halftracks
One or more additional engineer battalions (motorized).
A second mechanized cavalry squadron
An infantry battalion (seperate) or one attached from an infantry division.
A tank destroyer battalion with 36 M 18 or M 36 tank destroyers.

Assuming equal proficiency, the US unit is far more capable offensively. It also has far more mobility, especially in areas where the road net is poor or there are alot of natural terrain obstacles to cross.
Typically, the US division could bridge a major river in about a day when advancing. The German division would have taken 48 to 72 hours to complete this mission. The US division is capable of not only maintaining roads but building them too, something the German unit cannot do.
In communications the US unit has nearly infinitely more radios and telephones than the German one. The Germans are still heavily dependent on motorcycle messengers, etc. to commuicate.
There isn't much to choose between the tank element or capacity in either division. The US one does have the advantage of having a far superior maintenance capacity to the German division.
In artillery the German division is particularly deficient. Their artillery is towed. There is not alot of it. What there is cannot easily or readily be massed for fires. The US division has its artillery all self-propelled not only giving it more tubes but greatly increasing the efficency of those tubes (ie being self-propelled is a force multiplier in itself).
The one bright spot in the German division is it has far more infantry. There are four versus three battalions. Plus realistically the Germans have a fifth in their engineer element and somewhat more manpower as infantry in their recon element.
On the whole, the German division would be about equally capable defensively to the US division but sadly deficient offensively. The biggest drawbacks to the German division on the offensive are its inability to readily improve roads and cross obstacles, the lack of full off-road motorization, and the poor ability (relatively speaking) to coordinate far flung elements of the division by radio / telephone as it advances.

 

John Moiser's book is not one I would recommend in any way whatsoever. Here's a review I wrote several years ago:

Moiser's The Blitzkrieg Myth can probably best be summed up by the heading of one of his own chapters; The Persistence of Failed Ideas. This in a nutshell, is this book.
Moiser starts off by discussing the underlying theories and development of military thinking up to the beginning of the war. He chooses just two primary theorists to base his case on; Fuller and Douhet. The problem here is that Moiser draws the conclusion that these two authors are archetypical of all strategic thought of the period as applied to land and air warfare. This can best be summed up "So far as ground warfare went, Fuller's ideas reigned supreme. All French and German theorists studied his writings carefully....But Fuller's Plan 1919 became the controlling paradigm for effective ground warfare" [pg 18]
Nothing could be further from the truth. Fuller was essentially ignored in Britain where both he and Liddell Hart were turned into pariahs by the Royal Army for their vitriolic views of the future of war.
In France, the Ecole Superieure de Guerre developed the doctrine of "methodical battle" totally independent of anything Fuller suggested. If anything, methodical battle advocated precisely the opposite of what Fuller wrote about. General Gamelin went so far as to order that all articles, lectures, books, etc. that French officers might write had to be approved by the high command before publication. DeGaulle remained a colonel for breaking this edict.
With the Germans, their doctrine was a logical progression from the stroßtruppen tactics of late WW I. They developed the deep infiltration battle as their view of what would win in future wars. This, in 1939 became popularized as the Blitzkrieg. It was hardly a reality of what Fuller envisioned.
Moiser then turns to technical topics: Fortifications and tanks. On the Maginot Line he waxes eloquent at length about its strengths. Yet, even during the 1940 campaign the Germans found it possible to defeat the line, in part in practice and, in part in theory, using direct fire from 88 and 105 mm AA guns. A later offensive operation during the French campaign against the Rhine defenses proved the viability of this technique, something the French had not thought of and did not design the Maginot Line to be proof against.
Moiser does get right that Hitler spent too much capital on fortifications of his own at the expense of other equipment. But, in tying German tank production to this he stretches at best.
On the subject of tanks, Moiser sticks to basics when comparing vehicles: Armor, firepower, mobility. He brushes off such things as radios or lack thereof, crew efficiency or, visibility from the vehicle. The Tiger and Panther are characterized as failures. But, the Sherman is too for being unable to stand up to these vehicles. The T-34 is claimed to be the only really successful tank of the war, while the diminutive and cramped Hetzer is claimed to be the best tank destroyer.
On air warfare, Moiser derides the Allies for being overly focused on the strategic bombing of Germany to the detriment of tactical air support. He conveniently overlooks the contributions of the Allied Tactical Air Forces that rivaled the strategic bombing forces in size. With the Germans he claims exactly the opposite is true: That they ignored strategic bombing for tactical support. Neither is really the case but, this is never discussed. Moiser also overlooks the really minor role tactical close support played for the Germans both in Poland and France.
On the various campaigns Moiser's overall argument is that each (Poland, France, and the later Allied advances across France) were all broad front operations successful more by hard infantry fighting all along the front than anything due to narrow breakthroughs and fast armored columns advancing across the enemy rear. This ignores the effects of the breakthrough at Sedan, Saint Lo and, dozens of other such operations both in the West and East in the Second World War.
In between, Moiser hurls literary grenades at various generals, doctrines and, battles deriding all as failures to recognize the reality of warfare as he describes it in his book. The overall effect is amateurish. His bibliography, likewise, reflects a selection of generally popular sources that give no depth to his arguments.

 

Great analysis TA!
But an element you miss with German capabilities is their ability to "take a lickin' and come up tickin'". Totalitarian discipline lay at the heart of the German-and Soviet-war machines- and to put it short and brief; "anyone who does not do exactly as we say WILL BE SHOT." Democratic countries do not have the option of mass shootings of their soldiers, nor should they. It is an inherent weakness in the System of the democracies that the mass terror weapon is not available-though it is historically an effective tool (no combat fatigue in the totalitarian armies!).
I guess we will have to work with what we have at hand...
JeffinMNUSA
PS. I tend to agree with you on Mosier-Blitzkreig was a terrifying FACT to millions of people on the devasted European continent about 60 years back. I suppose people will be knocking heads on just what happened there for a very long time though. As I have been able to ascertain the German Army used their mobile reserve in critical sectors as a high tech "big brother" to their WWI style conventional divisions. Mosier's contention that the battle of France was not so much of a military disaster as a loss of will in the face of a few local defeats is well...interesting (I have always suspected that the French military has gotten a bad rap since WWII-and that they had no idea about who they were being ordered to surrender to) .
A link; http://books.google.com/books?id=vg...X&oi=book_result&resnum=9&ct=result#PPA132,M1
Another; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1555835/Germany-to-pardon-last-troops-Hitler-executed.html And I do believe the Soviet numbers are much higher.

 

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IMHO the truth is closer to no combat fatigue allowed in totalitarian armies which is a big plus only for short campaigns. When the fighting continued for months or years without interruption the result was that the germans units left "in the line" were mostly combat ineffective, or at least very brittle, due to accumulated combat fatigue.

I don't agee with TA, we should limit the comparison to the divisional assets, if you add in corps level battallion sized assets on one side why not a panzerjaeger or tiger batallion to the other? it was far from unusual for a panzer to have one of those attached and if we start that way we will end up with something like HG or GD more similar to a corps than to a division. The "light" US division has 7 manouver batallions including the recon element but not the engineers that would only be used for combat in emergencies, the germans have 9 (two armour, four inf, the recon, the engineers and the panzerjaegers) so even if the US are close in firepopwer (and I'm not fully convinced of that as the german have lots of mortars including some really nasty 120mm) the germans have more staing power as their formation is larger. In a one on one match without attached troops my money is on the germans even considering a"normal" 1944 TOE and not the unit thy would have liked to build which was the Normandy Pz. Lehr, what prevented them from doing it was not doctrine but insufficient industrial output.
As a long range penetration unit the US formation fares better as the only german tank really capable of long range operations is the Pz IV, the Pz V is still too unreliable and the Tigers were not meant for that role, on the other hand I would not underestimate the construction capability of the german engineers, while not so lavishly equipped as the US they generally got the job done nearly as fast.
In real life the 1944 germans are likely to be understrength, low of ammo, and with a mix of worn out veterans and insufficiently trained replacements, but the assumption was levels of training, morale and ammo typical to 1941 but with 1944 equipment.

 

Yeah, that's why I mentioned two battalions of Panzer IVs instead of the mixed Panther/Panzer IV regiment typical of 1944. And with a tiger company, which was attached to various heer and SS panzer divisions in 1943.

If the Germans waited a few years to launch the war, they'd most likely have much more SPW and self-propelled artillery than those that I listed. (though possibly not of the hummell/wespe type)

 

I went with the corps slice since that is how these divisions virtually always fought. I didn't include a Tiger battalion for the Germans because their presence in panzer units was rare. They generally fought more or less independent of panzer divisions and were rarely attached. You may find that a surprise, but it is historically accurate. Aside from that, there were very few Tigers in 1941.
The same is true of independent Panzerjäger battalions. These generally were not assigned to panzer divisions but rather infantry formations to bulk them up. Again, in 1941 most panzerjäger battalions were towed in any case.
A few elite divisions like HG or GD mentioned above did have a Tiger company assigned in their TO & E some of the time when the tanks were available for it. But, this constitutes the exception, not the rule. Additionally, this only started to occur in very late 1942 early 1943 at the very earliest.

The German panzer division's artillery fire power in 1941 is almost entirely in the artillery regiment. This had 12 105mm and 6 15cm guns normally. There are just 6 81mm mortars per infantry battalion and a heavy infantry gun battery of 6 15cm (towed or SP depending on availability) in the "13th" Company of the regiment.
By 1944 this is revised to 8 105cm, 4 15cm towed and 12 105 sp along with 6 15 cm sp in the artillery regiment, 6 81mm and 4 12cm (when available) in each PzGr Bn, along with 6 15cm SP Grille or Bison at the regiment level. None of the panzergrenadier regiment artillery is tied at division level.
This is against the US division having 3 105 Shermans or 3 M7 per tank battalion, 54 M7 in the artillery battalions, 6 60mm and 3 81mm mortars per AI battalion and 8 M8 MGC in the cavalry regiment.
All of the above firepower except the mortars is tied to the division fire control net. The Germans only tie the artillery regiment at division level. Even then, it was more common for the batteries of the regiment to be assigned to specific units for a mission rather than be in general support.
Alot of what kept the Germans from building a "better" panzer division throughout the war wasn't nearly so much lack of industrial output but rather simple slop and wastage in the field through an inability to keep what they did have running and repaired. For the Germans, artillery was always in short supply once the war got going. Between losses and heavy wastage in non-combat losses the Germans were always hurting for tubes. Later in the war the shortage of ammunition only made things worse. This shortage was brought on largely by the huge increase in flak units protecting German cities. When a single Allied bomber strike might cause the expenditure of up to 10,000 shells it puts a perspective on just how messed up German manufacturing priorities were.

 

In 1941 the typical panzer division had three companies per battalion and two battalions assigned. There were just 6 out of over 20 panzer divisions at that point that had 3 battalions in them.
The battalions themselves were generally composed of two Pz IIIG/H companies and one of Pz IVE or F models. There would also generally be about 6 to 10 Pz II assigned mostly as security and scouting vehicles in the battalion HQ. Some divisions were still using Pz 38t or 35t (like the 6th and 7th) instead of the Pz III.

The all Pz IV division really never existed. By late 1943 most divisions were running one battalion of Pz IV or possibly two weak battalions of Pz III and IV while the other assigned battalion was withdrawn for retraining with the Pz V. By mid 44 the typical make up was one Pz IV and one Pz V battalion although some divisions still hadn't gotten their Pz V battalion back on line.

 

Tiger deployment is a very confused affair, as is most german TOE once you drill down a bit, in late 42/ early 43 when the first tigers reached the front there were both tiger companies attached to selected divisions and independent batallions, later the companies mostly disappeared but the batallions themseves were sometimes attached to divisions. Having an additional Panzer of PzJaeger batallion attached is very unlikely as there were none to attach in 41 but not in 44, the only independent "panzer" sub-units I can think of in 1941 are the flammpanzers, that operated as army troops, and a couple of batallions in Norway, all the available tanks were used to build as many panzer divisions as possible as the germans believed that the combined arms division was the most effective way to use tanks . A "panzer" division may have anything from one to three armoured batallions in 1942-44 but two was the most common.
What is interesting in your post is that the 1941 unit is significantly lighter in artillery assets than the 1944 one which is something I had overlooked, if we go with the "1941 unit with 1944 equipment" comparison it would be short of tubes though it may have a third tank batallion.
I agree that a two batallion Pz IV unit probably never existed but some mid/late 43 favoured formations may be close, the PzIII was phased out of production as battle tank, most N models went as escort tanks in the tiger units, and Panthers were a rarity so what is left? (sometimes the answer was Stugs but it may have been PzIV in some cases).