Myth buster threads: comments

Then whould someone bother to develop tactic in which some tank have to keep Panther busy while the other try to outflank him,majority of the german tanks in wqestern front were destroyed by the aviation or abondened becouse they run out of fuel.

 

Source please. Considering the dismal hit rates with rockets (Cue Tony Williams) and air power in general, what do you base this assumption on?

Why not try to maximise your firepower? Afterall 5 Tigers acting together are more likely to take out a single Tiger than if they attack it one at a time, if this were to happen would we assume the first 5 tanks were inferior? Even though this refers to identical tanks?

Why not maximise your numerical advantage if you have it? It doesn't necessarily mean that you have a technological inferiority if you do so, it's simply common sense.

The German Army did much the same in the Blitzkrieg, using superior combined arms tactics to defeat individuals or small pockets of French Armour, in this case it was French doctrine that was deficient not equipment, yet we don't here horror stories of how it took 4 or 5 Panzers to defeat a single Char or Somua. (Read Len Deighton, Blitzkreig)

Again I ask for your sources rather than your suppositions.

What was the breakdown of Panzer losses on the Western Front according to you? You claim the majority were lost to air or self destruction, so what were the numbers? And where did you get them from?

I'll also repeat, what "revolutions" did the Panther and T-34 bring?

 

Let me see now,if tanks apear and with it design and capabilities puts entire german inventory of tanks obsolete you wouldn,t call that one revolution.Both tanks had sloped armor and large individualy-sprung road wheels with high wheel travel.

Only American weapon in July 1944 that could kill Panther from the front and in realistic range was 90mm AA gun and 105 mm howitzer firing shaped-charge warhead.Only weapon that could take on Panther was M-36 which had 90 mm gun mounted and this came in September 1944 before this one there was no allied tank that could take head on with this one.

 

Define obsolete. The PzIV was capable of going head to head with the T34 throughout its career, as I believe was the Stug. Hardly obsolete considering these were the two chasis Germany went to war with in 1939.

Sloped armour wasn't exactly revolutionary, neither AFAIK was the road wheel arrangement. Certainly neither individually or in concert revolutionised armoured warfare.

Define also realistic range. AFAIK the 76mm armed Shermans had a good chance of engaging and killing German Armour. The 17lber moreso, although this was a British weapon it was also mounted on the Sherman.

I will ask you again to clarify your earlier points, how can the T34 be so vastly superior to the Sherman if by your own words in Korea the only difference was in crew quality?

 

Why do you think they rushed with their new tank designs,surely not becouse PzIV was capable to go head to head with T-34,I am not a person who will write a memo here about this two tanks at that time.

You will also need to check some books about this one and you will be suprised how T-34 and Panther were able to gain better of road performance and why were they better in rough or snowy terain than the Brithis and American tanks.

Yes they could engage and kill german armour but not the best armour.

I thought that I answered that one.

 

Did they rush? I'm not asking you to write a memo necessarily, simply provide the sources you base your opinion on. What I have heard on here and in some books is that the PzIV with modifications was able to take on the T34. Yes it proved a shock to the Germans that the backwards Slavs were able to come up with something so good, but in terms of armour protection and firepower I believer the PzIV at various points equalled or bettered the contemporary T34.

So provide references. Please provide some references as to the comparable cross-country manouvrability, if these are so readily available you wont find it difficult.

What do you mean by the best armour? That which wasn't self-destroyed or taken out by jabos? Again, the general gleaning of this forum seems to indicate that the 76mm armed Shermans were capable of taking out Tigers and Panthers at practical combat ranges. What do you mean by the best armour? Types please.

Again, please define realistic range. How did this differ between Soviet and US weapons?

No, you didn't. Either the Sherman and T34 were comparable or they weren't either way one of your statements contradicts the other.

 

Wow this debate has certainly exploded

In response to some replies...
I believe that Korean War Shermans were equipped with modern suspension, and new fire-control systems, and were using the superior AT ammunition of the 1950's whereas Korean T-34's were using vintage WW2 rounds, and often the wrong kind...

As for the superiority of the 17 pounder over the 85mm, that is as much about the round as it is the weapon... The APDS shot gave the 17 pounder superior penetration to the 85mm, but at the expense of all other aspects... Most notably accuracy and damage upon contact... Furthermore use of the APDS round was a rarity in WW2... Far more common was the APCBC round, which most 17 pounders were equipped with... APCBC had slightly poorer penetration that the 85mm, and as it is the standard 17 pounder round it is what I was referring to in my argument... Use of APDS rounds was really not that common in WW2.

As for armor I believe that Sherman's did not actually possess better protection than the T-34/85 at any time in WW2... Post WW2 is another story, again because the Sherman was developed and the T-34 was not etc. etc... I believe that late war Sherman's had slightly thicker hull armor than the 1943 model T-34/85... Though the 1944 model T-34/85 had thicker armor all round... And since we are comparing late war Shermans, it would be unfair to compare their armor to an early T-34/85


If you are considering BHN values then you must remember that the Russians followed the American example, and all late-war production tanks were made with similar quality steel (in terms of BHN at least) to that used by the Americans... Including the T-34/85... Again, late war Shermans should not be mistakenly compared with early T-34/85... T-34/85's produced in 1945 had more flexible armor, though doubtless they saw far less comabt than their 1943 veteran counterparts, thus accounts of brittle armor shattering are far more common...

The problem I see is that we are making the mistake of comparing Shermans produced in 1945 with T-34/85's produced in 1943... Late war T-34/85's saw improvements as well, and should not be neglected...

I agree that late war Shermans may have been on-par with late war T-34/85... But certainly they were not noticably better than them as the mythbusters thread would have us believe...

 

If you want to find more about why the 76mm armed Sherman was not enough to deal with Panther you should look in BOOKS not in forums.

 

Surprisingly despite the fact that due to less armour Allied tanks were generally smaller and lighter than their opponents, their mobility was somewhat inferior due to suspension and track designs that had high ground pressure. When tracked vehicles traverse soft ground, the pressure under the track rises and falls as the bogie wheels of the track run over the track itself, as in effect a tracked vehicle is a continuous track-laying device. The average of the peaks of ground pressure, the MMP, is determined by factors such as vehicle weight, track width, track pitch, and the number and size of bogie wheels, with the lower the MMP the better. Due to experiences with soft ground in Russia and the adaptation of large diameter overlapping bogie wheel suspension for axle loading and suspension travel concerns, German tanks such as the Mk V Panther and Mk IV Tiger had low MMP’s of 150 and 230 respectively. Even the Tiger II, weighing over 65 tonnes, had a MMP of only 184. Therefore this would appear to give these tanks huge advantages in soft going over tanks such as the M4 Sherman at 282 and the Cromwell IV at 352. This was born out in practical experience where, especially in snowy or muddy conditions, Allied tankers repeatedly found that Panthers and Tigers could drive where their own tanks would risk bogging and immobilization.

After D-Day, the Tigers remained rare but Panthers became about 50% of all German tanks on the Western Front so the Army deployed 76 mm-gun Shermans to Normandy in July 1944. The higher-velocity 76 mm gun M1 gun gave Shermans anti-tank firepower comparable to many of the lighter German AFVs it encountered, particularly the Pz IV, and StuG vehicles. However, with a regular AP (Armour Piercing, Shot) ammunition (M79) or APCBC (M62) shells, the 76 mm could only reliably knock out a Panther with a shot to its flank or to the front from very close range and so the Sherman remained badly outmatched by the Panther whose higher velocity 75mm gun could easily penetrate the Sherman's frontal armor at all typical combat ranges. This contributed to very high Sherman tank losses during the Normandy Campaign.

Armour protection was the first drawback of Allied tanks, as it tended to be too thin and had poor sloping compared to the latest German designs. The main Allied tank, the American M4 Sherman, had armour thickness not exceeding 51 mm in the front, and the British equivalent, the Cromwell, was not much better with 76 mm. The tank destroyers, which had the main task officially of seeking out and destroying German armour, had even thinner armour, only 12 mm on the M 18 Hellcat. On the other hand the main German tank in 1944-45, the Panther, had armour up to 110mm thick, which furthermore was very well sloped, making it even more effective at deflecting shells. The heavy counterpart to the Panther, the Tiger II, had sloped armour of up to 180mm in thickness. Therefore allied crews turned to adding additional armour plate, sandbags, logs, even concrete to the front of their tanks, despite the fact that this was often ineffective, with shots penetrating layers of sandbags, the armour plate, and then exploding inside the crew compartment. A hit on an Allied tank usually meant a penetration instead of a ricochet, even at ranges of 3000 yards, something that was very discouraging for the crews. The fact that the heavier sloped armour on the front of a Panther normally deflected Allied tank shells in a head to head meeting made this doubly discouraging, and Allied commanders were shocked by the first reports of tank losses in Normandy

The greatest deficiency of all was armament. Allied tankers repeatedly complained about the inability of their main armament to punch holes in the opposing armour. The most common gun that Allied tanks possessed, a short 75 mm, simply did not have enough punch to tackle a Panther frontally at anything but point blank range. A new longer and more powerful 76 mm gun that was being introduced was not much better. Neither gun was any comparison to the long 75 mm gun of the Panther, whose higher muzzle velocity gave it not only higher penetrating power, but also a flat trajectory and therefore excellent accuracy. Compounding these difficulties German sights had greater magnification and clearness, and the gunpowder used was lower in flash and smoke. Therefore Panthers and Tigers developed tactics in which they would often sit in open terrain, daring Allied tanks to show up, then knocking them out with accurate long-range gun fire that could not be replied to. Incidents would happen in which Allied tankers bounced numerous rounds off their German counterpart, only to be knocked out immediately if they were hit once.

The net result of all of these deficiencies was that advancing was much slower and more expensive in terms of tanks and infantry than it otherwise would have been. Five hundred burning British tanks at the end of the failed operation Goodwood made dramatic testimony to the disadvantages that inferior tanks brought on to the Allies. Total Allied armour causalities in Normandy were running at three times the German total. The tankers kept fighting but costs were extremely high and the men were losing confidence in their tanks, despite usually having superior numbers.

Eventually the Allies blasted their way out of Normandy with the aid of 3300 planes dropping a total of 14,000 tons of bombs in three hours, literally obliterating anything in the path of the advance with a tonnage of bombs only exceeded by Hiroshima. Advantages in numbers, a willingness to take losses, and massive advantages in artillery, air support, fuel and supplies made it possible for the Allies to advance in Western Europe and eventually win. However the inability to produce a tank that could take on the panzers on even terms and the terrible causalities that this caused in men and machines is something that should not be forgotten.

 

The T-34 is often used as a symbol for the effectiveness of the Soviet counterattack against the Germans. The appearance of the T-34 in the summer of 1941 was a psychological shock to German soldiers, who had been prepared to face an inferior Soviet enemy; this is shown by Alfred Jodl's diary, who seems to have been taken by surprise at the appearance of the T-34 in Riga. The T-34 could take on all 1941 German tanks effectively. However, the new tank suffered from severe mechanical problems, especially with its transmission and clutch—at least fifty percent of the first summer's total tank losses were due to breakdowns rather than German fire, although this also included old tanks in disrepair (Zaloga & Grandsen 1984:127). There was a shortage of recovery and repair equipment, and it was not uncommon for early T-34s to go into combat carrying a spare transmission on the engine deck. The mechanical troubles were eventually sorted out.

During the winter of 1941–42, the T-34 again dominated German tanks through its ability to move over deep mud or snow without bogging down. German tanks simply could not move over the same terrain the T-34 could handle. The German infantry, at that time armed mostly with PaK 36 37mm and PaK 38 50mm towed antitank guns, had no effective means of stopping T-34s. Only the poor level of Soviet crew training and the ineptitude of Soviet commanders prevented the T-34 from achieving greater success.

The emphasis in the Red Army in 1942–43 was on rebuilding the losses of 1941 and improving tactical proficiency. T-34 production increased rapidly, but the design was 'frozen'—generally, only improvements that sped production were adopted. Soviet designers were well aware of the need to correct certain deficiencies in the design, but these improvements would have cost production time and could not be adopted. By mid-1943 T-34 production was running at about one thousand tanks per month, much higher than the German rate. However, Soviet losses greatly exceeded German losses due to continued tactical inferiority.

In response to the T-34, the Germans were beginning to field larger numbers of high-velocity PaK 40 75mm guns, both towed and self-propelled. They were also able to put the Tiger heavy tank into the field in late 1942 and Panther medium tank by 1943. By mid-war the T-34 no longer held technical superiority over German tanks. Loss ratios remained unfavourable to the Soviets; as their technical superiority waned, their tactical proficiency was not catching up fast enough.



Combat effectiveness of early war T-34s can best be evaluated in terms of 'hard' factors—armour, firepower, and mobility—and 'soft' factors: ergonomic features such as ease of use, vision devices, crew task layout and so forth. The T-34 was outstanding in hard factors and poor in soft ones.

The 'big three' of tank design have always been armour, firepower, and mobility. The T-34 had an outstanding balance of all three throughout its World War II life cycle. In 1941 its thick, sloped armour could defeat all German anti-armour weapons at normal ranges. T-34s could be knocked out only by the towed 88mm Flak guns or at close range by 50mm and 75mm short-barrelled tank guns. The majority of German tanks in 1941 did not have 75mm guns; indeed 37mm guns were far more common. By mid-1942 the T-34 was vulnerable to improved German weapons and remained so throughout the war, but its armour protection was equal to or superior to comparable tanks such as the US M4 Sherman or German Pzkw-IV. In terms of firepower, the T-34's 76mm gun could penetrate any 1941 German tank with ease. This gun also fired an adequate HE round. In 1943, the 76mm was out-ranged by the Panther's long 75mm and the Tiger's 88mm. The introduction of the Soviet 85mm gun in 1944 did not make the T-34-85 equal in firepower, but the 85mm could penetrate both Panthers and Tigers at reasonable ranges.

In terms of mobility, the T-34's wide track, good suspension and large engine gave it unparalleled cross-country performance. First-generation German tanks could not begin to keep up.

Overall then, in hard factors the T-34 was the worldwide trend-setter for tank development in the first half of the war.

 

He was having a poke at the Nazi's not the Slavs... You know, the whole "superior race complex"... and how they thought the Slavs were backward

 

Leave off the personal insults in future. As Smeghead pointed out, it was a dig at the Nazis' ideology not my opinion. I would have hoped that much was obvious. You've read all my posts? Really, all 2,600+ of them? Even if you have don't presume that you know the slightest thing about me from my posts on an internet forum.

Forums are flawed true, but then so are books, the posters on here have used sources to back up their arguments which is why overall I trust their arguments.

I haven't had time yet to read your entire arguments, hopefully I will do soon and then I'll respond, without resorting to insults.

 

Well i would like to apologize from my side i did overreacted and in a manner that was not sutable,once again you have my apology for what i previously said.I will delete that post because it doesn,t fell right to be there.

I agree with that ,but from what you saw written on those 3 myth buster themes don,t you think that you should ask some evidence for what was written there.

The things that i presented there come from books,they don,t come because i like one tank more than other or i respect one side more then the other one.

 

Do you have a source for that? from memory it should be the other way around.

 

As the guy who wrote the Sherman mythbuster, I'll try and answer the points raised, though you'll have to wait until I get home to my books (and get the opportunity).

As to the lack of references - basically, all the info (aside from the one or two bits that are referenced) comes from posts made on the forum, which were themselves supported by references. I am currently working on re-writing the Mythbusters as proper, fully referenced articles, but this might take some time.


And STOP the personal remarks and snide comments. :angry:

 

I went home during my lunch hour and wrote this, so please excuse its hasty nature and the lack of breadth in the sources used.


Ground pressure. The early Shermans (and the British cruiser designs) did have relatively narrow tracks for their size, which did increase ground pressure. Late-model Shermans with HVSS suspension had the wider T80 tracks to compensate, and all models could be fitted with ‘grousers’ to increase track width, though these were prone to damage. This issue was also a problem for the Pz.IV.

The Churchill had fewer issues with cross-country mobility, and was a renowned hill-climber, but also suffered from a relatively poor ground pressure.

The overlapping wheels of the Tiger I and Panther, while they provided an exceptionally smooth ride, aided the even distribution of the tank’s weight and even had the happy benefit of acting as a form of spaced armour for the lower hull, had drawbacks too. They easily became fouled with mud and slush, and in winter conditions this would freeze, immobilizing the tank until it was defrosted or chipped away. No good having superb grip on icy ground if your bogie wheels cannot move. Which brings me on to Track Design – all Western Allied tanks were at a disadvantage when it came to icy conditions, no question. However, most – and the Sherman in particular – had longer-lasting tracks. Ease of maintenance was prized above performance. All designs are a compromise. Why do you think that no tank since 1945 has employed overlapping road wheels?

76mm Sherman. By Normandy the 76mm gun Shermans had been in production for a full year, and was rapidly becoming the most common Sherman variant in use. Shermans with the 76mm gun had their frontal armour increased to 62mm, at a slope of 47 degrees (not sure if from vertical or horizontal). (Chamberlain & Ellis, “British and American Tanks of WW2”, (1969) pp 117)
The 76mm gun could penetrate 88mm of armour (30 degree slope) at 1,000 yards with APC, and 133mm with HVAP (Chamberlain & Ellis, “British and American Tanks of WW2”, (1969) pp 207). Combat ranges in NW Europe were seldom as great as 1,000 yards…

American Tank Destroyers were never intended to be heavily armoured. Their role was to ambush enemy armour, not to engage in a stand-up fight. This doctrine reached its zenith with the M18 Hellcat, which deliberately sacrificed armour protection for speed to enable it to employ ‘shoot and scoot’ tactics. The M18 was possibly the fastest AFV of the war, a very effective TD, and beloved by its crews. Allied TDs should not be compared to their German peers, which tended to receive heavier armour protection, due to a difference in doctrine involving their use.

Operation Goodwood was a big disaster, and a lot of British tanks were lost. The reason? They were not used properly. Goodwood was a very tank-heavy operation, with woefully inadequate infantry support. Why? Because Britain had lots of tanks available but not many infantry to waste. The result? Unsupported tanks were knocked out in large numbers. This is not due to any inferiority in the tank designs – a similar thing would happen to the tanks of all nations if they were misused in this fashion. How many of Goodwood’s losses were due to enemy AFVs? In addition, Goodwood involved an advance on a narrow front (due to English minefields!) against an enemy who knew they were coming (German Intelligence had even got the date correct). (Max Hastings, “Overlord”, (1984) pp 230-243 – the chapter titled ‘Goodwood’)

The use of Bombers to force a way out of Normandy. Tried several times, including in Operation Goodwood which you flag up as a failure, didn’t really work any time. Once they managed to bomb their own ground troops. Oh, and both the number of aircraft and the tonnage of bombs seems wrong. The bombing prior to Cobra was conducted by 1,600 planes. (Max Hastings, “Overlord”, (1984) pp 266-276 – the chapter titled ‘The Limits of Air Power’). ‘Overlord’ is full of great quotes discussing the essential uselessness of carpet bombing an area of the battlefield. Typically, the main outcome is a more disrupted terrain, which means a harder and slower advance, and better defensive positions. What allowed the Allies to break out of Normandy was the fact that they wore down the defending enemy to the point where they broke. What took them so long was a mixture of reasons, mostly a combination of terrain & tactics, rather than inferior tanks (Max Hastings, “Overlord”, The whole book). For every story of a German tank that appeared invulnerable or that destroyed a large number of Allied tanks, you can find a story of an Allied tank being hit but not destroyed, or brewing up a number of German tanks (like Joe Ekins, a gunner whose unsupported Sherman Firefly knocked out 3 Tiger I’s in a single engagement lasting 12 minutes [including the legendary Michael Wittman] – see this topic). I recommend reading “By Tank into Normandy” by Stuart Hills, and “Tanks, Advance!” by Ken Tout.

Probably the most important thing to remember is this: The majority of Allied tank loses throughout the entire war were not to enemy AFVs.

 

Why would allies develop new tank designs with biger guns and better armour protection if the Sherman was so good in dealing with german armor,why would anyone spend time and money on new biger and better tanks when he can produce the one he has.The logical answer is that the results on the field were not the same like the ones on test grounds or like they should be.
About Joe Ekins story,what will prove this?At what range did this battle took place?In what condition.
I have story about T-34-85 that destroyed 3 King Tigers and chase of 5 more ,what i am going to prove with that,that T-34-85 could engage King Tigers and kill them with ease.That same Wittman how many tanks did he destroyed before he was killed.
From what i have read so far i know that Panther and Tiger were superior to the allied armor.
To say that allied air supremacy didn,t help a bit in the Normandy campaign is childlish(this is not written in ofensive manner) realy,if air suport didn,t played so much then germans could have bring their reinforcment and replacment without losses.

 

At a range of 1 kilometre and with a 30 degree angle,

The 17 pounder equipped with the APDS round penetrates 213mmm of steel

The 17 pounder equipped with the (more common) APCBC round penetrates ~125mm of steel

The Russian L/53 85mm equipped with APBC rounds penetrates 102mm of steel



Compared to APCBC rounds Russian APBC ammunition is significantly heavier and slightly slower, making it much more more damaging in the event of a penetration, and a more effective bunker-buster... As you can see, given that the APCBC round was the most common, the L/53 and the 17 pounder have very similar performance, merely with different balances between damage and penetration...

British APDS rounds may absolutely thump Russian APBC in terms of penetraition, but that is because the things weigh only 4kg... Comparing with one of the L/53's 9kg shells is selective, as the two rounds are entirely different, one is a standard shell, one is a specialty shell... APBC is a balance of penetration damage, range etc... APDS exemplifies penetration at the expense of everythign else... In fair comparison, the APDS round should be compared with its appropriate Russian equivalent, the 5kg APCR, a similarily light 85mm shell which was designed to be a light, high-velocity low-damage penetrator...

Furthermore the L/53 was standard armament on all T-34/85's whereas the 17 pounder was only fixed upon a select number of Sherman variants... What proportion of Shermans were actually armed with the British 17 pounder? Not very many. The vast, vast majority were armed with 75mm and 76mm guns

Essentially what the mythbusters thread does is compare a late war sherman, armed with un uncommon tank gun (17 pounder), equipped with even less common specialist ammunition (APDS) and compares it against a 1941 stock standard T-34... Even then the two are very comprable... At the very least it should be compared to the model 1945 T-34/85, however, since the Firefly is really a specialist variant of the Sherman, an even fairer comparison would be to compare the Firefly against a T-34 specialist variant, such as the late-war T-34M...

As far as stock-standard models go...
1945 T-34/85 > 1945 Sherman M4

Sources (the ones I rememberd to bookmark)
http://armor.kiev.ua/Tanks/WWII/T34_85/
Guns vs Armor: http://gva.freeweb.hu/weapons/introduction.html

 

Thanks smeg. For all the extra damage the 85mm burster charge may cause (if it functions correctly), I'd take the additional inch of penetration of the 17pdr over it.

 

An extra inch of penetration makes a huge difference, to wit the 17pdr with ABCBC penetrates more armor at 1828 meters then the 85mm ABCBC does at 100 meters.

17pdr at 1828 meters, 30 degree angle. 111mm.
http://gva.freeweb.hu/weapons/british_guns5.html

85mm ABCBC at 100 meters, 30 degree target angle. 97mm.
http://gva.freeweb.hu/weapons/soviet_guns7.html

In short a 17pdr has a better chance at penetrating a heavy tank at 1828 meters then a 85mm ABCBC does at point blank range. This is sobering when you consider that the 17pdr could not consistently penetrate the Panther Glacis at any range (Sometimes it would penetrate, sometimes it wouldn’t.) and would not consistently penetrate the turret/mantlet of the Panther much past 1500 yards, where it still retained more penetrating power then the 85mm had at the muzzle. These are not comparable AT weapons. Its true that the 85mm does have a better HE round, but is nowhere near the 17pdr as a tank buster. Its actually comparable to the 76mm on the Sherman.

76mm AP M79 at 457 meters, 30 degrees. 109mm. 914 meters 92mm
76mm ABCBC at 457 meters, 30 degrees 93mm 914 meters 88mm

85mm AP at 500 meters, 30 degrees. 90mm. 1000 meters 75mm
85mm APCBC at 500 meters, 30 degrees. 90mm. 1000 meters 85mm.

After adjusting for the US ammo being at slightly closer ranges, they are virtually identical at 1000 meters. In actual Soviet field tests the 76mm was superior.
Quote from Russian Tests on the King Tiger.
http://www.battlefield.ru/index.php?opt ... Itemid=123
“10. American 76 mm armor-piercing projectiles penetrated the "Tiger-B" tank's side plates at ranges 1.5 to 2 times greater the domestic 85 mm armor-piercing projectiles."”

The 85mm has a larger explosive burster, but that is a double edged sword. Its interesting to read what a Soviet user of the Sherman thought about that.

Dmitriy Loza in his book Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks noted that the T-34s would blow up when hit, killing the crew as they tried to use the knocked out tank as a shelter. Sherman’s would not blow up due to having more stable ammunition. He also noted the armor would not spall when hit like the T-34. He never complained about the inferior power of the HE shells.
www.amazon.com/Commanding-Red-Armys-She ... 0803229208