Nuke the Germans?

The Carpet bombing clearly didn't have its desired effect. It certainly killed a lot of civilians, but they didn't rise up or force their country to surrender. Didn't some German Generals (including Rommel) try to broker a separate peace that involved killing Hitler? I am also pretty sure that the Allies refused peace talks until the complete capitulation of Germany.

So, dropping A-bombs would be less costly then carpet-bombing, but would it still have the desired effects on Germany? I don't see them (aka Hitler) raising a white flag while still controlling the majority of Europe...from the Spain/French border to virtually Stalingrad.

 

Carpet Bombing was also used on Japan and that didn't stop the Japanese or cause them to rise up and force the country to surrender. It wasn't until several days later that Japan offered their unconditional surrender.

The "desired effects" were not to encourage capitualion, although that was a by product, it was to economise the use of force available. Why send 100 planes dropping 2,000 bombs against one city when one plane dropping a single bomb could be just as effective.

 

If developed prior to D-day they might have held them until they had more than just 2 or 3. But if dropping them could remove the need for D-day I think that would have been quite a motivating factor. Dropped near the time for D-day they could also have potentially affect communications and reactions to it as well. Berlin going "off line" just as the allies were landing could have had some significant impact.

 

I could also see the US simply oblitherating the German defenses on those Norman beaches too. There wouldn't have been the kind of reluctance to use such weapons as there is today. This would have allowed the Allies to march ashore unopposed. I could see planners taking this as a great reason to use a couple tactically.

 

i think : NO. Not true. It's been officially stated, and i believe, that the a-bomb would have been dropped on Germany first if it had only been ready before V-E day (in early May 1945.) The a-bomb was not even tested until july of that year

The First Atomic Bomb Blast, 1945

So the question, fortunately for the future of Germany, became a non-issue. IF the a-bomb had been ready 6 months earlier, i don't think Roosevelt would have hesitated to use it on Hitler's Germany, since it might have saved millions of allied and even German lives.

I say might because we'll never know what Hitler's reaction to it would have been. Hitler was of course hugely egotistical, certainly sociopathic, extremely obstinate and definitely a die-hard (he spent 4 years on the trenches in world war 1, won the iron cross, and was even gassed, twice, so he was nothing if not a personally tough and resilient character) so he may have reacted to an allied nuclear strike with the only similar WMD he had, a large-scale nerve gas strike against the allies.

(Even in the closing days of the war the luftwaffe, the German economy and the army still had the capacity to cause thousands of casualties with chemical weapons.) Even such a horrific counterattack would certainly not succeed in making the allies halt their armys, and the Americans would then have replied with another nuke. One can only hypothesize the terrible results of an atomic strike on Germany during world war 2.

Moreover i think the Western attitude toward nuclear weapons and even nuclear power, would very likely, have been decidedly different then it is today.

but in answer to your question, i do not think racism played much of a role in deciding who was going to get nuked first - it was more a matter of timing.
Even the physicists and technicians working on the Manhatten project seemed to have harbored few qualms about their work, or even on who it would be used on first, for that matter.

"At Los Alamos during World War II there was no moral issue with respect to working on the atomic bomb. Everyone was agreed on the necessity of stopping Hitler and the Japanese from destroying the free world. It was not an academic question ‚ our friends and relatives were being killed and we, ourselves, were desperately afraid. "
-Joseph O. Hirschfelder, chemist

Manhattan Project

 

If it was available earlier than this probably. By May I'm not sure there's really a good target left (although hitting Berlin at the height of the Soviet assault might make an interesting what if). If it's ready in 44 I don't think there's much question even January or February of 45 probably. After that it becomes increasingly questionable. By late March early April the target list is shrinking rapidly.

 

Its a good question. I always wondered if Roosevelt was still alive when the bomb was ready, and they had a chance to drop it on Germany, if they would use it?

"The Conquerors" by presidental historian Michael R. Beschloss stated that Roosevelt had a deep seated hatred for the Germans. However, I have heard this claim disputed as well.

If this was indeed true though, would he have been less reserved in using it against the Germans? (providing that it did not endanger the allied forces).

 

Another interesting point here is that if a bomb was to be ready by say, May 1944 with some certainty, then the USAAF about October to December 1943 would have likely gotten with the RAF and decided on a half dozen larger German cities not to be conventionally bombed that would make good nuclear targets.
Just like with Japan, the US would have wanted pristine targets to test their weapon out on. So, there would have been targets selected in advance of the predicted date of delivery and reserved for nuclear weapons tests through operational use.

 

Dropping a bomb tactically is an interesting point, but dropping one one occupied France is another. Dropping a bomb on Germany could be seen as destroying the enemy at it's heart but to drop the bomb on an allied occupied country filled with not only civilians but allied civilians is something else.

 

In 1938 many people feared that Hitler would build an atomic bomb after word spread that German scientist had split the uranium atom (fission). However, one of Hitlers mistakes was his persecution of Jewish scientists. This persecution resulted in numerous scientists seeking asylum in the United States. One such scientist was Albert Einstein. Einstein, abandoning his belief in pacifism, urged then president Franklin Roosevelt to develop an atomic bomb before Hitler did. Eventually Roosevelt agreed and the United States attempt at building the atomic bomb was codenamed The Manhattan Project. http://gk12.rice.edu/trs/science/Atom/man.htmPresident Franklin D. Roosevelt received a letter from Albert Einstein on August 2, 1939 which told of a new field of physics with the construction of extremely powerful bombs. Einstein helped the U.S. begin the same research of uranium and fission that was occuring in Germany.The Manhattan Project
For the US the possibility of developing an atomic bomb became evident late in 1938 when scientists in Germany successfully split a uranium atom by bombarding it with neutrons.Prodded by Szilard, Albert Einstein, world‐renowned German physicist who had fled to the United States, wrote to President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 2 August 1939 warning that the Nazis might develop an atomic bomb.After the United States entered the war, Roosevelt gave the development of nuclear weapons top priority, and in August 1942 he assigned the top‐secret project to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Its code name, the “Manhattan Project,” manhattan projectTherefore: Web Search Results from Answers.com first developed with the intention they might need to use it against Germany who might of had a bomb of their own.

 

IF the sociopathic Adolf Hitler was such an unstable character when pushed to the edge, he almost certainly would have pressed the chemical button, regardless of retaliation. This is something he couldn't bring himself to do even when Germany was obviously going down the tube....so why would he do it in response to a nuke?

Meaningless speculation.....and given the historical record, unfounded.

Dropping nukes will forever remain a stain on the character of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States Military, and the otherwise affable Harry Truman. If the Japanese Suzuki Cabinet were negotiating for peace through any other mediator than the Soviet Union, the Pacific war would have come to a screeching halt right after Saipan. Shigamitsu claimed to his dying breath that the entire function of the post Tojo Japanese leaders was to find some HONOURABLE way of backing out of the contest. Unconditional surrender was not honourable, therefore no surrender. And with the Soviets vacillating and stretching the negotiations, (so they could grab the spoils, like Sakhalin), the Suzuki cabinet was really caught between a rock and a hard place.

The bomb was dropped to demonstrate it's overwhelming power, not to the Japanese, but to the RUSSIANS.

But Stalin was already well informed.....

 

You might try and read "Downfall" by Richard Franks. The only honorable way according to the Japanese was no occupation,no war crimes trials,Japan still holding onto to Manchuria & Korea and on and on. Do you really think the Allies should have given in on those items? No the Japanese weren't caught betwen and rock & a hard place heck even after Hiroshima,Nagasaki and the full details of August Storm were known the Military leaders were still willing to keep on with the war only the intervention of the Emperor insured Japan's surrender on 8/15/1945.

 

"Downfall" sounds like a good read then...

I base the above post on comments made by Shagamitsu in an interview done for BBC television associated with their "World at War" series. Shigamitsu was interviewed for their program called "The Bomb"....

As always, Im perfectly willing to change my tune if presented with better info!

 

Downfall is an excellent read. From the Publisher’s Weekly:

The premise behind this excellent history of the concluding stages of WWII in the Pacific is that the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has cast a light so bright that it has blinded historians to many of the political, diplomatic and military realities that existed before August 6, 1945. In his comprehensive study of the last months of WWII, Frank (Guadalcanal) aims to present events "as they were perceived and recorded by American and Japanese participants in 1945Anot years or decades thereafter." In 1945, American strategists developed their plan, "Operation Downfall," for forcing the unconditional surrender of Japan. Japanese leaders, meanwhile, mobilized all available military and civilian resources for a final defense of the homeland. Though they knew the war was lost, Japanese military strategists believed their preparations were sufficient to compel the Allies to offer more generous terms on which the war might end. Frank immerses his readers in the flow of intelligence estimates, battle experience and shifting strategy on both sides. The centerpiece of the book is an exacting and dispassionate examination both of the American decision to use the atomic bomb and of whether Japan would have surrendered absent the bomb. Frank marshals an impressive and complex array of evidence to support his contention that surrender by Japan was by no means imminent in August 1945, and that alternatives to the bomb, such as incendiary bombing, carried no certainty of causing less suffering and fewer deaths than the atomic bomb. In his balanced use of sources and in his tough-minded sensitivity to moral issues, Frank has enriched the debate about the war's conclusion. Agent, Robert Gottlieb of William Morris. Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc.

The Japanese were NOT attempting to negotiate a "peace" through the Soviets, the most gracious term for their offers is "peace feelers", but the Soviets wouldn't even meet with Prince Sato in Moscow. He was persona non grata in a sense, and simply fobbed off on minor dignitaries. His telegrams back to Tokyo still exist, and show his own undestanding that his mission was pointless, and telling Togo back home to start seeking peace at the first possible moment.

Unconditional surrender doesn't mean NO terms, it didn't then it doesn't now. It means accept our terms, or continue the fight. When the Japanese finally went through the offices of the Swedes and the Swiss, they were given the terms we (allies) would issue. Accept them or fight on. As history shows, they accepted.

It should also be remembered that World at War is really an early 1973 release, and was produced in the late sixties when material for sourcing was still (in many cases) still covered by the 50 and 75 year secrecy acts of both the UK and the US.

Downfall is of course a much later work (1999), when much more data, journals, and diaries had been found/released which World at War didn’t have access to.

The firestorm created in Toyama just a few days before the Hiroshima bombing devoured about 98 percent of the city, neither Hiroshima or Nagasaki suffered that extent of loss. The very "effectiveness" of the Toyama firestorm may have unwittingly made the second atomic on Nagasaki even more necessary. With the huge devastation at Toyama, and similar (but lesser) destruction at Hiroshima those in command wondered if it really was a "new" weapon, or just an improvement on the creation of firestorms with fewer aircraft, which the Americans were getting better and better at. They never even sent scientists to either Hiroshima or Nagasaki to measure radiation levels until after Aug. 10th.

Fire produced in war, no matter how destructive, is a man-made occurance, and can be combated. But the Japanese have a tradition of not battling nature, they hunker down and wait for the earthquake, tsunamis, floods or volcanic eruptions to cease and then rebuilt. Harnessing a "force of nature", especially the "power of the universe" (incorrect, but used by Truman in his speech), against an "Empire of the Sun", ruled by a "Son of the Sun" was emotionally, politically, and militarily too much to deny as the "beginning of the end".

In the minds of many religious Japanese we had captured their goddess and used her power against them. The Japanese religion sponsered by the government, Shinto, teaches that the emperor is the descendant of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu. As such in 1945 he was a living god and could, according to the Shinto religion control nature such as the power of the sun. Shintoism further teaches that the emperor has a duty to bring all the peoples of the world under the rule of Amaterasu a sun goddess whose power is the power of the sun itself.

This bomb, using the "basic power of the universe" made Hirohito, as her son, possibly a "fake" and thus showed him and the others in the war cabinet to be without the divine mandate of the goddess, i.e. "heaven". That the hated enemy now had her mandate was more than just a shock to the average Japanese; it in affect destroyed their world view and their very view of themselves as Japanese.

The Japanese might have fought the allies until they (Japanese) were all dead or we had gone back to our own lands and given up, for them fighting men is easy. But how does one fight a goddess? Japan and her people, still deeply religious at the moment, believed in the goddess's mandate from heaven, they had no choice but to surrender.

As I mentioned before, the Japanese knew better than to fight with nature, and this was clearly a force of nature. They could fight people who invaded, fires, bullets, and the impact of conventional bombing. They could not and never did fight nature, not tsunamis, earthquakes, floods, or volcanic eruptions.

Soviet entry in to the war between the two atomic explosions, most assuredly helped make the decision more urgent; but as Hideki Tojo's diary states; "...the atomic bombs killed the god and goddess of Japan and thus forced the emperor to surrender his nation".

 

I'm darned chuffed I didn't discover this book earlier....my bad!!! (Sniff!)

 

V Boatman, here is a link to the communications, memos, meeting minutes, and telegrams taking place during the decision to use the bombs, both pro and con are presented.

Goto:

Nuclear Files: Library: Correspondence: Index

Inside of that site, if you scroll down into the second section you will find the telegrams between Togo and Sato. Remember that Truman was also reading these messages in "real time" since the Japanese had never stopped using their diplomatic codes, which we had broken pre-Pearl. While it isn’t easy to do, try to read them in order of their transmission and receipt to get a sense of how futile Sato in Moscow feels the attempt to be.

Truman was quite pleased when Stalin told him of the Japanese attempts on his own without prompting, and he recorded the message from Stalin in his own diary and a letter back to Bess.

Goto:

Nuclear Files: Library: Correspondence: Telegrams: Togo-Sato

 

Interesting point! I have had this vague thought for some time but you put it in words.

 

Unfortunately one of the words I put it into was misspelled....doh!

 

Two other books recommended.


'Japans Decision to Surrender' by Robert C Butow. This has even more detail than 'Downfall' tho a drier read. It confirms that until mid August the Japanese 'peace' initiative consisted of the idea the the Allies would rather negotiate a peace treaty than fight Japan any longer. They really did think they could negotiate the retention of the Empire on mainland Asia. They also thought they could play off the USSR against the US and use that to a advantage in negotiations. thats why the declaration of war by the USSR was such a shock. It flushed the foundation of Japanese forigen policy plans for the future down the sewer.

A third recomendation is John R Skates 'The Invasion of Japan'. This outlines and dicusses the Japanese preperations for defense against the US invasion. Amoung other things it shows how the fanatics were very ready to fight to the end. It also shows how many individual Japanese were terrified of the oncomming battle and suggests they would have fought badly.

Last I''ll recomend 'The making of the Atomic Bomb' by Richard Roades. In it are several passages describing how various groups in the US and British leadership fully expected to use atomic weapons against Germany. Particularly telling is the British project of 1941. That was started long before war with Japan. Its roots in British research go back to mid 1940 & the Maude Committe. Until they handed over the entire project to the US in 1942 the British leaders had every thought of using the results of their atomic project against Germany.

 

On the difference between carpet-bombing and the a-bomb on the enemy's will to fight:

The realisation that a single plane with a single bomb can instantly annihilate any city in their possession is far greater than the realisation that the enemy can send bomber planes over a period of weeks to cause a similar effect.

The sheer psychological impact of knowing your enemy is able to pick any major target and destroy it utterly within 24 hours would shatter your will to fight. It is possible to defend against a strategic bombing campaign (AA, figheters etc) and also 'dig in' to reduce casualties (bunkers). This is just not possible with a nuclear attack. It is completely indiscriminate in its destruction.

A strategic bombing campaign - however intense - also involves discrete attacks over a period of time compared to the solitary attack of a nuke. Even under intense bombing there is a chance for survival which creates at least a small amount of hope. Death is certain with a nuclear attack and the knowledge of this only leaves room for utter despair. Even the fanatical and suicidal Japanese were unable to overcome this.

So yes, while the overall tactical impact of strategic bombing can be similar to that of a nuclear attack, nuclear war inflicts a much more severe level of psychological damage and I doubt any nation would be able to withstand capitulation when faced with such a threat.