I would assert that Stalin had much to gain by occupying the Finns, or perhaps installing a DPR Finland type of setup. One would never have to worry about the old hatred of Russia resurfacing in another conflict (coughcough 1941) and the Leningrad sector would be forever sealed against any type of attack, freeing a massive logistical strain, without repercussions from a world much to fearful to step in the way of Stalin at this point. It likely would have been worth the men and time to achieve such ends, the fact is that Russia had massive amounts of light tanks that could eventually be brought against the Finns. They had no real tank force to speak of, and largely improvised tank weapons, and as such a decisive advantage. If they broke the Finns in the south and caused sufficient casualties on their army (Finland had no means of mass troop replacement), the road to Helsinki and the industrial south would be open. At the time the rest of the nation was largely agrarian, and as such they had no real means to fight if they lost their industry.
Finland is perfect for Guerilla warfare and since Germany wanted to free up troops for the fight Germany it makes no sense to occupy Finland. As stated Stalin was having enough problems with the Polish question, why add another issue especially since he desperately wanted a deal in the Balkans. Besides who was going to work with Finland.
Back again... It did make sense, because for the soviets their plans had failed massively and the situation was different in spring 1940 than what it had been in autumn 1939. The soviet invasion was supposed to be a swift occupation to "liberate the cheering and wellcoming Finnish peasants and workers" with next to no casualties - a bit like the attack on Poland only few months before. Now all the hospitals in Northern USSR were full of wounded/frostbitten and the people were complaining and asking for the sensibility of this kind of "liberation". Even the soviet leaders could not totally ignore this. One must remember that the USSR had not been (succesfully) attacked so far and the country was not even supposed to be in a real war at all! The USSR had suffered a huge humiliation and propaganda loss, end of which was not visible. The supposedly already beaten Finns were still fighting and they might stubbornly continue to do so for months - as far as the soviets new. The popular demand of the peoples in the West was on the Finnish side and the French and the British were sending troops to supposedly help Finland (in reality to occupy the iron mines in North Sweden and to open a new front against Germany). This might have led to conflicts between the West and the USSR, which Stalin did not want. Stalin wanted to have his hands free and ready to react on the ongoing war between the West and Germany. At the same time the soviet ally Hitler had realised, that the continuing war in Finland was not in the interest of Germany either. Loosing the flow of the iron ore from Sweden because of the Western invasion would have been very harmful. Hitler was also aware, that his ally Stalin was still secretly negotiating with the West about the new front in Scandinavia against Germany. Therefore the USSR was not to be allowed to get next to Sweden either. That's why Hitler demanded his ally Stalin to make the peace with Finland. Stalin did NOT get what he wanted, because he wanted hole Finland. He did however get some valuable war spoil from Finland, namingly hydro energy to get rid of the lack of energy of the Leningrad arms factories, and cellulose (more than doubling the soviet total output) for the gun powder production.
The up to 30.000 soviet troops in Hanko peninsula next to Helsinki were increasingly transferred there since the end of the Winter War. The soviets also demanded for the transfer right through Finland, which they got. So it was not only the troops in Hanko but also the soviet troops moving from/to there. In exchange of food and arms Germany asked for the similar right to transfer soldiers to/from Northern Norway in the late summer 1940. There were no German fighting units stationed in Finland prior to mid-June 1941. Naturally Finland granted such balancing right for Germany as well. For comparison: about 20 times as many German troops were transferred through Sweden prior the Barbarossa - and even the fully armed 163. German division on it's way from Norway to Finland in late June 1941. The very existance of German troops transferring through Finland and the German help was a gift from heaven for the desperate Finns. It was a sign, that Finland was no more alone and at the mercy of the USSR. Stalin was already ready for a new attack on Finland. He did not need any provocations for that. E.g. Molotov asked Hitler on his visit to Berlin in November 1940 for the permission to finish Finland. Hitler refused - and this information was later passed on to the Finns. No - Finland could not get the arms only. There was/is no such thing as a free lunch. It was well understood in Finland, that for the absolutely crucial food and arms Germany expected the permission for troop transfers. For the Finns it was not a problem - especially after the similar permission had been blackmailed by the soviets. Sweden was strategically in a much safer position. It was not a target for a Western invasion like Norway, and Finland was facing the soviets. Still Sweden yielded a lot to Germany - as I partly explained above. Germany did not need Switzerland, but needed for example essential nickel and cellulose from Finland - not to mention support for the eastern attack, what she expected to get. Spain was leaning towards Germany and was diifficult to attack and occupy anyway, Portugal was even further. Either of the countries were strategically essential - as long as Spain was not one of the Allies. Turkey was not needed either. Germany needed to secure North Sweden. She did it by occupying Norway. If Finland had refused, occupying undefended Aland islands would not have been that difficult, neither had been occupying Northern Finland from Norway. Don't think Germany would have needed hole Finland. For Finland such situation would have been untolerable, since Germany and Sweden were practicly the only countries to trade with. Now Finland would have been totally cut of the rest of the world - and between the two hostile great powers still in an alliance! For Finland the only aggressor was the USSR. For such a small country in such a desperate situation there was no room for being picky. After all there seemed to be no room for such for the great powers like the USA and the UK either...!
As I explained before, there were no German fighting units stationed in Finland prior to mid-June 1941. Even then two German divisions (or rather only 1,5 divisions) were officially only to change to/from Northern Norway - which they did not. For the USSR there was no constant threat from Finland - especially, since the soviet troops behind the border outnumbered the combined number of the Finnish and the German troops. The situations for Turkey and Sweden were different, as I explained before. The USSR did not want war against Japan, but wanted one against Finland. That's a big difference! The USSR - the very country which wanted the war in Europe the most and started it with Germany - was not "fighting for it's life" at 06.05 on 22nd June 1941, when the first soviet bombs against Finland landed. No, I don't claim that. Why on earth would I?
No - attacking the Finnish targets was the most effective manner to make Finland to "join" the German side. We understood very well, that it was NOT about the soviet border security, but about the soviet/Russian expansionism! Nothing was threatning the USSR from Finland before the Winter War - which of course changed everything. Even after that Finland would/might have remained neutral, with much less troops than the soviets by the Finnish borders, had the soviets not chosen to attack straight away. Finland did not attack the USSR, neither did Germany from Finland. You are unfortunately only backing the age-old soviet reasoning for attacks and occupations - "they could have attacked us - or at least that's what we want you to believe we thought...".
It was both. It was a common preconception based on all the events and the pressure by the soviets during the Interim Peace (March 1940 - June 1941). How does the saying go? “If it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, looks like a duck, it must be a duck..." It was also knowledge, since Molotov had asked Hitler for a permission for a new attack on Finland In Berlin November 1940. There had been several situations throughout the Interim Peace, when the soviet attack had been waited for. Early summer the situation towards Finland was not alarming, since there were rumours about the possible hostilities between the USSR and Germany, but the situation could have changed quickly - as it did. Anyway the USSR was not trusted (for many excellent reasons) - except for attacking sooner or later. From wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interim_Peace#Continued_Soviet_pressure "Continued Soviet pressure The implementation of the Moscow Peace Treaty created problems due to the Soviet Vae Victis-mentality. Border arrangements in the Enso industrial area, which even Soviet members of the border commission considered to be on the Finnish side of the border, the forced return of evacuated machinery, locomotives, and rail cars; and inflexibility on questions which could have eased hardships created by the new border, such as fishing rights and the usage of Saimaa Canal merely served to heighten distrust about the objectives of the Soviet Union. The Soviet attitude was personified in the new ambassador to Helsinki, Ivan Zotov. He behaved undiplomatically and had a stiff-necked drive to advance Soviet interests, real or imagined, in Finland. During the summer and autumn he recommended several times in his reports to the Soviet Foreign Office that Finland ought to be finished off and wholly annexed by the Soviet Union. On June 14, Soviet bombers shot down the Finnish passenger plane Kaleva. All nine passengers and crew perished. On June 23, the Soviet Union proposed that Finland should revoke Petsamo mining rights from the British–Canadian company and transfer them to the Soviet Union, or to a joint venture owned by the Russians and the Finns. On June 27, Moscow demanded either demilitarization or a joint fortification effort in Åland. After Sweden had signed the troop transfer agreement with Germany on July 8, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov demanded similar rights for a Soviet troop transit to Hanko on July 9. The transfer rights were given on September 6, and demilitarization of Åland was agreed on October 11, but negotiations on Petsamo continued to drag on, with Finnish negotiators stalling as much as possible. The Communist Party was so discredited in the Winter War that it never managed to recuperate between the wars. Instead, on May 22, the Peace and Friendship Society of Finland and Soviet Union was created, and it actively propagated Soviet viewpoints. Ambassador Zotov had very close contacts with the Society by holding weekly meetings with the Society leadership in the Soviet embassy and having Soviet diplomats participating in Society board meetings. The Society started by criticizing the government and military, and gained around 35,000 members at maximum. Emboldened by its success, it started organizing almost daily violent demonstrations during the first half of August which were supported politically by Zotov and a press campaign in Leningrad. The government reacted forcefully and arrested leading members of the society which ended the demonstrations in spite of Zotov's and Molotov's protests. The Society was finally outlawed in December 1940. The Soviet Union demanded that Väinö Tanner be discharged from the cabinet because of his anti-Soviet stance and he had to resign August 15. Ambassador Zotov further demanded the resignation of both the Minister of Social Affairs Karl-August Fagerholm because he had called the Society a Fifth column in a public speech, and the Minister of Interior Affairs Ernst von Born, who was responsible for police and led the crackdown of the Society, but they retained their places in the cabinet after Ryti delivered a radio speech in which he stated the willingness of his government to improve relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. President Kallio suffered a stroke on August 28, after which he was unable to work, but when he presented his resignation November 27, the Soviet Union reacted by announcing that if Mannerheim, Tanner, Kivimäki, Svinhufvud or someone of their ilk were chosen president, it would be considered a breach of the Moscow peace treaty. All of this reminded the public heavily of how the Baltic Republics had been occupied and annexed only a few months earlier. It was no wonder that the average Finn feared that the Winter War had produced only a short delay of the same fate."
Actually there were no German fighting troops in Finland prior mid-June 1941 - only small number of troops passing through. It was not the troops that aided Finland most but the political support and the food and arms shipments. In 1940 happened a lot. The soviets invaded the Baltics - extremely alarming for Finland! Germany occupied Denmark, Norway, Holland, Luxemburg, Belgium, France and was trying to get the UK. The time was not right for the USSR to get disoriented with a new attack on Finland. After the Winter War a new winter attack against Finland was maybe not the best option... I have explained earlier about the Soviet new attack plans against Finland. I have no problem believing, that the similar kind of intentions against Germany prior Barbarossa were totally possible - even likely. However maybe it's better not to go there now...
I can only agree with you... However one must remember, that all Stalin's co-bellingerents made exactly similar Devil's bargains too - also with good reasons, I must admit.
Stalin wanted to have Finland first - swiftly and easily. This did not happen in this time either, and the soviet troops ran out of time, men and supplies. After the soviet attacks had been stopped the Finnish army was at it's alltime strongest at the end of summer 1944. Of course this would not have lasted after the German support had dryed up, but for the USSR to conquer Finland would have meant lots of new troops, new supplies, new preparations and most of all more time. In summer 1944 the Western Allies were seemingly rapidly advancing towards Berlin - where Stalin absolutely wanted to get first. Therefore Stalin was forced to choose between Finland and Berlin. Berlin "won"...
Can not agree! Stalin indeed wanted the conquests at least as much as Germany. Stalin did NOT get what he wanted in either 1939-40 or 1941-44. He was however pragmatic enough to settle for less.
I'm skeptic about your claim that the Soviets didn't have conditions to occupy Finland by 1944. Together with the troops of the Finish front, there was considerable more manpower and equipment that could be taked from the Far East and the Caucasus.
Please read my post again. I didn't say that the soviets didn't have the conditions in general. They just didn't have them at the Finnish front after their offence ("the 4th strategic strike - the only one, which did not meet its's targets...) was stopped. For a new strike the soviets would have needed replacements for both troops and supplies - and more importantly more time. This Stalin did not think he any more had, since conquering Finland had taken too much time - and failed again so far. He was afraid that finishing Finland off would have taken valuable assets away from the German front - which might have resulted losing the race to Berlin. This was a gamble Stalin did not want to take. So - from late July 1944 on soviet tanks, troops and artillery was being transported from the Karelian Isthmus to face the Germans. Further north the fierce fighting still continued.
As far as I know there was not a race to Berlin. As far as finish off Germany was concerned, subsequentely the Western Allies were more fearful of the Soviets than vice versa.
About the "Devil's bargains" again... One - myself included - often makes the mistake of judging the historical situations with all the knowledge we have now - and which the people at certain historical times did not have. In spring 1941 " the Endlösung", the exterminations camps and actions of the Einsatzgruppen were all in the future - unlike the soviet mass killings (of Finns too), death camps and forced transportations of nationalities. So far the Nazis had "just" attacked other countries (as had the USSR and many other countries before) and been rough on jews (as had many other countries been before, especially the Imperial Russia). The Nazis were not the only ones in the world who linked communism and the jews - neither was Hitler the only statesman to do so. So with the information available in June 1941 the ones dealing with Stalin made more of a "Devil's bargain" than those dealing with Hitler - not that Finland had any choice to start with.
AFAIK there was one for Stalin - maybe not for the Western Allies. Do you mean, that AFTER finishing Germany off the Western Allies were more fearful of the soviets that v.v.? This I agree with.
Didn´t Stalin claim to Western Allied even in march-April 1945 that he was not keeping Berlin top target... http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1774&dat=19660320&id=YOYeAAAAIBAJ&sjid=r2UEAAAAIBAJ&pg=7178,5632718
The geopolitical situation by early 1945 is interesting. We have a very strong Red Army, but we also have a West that has a weaker Army but was close to have an atomic bomb (which Stalin was aware of it's development). Neither side wanted to provoke much the other.
Had forgotten this one... During the Cold War it was the fear of a nuclear weapon response which prevented the soviets from attacking. During the WW2 the soviets did not have such threat from Finland. There was nothing to stop the soviets - before Germany came for rescue. North Korea knows, that an attack against the South would mean suicide. Also the PRC knows, that an attack against Taiwan would bring the USA to the ring too.