Stalingrad, Kursk, or Other?

OK, let's make a bit of a jump here. We have generally seemed to agree (contrary to many historians, I should say) that the "turning point" of the German campaign in the east was when the Germans failed to capture Moscow in 41-42. (Or at least we can agree that it was a VERY significant "point"). But considering the eastern theater AFTER say, April 1942, what was the most significant operation, the "turning point"?
I'd have to go with Kursk. Stalingrad was a massive defeat, both materially and psychologically. But the German army in the east was still an incredibly powerful force- they had essentially made the classic mistake of outruning themselves. After the retreats of winter 43, the spring thaw gave a good month or so to consolidate and regroup. And by that point, the Tiger was in service, most of the older german armor had been up-gunned and modernised; german troops were generally well supplied and there was still a good quantity of well trained veteran officers and generals.
Certainly, the Russians had also improved by this point, and they as well were fielding good equipment. The general level of trainign and morale was probably less than the germans, but the russians had certianly improved over 1941.
But that being said, all of the german advantages I mentioned above- all of that was essentially thrown away at Kursk. There are many sets of numbers around for armored casualties at Kursk (I'm sure we all know which one is the "right" set... ), but we can certainly agree that the panzer divisions lost a significant amount of armor. Not to even mention the german casualties- at least 20,000 (and that's a low estimate).
To top it off, the strategy for Kursk was greatly flawed to begin with. Early in the war, germans had great success with "pincer" style attacks. But in these cases, the pincer arms would encircle a large amount of TERRITORY, and trap the russian armies within that area. Forces could then be fed up to eliminate the trapped russians INSIDE the pocket. But at Kursk, the salient was only about 100 miles at it's highest point, and it was not deep. But more to the point, the whole idea at Kursk was to encircle russian ARMIES, not territory. This more or less garaunteed that there would be constant fighting even for the lead force.
The Germans should have gone with Manstein's (I think it was Manstein) plan for an elastic defence in 1943. The Germans could have conserved their men and equipment. We see repeatedly that later in the war, when the russians could finally launch significant offensive operations, that they had even more of a tendency to outrun themselves than the germans- the Germans could have inflicted crippling losses on the russians and at least maybe forced the russians to sue for peace...

 

Kursk was Gremany's last chance to acquire victory in Russia. After Kursk, only the a-bomb would have won the war for Germany. Of course, Stalingrad and Moscow wasnt a big help either, but Kursk is what did them in. Even though supposedly it was a close battle, they didnt win. They needed a decisive victory. They could have bought a lot of time and perhaps launched another offensive. Kursk was the oppurtunity, and the Wehrmacht blew it.

 

Kursk was actually a huge trap for germans, and it did what the russians wanted. Germany lost many valuable tanks, so did russians but they could replace the T34´s soon.

Kursk had some 6 defensive lines, all of which heavily mined and lots of troops and tanks. Still in the south germans were close to a breakthrough. I´m not sure would that have meant anyhting, as russians started massive counterattacks everywhere in the front soon after Kursk, and germans might have lost the ground gained in no time at all.

In the middle of it all Hitler took LAH ( also Das Reich? ) away, to Italy, which does´t make sense, not to the fighting generals either. Hitler lost the possibility of a minor victory as well, as he could have destroyed the russian tank reserve in Kursk after prokhorovka.What was going on in his mind? Nothing! he feared to attack in the first place and as the battle didn´t go at all well he lost his nerves and pulled back.

I believe the best thing would have been not to attack in Kursk at all. The place was a huge trap, a killing machine. Germany would have lost the war however, but with the tanks not destroyed a long defensive battle would have been possible.

 

I guess I´ll have to express myself better before a load of questions. With a possible breakthrough in Kursk I mean that it was A TOUGH CAKE for the russians as well. They were forced to call the 5th guards tanks to help, and without them in Prokhorovka the german tanks would have pushed ahead freely. What a total disaster-feeling for germans. You see the final victory ahead of you and then they take it away...

 

I disagree with this assessment, although it's really just somantics- the Germans didn't fail... the Russians succeeded! Kursk is often made out to be a "german failure", but that fails to give the russians the credit they deserve. The incredible defensive system Kai mentions was truly unique- never had such a concentration of defenses been set up in ww2. The russians accomplished exactly what they planned- suck in the germans and catch them in a battle of attrition- a battle the germans could not afford. The germans tried as well as they could have, it was just an impossible task. Even if they had broken through, and destroyed most of the russian forces, the germans would have been completely exhausted. Then we get back to the resources- the russians could rebuild their forces easiy and quickly. But the germans could not because...
As Kai mentioned, LAH and I believe most of Dasriech was pulled out. But this actually happened July 13, after the battle had already been going for 9 days. It happened, Kai, because the Americans landed at Sicily, beginning the invasion of Italy. Hitler knew he desperatley needed more forces in Italy to hold off the allies.
Thus, while the russians could be rebuilding and recovering, the germans were forced immediately to meet a new threat, further straining their resources.

 

Two things here. First. The salient was not an intentional trap set up by the Russians. The Russians did not even begin to build up defenses in that area until they heard it through their spy network of Germany's intent. Second, the battle could have been won but as usual, Hitler's meddling caused the loss due to his insistence on waiting for the Panthers. The loss of LAH was not a factor. They had the equipment and at the beginning the element of surprise. But after the delay, they should have consolidated and set a trap for the Russians and then spring a counterattack.

 

Absolutely disagree.

The strategy was ruined at the beginning of 1942, don't even to mention in summer 1943...

The only way of winning (partially) the war against the USSR was to do it in a single campaign, beheading the USSR and destroying all its armies. Taking Moscow in November 1941, destroying the government, the communications centre and an enormous ammount of armies would have provoked a partial collapse of the Soviet Union. But we did not. We left behind all that.

And by 1942 it is obvious that the war cannot be won and that the strategy is no longer on our favour. In 1941 we launched three huge offensives in three different places at the same time. In 1942, we could only launch an offensive in only one place. What does that show? Eh? The Wehrmacht had 600.000 men in 1942 than in 1941, even with the reinforcements. Beside, the materials were not enough to equpip all the front. What does that show? Please! Consider this!

And if the campaign of 1941 took away the 30% of the Wehrmacht strenght, debacles like the Caucasus and Stalingrad took away another 40%...

After that, how do you think that we could have won? We only could have won with a very strong Wehrmacht and with a very inexperienced and unorganised Red Army. And those conditions were only in 1941. Later, the Wehrmacht became weaker and weaker and the Red Army stronger and stronger.

The only chance to destroy the Red Army was with anhilation battles in 1941, when an inexperienced Red Army could not respond. And even with the huge industry and men reserves of the USSR, even the Soviet Union could NOT bear such an amount of casualties and the loss of strategic points.

"Blau" and "Zitadelle", even if they succeded, the outcome would have been the same and you perfectly know it. Just and only "Barbarossa" could win.

 

Completely incorrect. The russians had regular updates on the day the attack was to begin, and by the time that day arrived, the russians actually knew the exact hour the offensive wass supposed to start. That's according to Carell, Healy, etc. The russians opened their artillery barrage 15 minutes before the germans, catching the germans in their staging areas. The germans were caught completely off gaurd, and the start of the attck got of slower than hoped.
And the LAH not a factor? The LAH was one of the strongest units in the 4th SS Pz Army- and that was the group that made the most headway against russian defenses! Or do you mean that by the time the LAH was withdrawn, the battle was already over?
And while the salient originally was not a trap, keep in mind that because of Hitler's delays, the russians had over 2 months to fortify the Kursk salient.

Friedrich, I tend to agree with this. Maybe you misunderstood me... I mean which of the battles AFTER moscow was the most significant. I'd agree that the germans could not have won after losing Moscow; but there were many operations which had huge impacts on the theater after 1942.
I didn't mean "could the germans have won after moscow"; but rather, which was the most significant operation AFTER moscow, and why was it significant.
My point in citing Kursk- the germans could not have achieved anything significant with a vioctory at Kursk. But had they gone on the defensive instead of wasting all their resources at Kursk, the germans could have theoritically held the russians for a long time on a defensive front while building up their own forces.

 

I did not mean that the element of surprise was there at the onset of the battle. I meant that element of surprise was there when the decision was made to attack at Kursk prior to the delay.

 

Well, I understand your point, but disagree with other's.

There was no chance of victory after Moscow, but the MAJOR debacle of the Eastern front, the one that changed the outcome of the war was definately Stalingrad an the campaigns in 1942-1943. Not only the armies in the Caucausus had been beaten, but a whole gigantic elite army was anhilated, beside 2nd Hungarian Army, 8th Italian army were also anhilated and 2nd German Army was severely damaged. That meant the loss of 600.000 men and an enormous hole in the German lines... I would say that we lost the initiative after Stalingrad, but we kept a bit for Kursk.

Crazy, there was no 4. SS Panzerarmee at Kursk. There was an SS Panzerkorps (LSSAH, SSDR and SST), but belonged to Hoth's 4. Panzerarmee.

And there were posibilities for wining and squeezing the Kursk salient, even if there was ANY surprise or lightining warfare factors. But even if Von Manstein would have continued with the offensive and the Russians would have been severely beaten, the German losses would have been enormous. The tactic levels would have been on favour of the Germans, but the we would havce not gained a strategic battle, which was what we needed. After Kursk we lost the initiative completely because our losses in materials. The losses of men in winter 1942-1943 and materials in summer 1943 took all the initiative away. And let's not talk about "Bagration", because it was much, much worse.

 

Not even. Stalin knew about it within a couple days at most through Werther. And more to the point, the element of suprise meant nothing "in theory"... If the enemy knows about your "suprise" attack, you lose any advantage. Even had Stalin not known early on, the delays Hitler imposed and the concentrations of troops building around the salient made german intentions obvious to the russians...

My bad. I knew there was a 4th something... thanks for the correction.
"Bargartion" deserves mention here- I'd say Bagration was a huge defeat for the germans, probably at least as significant as Stalingrad or Kursk. I don't think Stalingrad was so huge, only because it was the first major defeat of the german army. Stalingrad was more of a psychological defeat IMO, because after Stalingrad the germans could still field a powerful army.

 

Do 350.000 elite men are not significant?!!!!! It was the second major debacle of the entire war and of the entire history of the German armed forces.

And by the way, "Bagration" was like five Kursk or two Stalingrads...

 

I agree that Germany could not have beaten the USSR after failing to take Moscow, but only after Kursk were the soviets able to continually advance against the Germans. A victory, preferably a descisive one would have given the Germans lots of time. In this time, were talking about more advanced weaponry being developed and used, better defensive positions developed, perhaps, if the victory were complete enough , limited offensives designed to keep the Soviets off balanced could have succeeded. Germany was also supposedly a few months from the a-bomb at wars end. Victory at Kursk would have bought that and more. Yes I know Moscow took victory away from Germany, but Kursk handed them certain defeat.

 

Kursk , as Hitler said , was a lump in his stomach turning it around. Yet he felt he was forced to attack. After Kharkow he felt that with SS troops he could make it.

There are several things that helped the russians. By this time Hitler gave sepesific orders that were transmitted to generals by Enigma. And British knew the codesystem. They informed russians,but not of everything though. That´s why probably the main point of attack being in the south was a surpise. But Hitler gave almost minute to minute orders, which must have angered the generals. In Kharkow the attack was not carefully planned so that´s why russians couldn´t react and lost. Of course the russians were stretching their lines and supply was low so cannot tell would it have gone any differently if they had known the german plans.

In prokhorovka the russians had the advantage, as tanks faced in close combat. Every shot that hit destroyed the enemy. If germans would have met the 5th guards tanks, say, in a position where the distance would have closer to 1.5 kms, I am sure germans would have fared it better.

There´s been discussions on the german tank losses lately in Kursk, and according to some germans didn´t lose a huge number of tanks on the date of prokhorovka. So it might have been russian propaganda, eh?? Any ideas about this suggestion?

 

That is not a myth. The German losses in Prokhorovka were not a high as everybody thinks. The SS Panzerkorps had quite a lot of tanks still running by July 12th. Beside, this day was when the 5th Soviet Tank Army was running out of tanks and reserves. Just at this point is when Kursk could have been decided and Erich von Manstein knew it perfectly. But Hitler cut off the ofensive at the very moment when they could have achieved something.

And if Kursk would have fallen, it would have been another big defeat for the Soviets, but not an strategic victory for the Germans. It would have gave us some time more. But even with new weaponry there was something quite more important that we were running rapidly out of: men.

So, it could not have meant much a German victory on Kursk for two reasons: it would not have achieved much strategically and it would have costed a lot, anyway.

 

Kai :

You need to go back in the older threads via the Russia forum and find the older materials posted about Kursk. The Soviets nearly lost Prokhorvovka to 1st, 2nd and 3rd SS. As I mentioned there are several new titles that have corrected history about this battle the last 5 years. The first being the German account by former W-SS veteran Sylvster Stadler in Die Offensive gegen Kursk 1943 and George Nipes, Decision in the Ukraine 1943. both speak clearly of the German losses and their victories.
There is also a book dedicated to just the tank battle being worked on right now.

E

 

another title is by Wolfgang Schneider, Tigers in combat 2 which covers in detail the W-SS Tiger 1 units.

John Fedorowicz Publishers in Winnipeg, Canada.
ISBN # 0-921991-39-8

check around the book dealers as JJF is rather expensive at $ 95.00 US. Great book though !

E

 

Lastly concerning Kursk, 13./SS Panzerregiment 1 scores over 150 Soviet Panzers !

E

 

Should actually continue this on a seperate thread on Kursk I think.....

the German OOB for the southern flank during the battle.

http://members.tripod.com/~Sturmvogel/SouthKursk.html

E

 

Well, Erich, before moving to another thread, re-read what I posted at the beginning- this thread WAS NOT about Kursk... Unless everyone thinks that Kursk was the decisive german operation AFTER Moscow. That was the point of this thread. Dasreich addressed the idea in his comments on Kursk- after Kursk the russians took over the strategic initiative. That would make a good argument for Kursk being the "turning point". And Friedrich makes a good argument for Stalingrad as well... that was the idea of this thread.
But I've been thinking more also about the Battle of the Bulge- despite this thread being in the war in russia subject (probably should have been in "General"), we could consider operations from other theaters as being a "turning point". And the Ardennes offensive was another example of a pointless waste of resources in my opinion. But that's my point- not to discuss Kursk, but to maybe pinpoint the operation AFTER MOSCOW that really sealed the chances for germany.
So myself, I'd (probably) take Kursk, and it seems Dasreich would as well, while Friedrich seems to go with Stalingrad (remember- AFTER MOSCOW).
Hope this has clarified my intent here- sorry if I confused !

One other thing though- case in point for my "numbers game theory"- Erich, ahev you checked the numbers given on that webpage you cited?
July 1- LAH SS 13 Tigers, DR SS 14 Tigers, and TK SS 15 Tigers.
July 4- LAH SS 12 Tigers, DR SS 12 Tigers, and TK SS 11 Tigers.
So the SS PZ Corps lost 7 Tigers in 3 days of not fighting? That would seem a bit strange to me...

[ 07 August 2002, 03:45 PM: Message edited by: CrazyD88 ]