Stalingrad, Kursk, or Other?

Indeed, after Stalingard the German losses of men could not be met with new recruits and thus the situation was turning chaotic. Instead the Russians had no worries over this. If one division was destroyed they just would sent two more to replace it...

After all the thoughts and reading on Kursk I think that the worst Hitler could do was to pull out after the Russians started to attack on both sides of Kursk. He did not achieve anything with the operation cancelled!If von Manstein could have destroeyd the Russian reserves there it would have at least stopped the Russian attack soon all over the front for the 1943 part. Now Germany was giving the upper hand to the Russians as well. Talking about bad decisions one after another. First attacking Kursk and then not applying the "reduced" victory blow to the Russians..

The Germans had lost but by gaining time the new weapons might have given Germany better defensive power and maybe...Maybe it´s better Hitler himself ruined it all!

 

Those are big numbers. There is no possible way that Germany could have recovered from those loses. If Russia had lost that many then they would've replaced them with twice the amount lost! But weren't Russian foot soldiers shot on sight by higher ranking officers if the foot soldiers fell back from enemy fire? And wasn't there only one gun for every two soldiers?

 

Indeed, Mustang, it was true, unfortunately. It is not just a thing from Enemy at the Gates but it is something form reality. But you must remember that the Soviet Union was a country with nearly 200.000.000 people then and could mobilise some 25.000.000 men for combat duties and like 60.000.000 men for other duties. In the other hand, Germany had no more than 60.000.000 inhabitants in 1939 and could only mobilise 10.000.000 men as a maximun...

Beside, Germany could not replace lost divisions very easily after 1941 and even if we did replace anihilated divisions, the new units were not the same quality...

 

Ummmm...not so sure. Von Manstein could have made an attempt to destroy some of the reserves around Kursk. But then we have to factor in the Russian attack in the south, which several panzer units were historically moved to counter, which they did successfully. If these panzers continue their actions in the assault on Kursk, the Russians could very well have collapsed the German southern wing instead! Plus, the attack on the Orel bulge would still be going on. And this is all assuming Manstein could maintain a sufficient loss ratio to even prevent the attack on Belgorod and Kharkov, a very uncertain assumption. In my opinion, the Germans were pretty much in the "damned if you do, damned if you don't" situation by this time.

 

I think that Von Manstein could have taken the things further in Kursk in 1943 but even if the whole battle would have been won it would not have had a serious effect on the war. And the battle could not be won. Why? Because the Northern pincer under Von Kluge was stopped. And how was that Kesselschlacht going to suceed if one of the pincers was not moving at all? I wonder...

 

And even if the germans had managed ot close the pincers at Kursk, then what? By the time they closed up, the germans would have suffered even greater losses than they did (if they continued fighting longer, we must assume more losses). So what german troops would have been available to actually clear out the salient and defeat the russian troops they had encircled? We know that the russians were massing huge amounts of men and material for their counter-offensive. If the germans had continued at Kursk, this could have left them further exposed once the russians attacked.

This varied during the war depending on time and place. Early in the war, and still at Stalingrad, the russians were very poorly equipped, and the one rifle for two men thing was probably accurate. But even while the soldiers in Stalingrad were struggling, the armies building for the counterattack were fully equipped. And as the war progressed, the russian soldiers got better equipped. By Kursk, most soldiers and divisions were well supplied.

 

You think? Well, could be. The impression I have, is that by the time of Stalingrad this would be true mostly for penal battalions and similar units, that weren't deemed important enough for decent equipment. In general anyway.

Now, anti-tank weapons and other special equipment are probably a whole different ballgame...

 

Heartland, I try not to think too much!

I get the idea that the low supplies was true in the Stalingrad fighting. However, this was probably due to the large numbers of troops being hurriedly thrown into the fight. Also, these troops were essentially being taken right of the train and thrown into the fighting. So in the case of the Stalingrad fighting, I do think that the russians were generally poorly equipped.
But since this was mainly due to circumstance, Stalingrad probably does not show the condition of the whole russian army. I think they were decently equipped by 1942. The biggest problem I think the russians often had was not havin

 

http://www.magma.ca/~khayward/deepops.htm

In October a Soviet counteroffensive had encircled the German Sixth Army in the Stalingrad pocket, destroyed the Fourth Rumanian Army, and opened up a 120-mile wide gap between German Army Groups A and B. The Soviet Southwest Front began a new series of attacks with four armies to seize Rostov and to isolate Army Group A in the Caucasus. The 24th Tank Corps was plunged into the vacuum left by the collapse of the Eighth Italian Army after the first attacks. A speedy advance put the 24th well ahead of its supporting units as it headed for the Tatsinskaya airfield, where the entire German resupply capacity for the Stalingrad pocket was based.

The Germans did not have the in-place forces necessary to defend the airfield, but they were unable to relocate the airlift operation and still maintain the resupply of Stalingrad. To protect the airfield from seizure and prevent the destruction of many aircraft, the Germans were forced to divert armoured forces from the effort to relieve the Stalingrad pocket; in so doing, the Soviet 24th Tank Corps was isolated and destroyed. The Germans scored a tactical victory at Tatsinskaya in defending the airfield, destroying a Soviet tank corps, and temporarily stopping the Soviet drive on Rostov. But the offensive as a whole was a Soviet strategic success in that only a portion of the advancing army was lost; the threat to Rostov forced Hitler to evacuate the Caucasus, sealing the fate of the Sixth Army in Stalingrad.

Also check this great site :

http://www.11thpanzer.com/dsp_originalUnit.htm


On Stalingrad:

http://216.198.255.120/diary/calnov.html

30 November 1942

By the end of November 1942, overall Luftwaffe strength is some five hundred planes lower than was available at the start of Barbarossa. The first production run of the HE-177; a 4 engined, long ranged heavy bomber, has been interrupted to convert the aircraft to a transport, so that it could assist in the resupply efforts to 6th Army. Although powered by four engines, these were paired to only two propellers. Twelve hundred of the aircraft were eventually built, but reliability problems and disappointing engine performance seem to have prevented its widespread employment as a strategic bomber. The Luftwaffe also introduced into service a huge transport around this time frame; the six engined (with six propellers) Me-323. This was capable of moving ten tons a distance of three hundred miles. Both planes were tried in the effort to supply Sixth Army, and both were miserable failures.

 

Hmmm.let´s see if it works this time...

Interesting...the first post would not show at least to me until now as I sent the info again.

The Germans gained a tactical victory at Tatsinskaya Dec 1942, yet this battle series also draw German troops and in the end was in part causing the Stalingrad destruction as forces had to be used elsewhere than for attack towards Stalingrad to free the 6th Army.
---------------

http://www.magma.ca/~khayward/deepops.htm

In October a Soviet counteroffensive had encircled the German Sixth Army in the Stalingrad pocket, destroyed the Fourth Rumanian Army, and opened up a 120-mile wide gap between German Army Groups A and B. The Soviet Southwest Front began a new series of attacks with four armies to seize Rostov and to isolate Army Group A in the Caucasus. The 24th Tank Corps was plunged into the vacuum left by the collapse of the Eighth Italian Army after the first attacks. A speedy advance put the 24th well ahead of its supporting units as it headed for the Tatsinskaya airfield, where the entire German resupply capacity for the Stalingrad pocket was based.

The Germans did not have the in-place forces necessary to defend the airfield, but they were unable to relocate the airlift operation and still maintain the resupply of Stalingrad. To protect the airfield from seizure and prevent the destruction of many aircraft, the Germans were forced to divert armoured forces from the effort to relieve the Stalingrad pocket; in so doing, the Soviet 24th Tank Corps was isolated and destroyed. The Germans scored a tactical victory at Tatsinskaya in defending the airfield, destroying a Soviet tank corps, and temporarily stopping the Soviet drive on Rostov. But the offensive as a whole was a Soviet strategic success in that only a portion of the advancing army was lost; the threat to Rostov forced Hitler to evacuate the Caucasus, sealing the fate of the Sixth Army in Stalingrad.

Check this site for great info on this battle scene:

http://www.11thpanzer.com/dsp_originalUnit.htm



[ 18. January 2003, 03:43 AM: Message edited by: Kai-Petri ]