stalingrad?

In september,a withdrawal from Stalingrad was maybe possible,but,as there were no indications of a Soviet attack,there was no need for a withdrawal.
In november,a withdrawal was impossible,because the Soviets would attack the retreating 6 Army and destroy it and,there were in november (and I suspect also in september) no mobile divisions available to help the retreating 6 Army:in october only the 22PzD with 42 tanks was available.,at the end of october even Hitler became anxious,and ordered to bring in 6PzD and 2 ID(of course,this was not enough),but,the problem was that these divisions were in France :this is proving that nothing was available in the East :everything was committed.To prevent the catastrophe,at least 15 mobile divisions were needed.
Last point :from WWIItotal,the German strength on 24 june 1942
AGN: 45 divisions (of which 7 mobile)
AGC:61(of which 12 mobile) + 2 allied
AGS:69 divisons (of which 20 mobile) +28 allied
The total would be (Germans only) :2.8 million

 

....and at least it shows that the experiences that Napoleon made were blown in the wind!

 

The reacon would have helped but I give more credit to the Russians hiding their intensions vs Germans doing a poor job. Germans did all they could with what they had it was actually the Bulgarians and Hungarians who warned Germany of what they suspected... Germany thougth that it was impossible and then BAM!

As for the sneaky Russians.... That was me, im the one that said that

 

Yes indeed, but they were no longer fighting in Russia...

Thanks BTW.

 

Also, can our mods move this thread out of "General" and into the "Eastern Front"?

 

Sometimes it is good to believe your allies! Problem was that they often called out a Russian mass attack and it were only a smaller aerial attack. Thats live! No excuses for having done a really bad job. Normally you´ve send out a own Recon unit to have a look at it! But as often mentioned, we can easily say what would have been right from our POV.

I knew it and i like it!

 

It seems that you are the only one who wanted to be "evacuated" TO the Eastern front.

 

Stalingrad may not have been the Military turning point but it was certainly the pschological turning point - up to that point german superiority had been accepted as the norm but after Stalingrad the prestige of the German Army never recovered with German Allies and Neutrals and opponents.

The SSD which regularly reported on german opinion to Goebbels issued a report that even in Germany confidence had dropped - "Our fickle racial comrades are inclined to regard Stalingrad as the beginning of the end" ran one report (source Joachim Fest - Hitler) - Winston could not have put it better.

Also it had a big effect on Hitler himself. He had already sacked Halder but even his new Chief of Staff, Zeitler, argued strongly that 6th Army should be allowed to break out. Only the toadies Jodl and Keitel supported Hitler.

Hitler retreated into his lair - Goebbels comments that the Fuhrer no longer got any fresh air, no relaxation, rarely visited the troops and cut himself off from his Generals "his only companion was Bondi!"

Already he was starting to think of Gotterdamerung.

 

Had this city not been taken the Red Army would always be present to hit the Germans or her allies on the flanks

They could certainly attack through the "land bridge", but that would not depend on possession of the city. There were no bridges at Stalingrad at that time; it's irrelevant to an attack from one side of the Volga-Don line to the other. If you want to modify the argument to that the Germans should have secured the entire area between the rivers and anchored their line on the bend of the Don, you could make a case for that.

Slight digression - it's sometimes suggested that the Germans had an opportunity to seize Stalingrad at little cost early in the campaign, if 4th Panzer Army had not been diverted south to support von Kliest. Anyone know how true that is? It would certainly be worth taking the city if it could be done easily, for many of the reasons enumerated here, but that does not mean that fighting for it block-by-block as they did was an absolute necessity.

Although we consider the Volga-Don line the flank of the drive into the Caucasus, as the Germans moved down the right banks of the rivers, they would be deploying - facing left, so to speak - to meet the anticipated Soviet counteroffensives.

Think of the Kursk salient, but this time put a large city there instead....

O.k., or just imagine that Kursk was a larger city than it was - how does that change that battle?

The Russians were able to replenish the city with hundreds of thousands of men under fire. Imagine what they might have done had they were allowed to do this freely

Wherever the lines were, the Russians would be moving replacements and reinforcements forward, and the Germans would seek to interdict them, by air and in the immediate rear areas by artillery. Given the Russian talent for camouflage, they would probably suffer less moving up over land than having to cross a river under fire. Think for a minute - when the replacements get to to within a mile of the front, are you actually suggesting that it's better for them to have to get into boats and cross a river than if they could walk there?

secure all land up to the Volga Red Army free with a shorter and better defensive position and excellent landing strips for the Luftwaffe.

Again we may recall that Stalingrad is beyond the bend of the Volga. They could certainly continue on into the "land bridge", secure Stalingrad, and anchor their line on the bend of the Don, but the length of front is the same and so is the portion of it which is land versus riverbank. The "land bridge" might offer some air base locations, if you want them that close to the front lines, but once again it's hardly worth a bloody struggle in the city.

What would they do if Stalingrad was fully in Russian hands? What if the Russians launched a similar offensive aimed at cutting of the Germans at the bend from the rest of the front?

The offensive they did launch did not depend on Stalingrad, nor would it have been impacted if the Germans had occupied those last few blocks of the city. The obsession with Stalingrad was what set the Germans up for the Russian assault.

 

You beat me to it

I agree. The fighting that the 6th experienced within the city walls was quite unorthodox and perhaps uneccessary but none the less; it was Germany's own making. By the time the 6th entered the city it was a rubble. IMO, what prevented the Red Army from retreating was Stalin's order 227. The Germans, expected to simply walk through (probably should have) but once the fighting started they simply could not retreat. Even Chuikov had a hard time understanding how the city held on. Though im not sure about the panzers, (while arriving late) tanks usually dont do very well in cities so that argument will perhaps always remain in the air.

The referrence I was trying to make was regarding the front. With Stalingrad in Soviet hands, you now woud have a bulge (just like the Kursk salient) which the Germans attacked in order to shorten the front. This Bulge however would now be an industrious power house. A base camp from which to launch coordinated attacks. With Stalingrad in German hands, they now have a front along a great natural obstacle and of the Red Army across the river (at least for the time being).

Apologise, not sure what you mean here?

Sorry, I dont understand? To me Stalingrad is right on the bend of the Volga.

I also agree. I guess the argument I was trying to make was had the Germans decided to bypass the city and move south to the oil fields, what was to stop the Red Army from transferring units to Stalingrad from which to strike up to the Don and cut off the Germans in the South? In other words the Germans would now be trapped between the Black and Caspian sea.

In reality, it would seem that almost any scenerio would have been better than what had historically happened Was the city worth it? There could be an argument for both, one thing is for sure though; definately not at the expense of 700k axis troops.

 

From Strategy for defeat the Luftwaffe 1933-45


On November 23, at Göring's behest, the Luftwaffe staff began the task of improvising an air transport force to supply Sixth Army. From the start, it was apparent that only in the best circumstances was an airlift capability of 350 tons per day possible (Sixth Army estimated it needed 600 tons). However, only by stripping training units of all aircraft and by removing transport aircraft assigned to duty in Germany could the Luftwaffe reach such a level. An assortment of Ju 52's, Ju 86's, and He 111's (now being assigned to some transport units) moved from the Reich to support the airlift. In addition, the first operational Gruppe of He 177's and several He 111 bomber Gruppen joined the force.

(my bold)

By 3/2/43 the Luftwaffe had lost 269 Ju 52's, 169 He 111's, 9 Fw 200's, 1 Ju 290, 5 He 177's, and 42 Ju 86's, for a grand total of 495 aircraft.These losses represented the equivalent of five flying wings or an entire Fliegerkorps. Perhaps as important was the negative impact on training programs, especially those training multiengine pilots. Particularly devastating were crew losses among instrument instructors.

 

Thanks for valuable data!

Sadly, Air Bridge was just a swindle to keep the 6th army in the cauldron. For Wehmacht headquarters they were more worthy dead than alive.
Führer was perhaps in delusion that the rescue might have worked out but all professional soldiers of the general stuff must have known what was really going on. They have double-crossed Paulus with promises that they would have rescued him and his soldiers. Paulus's correspondence reveals that he trusted his colleagues. In fact, they have traded-of benefits of rescuing Manstein vs. sacrificing Paulus. This episode reveals morbid character of opportunists that Führer has gathered around himself in the headquarters of Wehrmacht. However it was Manstein who has knowingly betrayed Paulus on the battlefield.

 

all land up to the Volga Red Army free with a shorter and better defensive position and excellent landing strips for the Luftwaffe. Again we may recall that Stalingrad is beyond the bend of the Volga. They could certainly continue on into the "land bridge", secure Stalingrad, and anchor their line on the bend of the Don, but the length of front is the same and so is the portion of it which is land versus riverbank. The "land bridge" might offer some air base locations, if you want them that close to the front lines, but once again it's hardly worth a bloody struggle in the city.

Sorry, I dont understand? To me Stalingrad is right on the bend of the Volga.
The offensive they did launch did not depend on Stalingrad, nor would it have been impacted if the Germans had occupied those last few blocks of the city. The obsession with Stalingrad was what set the Germans up for the Russian assault.



I also agree. I guess the argument I was trying to make was had the Germans decided to bypass the city and move south to the oil fields, what was to stop the Red Army from transferring units to Stalingrad from which to strike up to the Don and cut off the Germans in the South?

Suppose the limit of the German advance was the Volga-Don canal (which I believe was under construction at the time), they would hold all the territory south of the Volga, including plenty of space for air bases. Yes, the Russians would have the opportunity to strike south through the land bridge, it's almost inevitable; the Germans would understand that and prepare to meet them on open ground. It's simple geography, does not depend on the city of Stalingrad, indeed the situation would be basically the same if there were no city on the west bank of the Volga at all. The city might be useful for housing troops temporarily before they went into battle, but it's no easier to cross the Volga there than anywhere else, not to mention that the Russians would move into the land bridge from the north, between the rivers.

We're only talking about a little square of land, about 40 miles on a side IIRC, with the city of Stalingrad on one side. If the Germans had been able to secure it easily early in the campaign, they certainly should have, but on the scale of the 1942 battleground that's not a vast difference either. What I disagree with is the idea that possession of Stalingrad is what determines whether the Russians can threaten the German advance into the Caucasus or feed reinforcements into the battle.

 

Well put