T-34

IIRC, according to both Zaloga and Glantz, the real pain T-34-76 inflicted on the Wehrmacht from 1941-1942 was the wrecking of German infantry divisions. Panzer Division were shaken and demoralized by the apparent superiority of Russian tanks, but in armor versus armor engagement Germans invariably prevail by superior combined-arms tactics and vastly better maneuver.

Pz. III's, 88's and a few Stukas were generally sufficient to throw the Russians in confusion.

 

Not really much to add, other than salutes to both TA's and Triple C's posts. Superb analysis of the T34.

Seems that numbers often somewhat skew analysis of the T34; so many were produced, that simple numerical superiority often gave the russian tank armies a large advantage. Especially given they were fighting the germans, who were never able to produce enough tanks and AFVs, seems fair to say that the Russians could usually count on a numerical, and hence brute force, advantage.

But if one is to believe that the kill/loss ratios recorded by German tankers are even close to accurate, when it came to the [relatively rare] tank on tank action between relatively equal numbers, the weaknesses of the T34s and KV series became pretty apparent.

 

Just one additional comment regarding the T34:
Its interesting to read comments about the ground pressure, flotation, etc. of the T34's wide tracks. Yes this is an advantage, but not to the degree that I often see it put out there as. The reason being is that during the early part of the campaign in the Soviet Union is when the T34 had its best comparative advantages, but also had its worst disadvantages in regards to communications (no radios) and logistical support. Its not like the Soviets had fuelers with the same off road capability as the tanks, nor could they coordinate support on the fly to maintain any kind of mobile operations. If the environment is such that only the T34's can move because of mud or snow, I would assume that the Germans would be defensive? Even if the Soviets with their T34's can move and attack in mud/snow, how would they follow up/consolidate, refuel, recover tanks, etc. when nothing else can move. So to me, the comparative advantage held by the T34 over German tanks in the early war period in the East isn't all that impressive once all things are considered.

 

JBark,

Good post on the strengths and weaknesses of the T-34. However, don't you think it's an overstatement that by 42 German AT weaponry was regularly knocking out T-34 tanks? The long 50mm was not very effective against the T-34, frontal engagement was probably still a nasty job left for the 88s and long 75s.

PAK 40 was introduced to the Eastern front in November of 41 and became the main AT gun for the Germans from then on. The PzIV long barrel 75 was appearing in greater numbers as well so the advantage of the T-34's armor had been negated. I'm not sure what you mean by a nasty job for the 88's and 75's? They could both kill the T-34 with a frontal shot.

I'll say once again I think the T-34 got an exaggerated reputation because the men in the field were not ready for it and ran into a number of situations where they didn't have enough gun to dispatch it quickly. In the final analysis WWII saw example after example where technology was not the winner for tank v tank fighting, but tactics. The Germans killed more than a boatload of T-34's.

 

Possibly the M4/76 not the M4/75, The M3 75mm is nearly hopeless against a Panther's frontal armour, an 85/52 is not, according to Soviet tests the 85/52 could penetrate late production Panthers, earlier production tanks apparently had significantly better quality armour plates.

Soviet tests credit the US 76 with a better A/T performace than the 85.
Soviet tank guns, like the M3, and unlike the US 76, were not optimized for A/T, the Soviet 85 had much better HE capability than any allied tank weapon except the 90mm ad the low velocity howitzers of some British tanks.

IIRC in 1942 the US were turning out medium tanks with a 7 men crew and a 37mm turret, the Valentine had a two man turret, a backwards step from the Matilda, but it was in production long after the T-34/41 was phased out.

Seem to remember T-55s in Saigon, as the ARVN had quite a number of M-48s how did they get there?
In other instances with similar training levels (Iran/Iraq and India/Pakistan) the soviet armour doesn't look to be at a noticeable disadvantage . Of course the Israeli would make a Little Willie look good, but they replaced almost as much of their Shermans as of the T-55 and quite a lot of the M-48 as well.

AFAIK Italy replaced the M47 with Centauro heavy armoured cars years ago and is currently in the process of replacing the first generation Centauro.

 

The M3 medium was an interm design that the US put into production mainly to get something in the field quick. The Valentine was a pre-war design that was put into production again to put tanks in the field. The British only fielded two brigades using the vehicle and it served almost exclusively as a gun tank in North Africa. After that the hulls became surplus for British usage and were converted into various engineer vehicles and Archer SPGs.
The Russians liked and used the Valentine because it was a far better light tank than their own T 70.

The ARVN did have M-48's. Up until these ran out of ammunition and spare parts they shot the snot out of NVA T 55's. In one of the first large tank on tank actions along Highway 1 during the early days of the North invading the South a T 55 regiment got demolished by the South's 20th Tank Regiment around Dong Ha. Another fight between ARVN M 41's and a mixed group of T55 and PT 76 near Aloui resulted in about a dozen NVA tanks lost for no ARVN losses.
In fact, the 20th Regiment did not lose a single M48 to enemy action. They in turn destroyed in the neighborhood of 75+ NVA tanks in a number of actions. In fact the one really successful action against ARVN armor was at Kontum where the NVA deployed a number of sagger missiles against ARVN M 41 tanks destroying a number of these. The small number of T54 present did not contribute anything to the armor battle.

 

IIRC Valentine production ended in 1944 and the were in use in the PTO until V-Day. The T-70 was a much worse case of too much gun/armour and too little crew space than the T-34 , little wonder the crews preferred the Valentine, it had a two men crew and a one man turret with very similar issues to the French tanks.
Do you know what position was deleted by the British 6 man M3 variant? can't find any info on it.

 

It was the radio operator - the British commander used the radios in the turret in the Grant and hooked into the hull radios in the Lee, so an extra dedicated radio operator in the hull was considered unnecessary.

 

Well there was the M4(105)

 

Forgot abot that one,your'e right

 

In all fairness some don't consider it a "tank" at that point. Although with a HEAT round it may have also had one of the more leathal AT rounds given a hit.

 

By nasty business, I mean the Germans usually whipped out their towed 88s, field howitzers fired over open sights, or fighter-bombers to deal with T-34s whenever possible. The first tank capable of fighting the T-34 or KV-1 on equal terms was the Pz. IV with the long 75. I do not think the long 50 had the power to joust those Soviet tanks. Until the advent of Pz. IV ausf. F and Tiger tanks, the Wehrmacht must best Soviet armor with cunning and skill, not better weapons.

I think PAK 40 were comparatively rare in 42. Even in 44 regimental anti-tank guns were the antique long 50, which gives some perspective to Allied tankers complaining about those damned 88s. Even during Operation Blue the Germans were running four variants of Pz. III and IVs, armed with short 50, long 50, short 75 and long 75. The last category IIRC was a minority. The PAK 40 might have been intended to be the main antitank weapon of German forces, but I recall shortages were quite severe.

T-34 was an excellent piece of engineering in terms of performing its intended function, i.e. to be thrown at the Germans. It made little sense to the Russians to machine the running parts to a high standard since those nuts and bolts were unlikely to outlive the very short combat life expectancy of their tanks.

I am going off to a wild tangent now, but I recall II SS Panzer Corps almost wiped out the 5th Guards Tank Army in Porkhorovka, but in four weeks the Tank Army was completely reconstituted and again attacked the Germans with the familiar determination.

 

"I think PAK 40 were comparatively rare in 42... The PAK 40 might have been intended to be the main antitank weapon of German forces, but I recall shortages were quite severe."

I did not know this nor have I seen mention of it in quick checks of info on the web about PAK 40's and such. I recall reading in the Osprey book T-34 v. Panther that the difficulty in dealing with the T-34's armor was short lived and the author cited the arrival of the PAK 40. It seems they killed a boatload of them, so...?

 

this site shows the production figures, very few before 1943;

The Pak 40 Anti-Tank Gun

 

Large (100mm and up) field pieces were dangerous to most tanks even just firing HE rounds. Aganist most AFV a large HE round direct hit would destroy the tank as thoroughly as any AP round would. The M4(105) was mentioned. I put up a picture of what the APHE / Heavy wall / Common round would do to a Panther at say 500 yards.

As for the 50/60 pak by the invasion of Russia it was beginning to be issued on a one platoon / battery basis to divisions as it came available. This meant that a division receiving these replaced 6 pak 3.7 with 3 pak 50/60. So, initially, an infantry division might have had three pak 50/60 available. The French 4.7cm and even French 7.5cm field pieces were issued as interm substitutes when it was obvious that more AT firepower was required.

By mid to late 42 most divisions now had 3 to 9 50/60 in the panzerjäger abteilung. These were then replaced by the 75/46 on a one-for-one basis and by 1944 the pak 50/60 was becoming more rare. The 3.7cm soldiered on until lost often fitted wtih a special HEAT bomb that could tackle most tanks. Of course this was a poor substitute being short ranged and having to be muzzle loaded.

 

Let's both check elsewhere for corroboration. I glanced at another Osprey book at B&N the other day and it quoted production numbers double what your site mentions for '42. I've also read in two places that delivery of the gun began in Nov. '41 which your site seems to disagree with.

?

 

Spartanroller

Just did a quick search of internet sites offering history of the PAK 40; only yours does not show the gun having been introduced on the eastern front in Nov. '41.

 

They claim the figures were from Hogg's "German Artillery of World War Two" - don't currently have one but working on it. I have found several conflicting quantities now. Will get back to you, nice catch(perhaps)

Apparently 'Waffen und Geheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933-1945', by Fritz Hahn also agrees with original figures for 1941;

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=70&t=155979&start=15

"One can accumulate the following figures for Pak 40 in 1941: Gun production none, ammunition production none, guns lost on the Eastern Front none, ammunition consumption in the East none"

"It is quite possible that pre-production Pak 40s were used in field trials in 1941. According to Waffen-Revue No.79 the Heer received first guns in February 1942: 15 Pak 40s (3 of which on wheeled carriage), further 10 were delivered in March 1942 (all on wheeled carriage). However the Heer inventory on 1.4.1942 included 44 Pak 40s; 19 more than deliveries of production Pak 40s by that date. Thus it seems that at least 19 pre-production guns remained in Army inventory."

"Waffen-Revue No.79 notes that the statement that the first Pak 40 deliveries to the troops were in 1941 stems from a British report that was used as a source by post-war German authors. However according to Überblick über den Rüstungszustand beim Heer the first Pak 40 deliveries were made in February 1942 (only three of which on a wheeled carriage). Although the stats are known not to be quite consistent it is notable that on 1.12.1941, 1.1.1942 and 1.2.1942 the Heer arsenal included zero Pak 40. Thus it seems that a Pak 40 delivery to a sideshow theatre of war in 1941 is highly unlikely and that Milintel reports are not always the most reliable source especially if they conflict with primary ones."

Although other contributors disagree.

Perhaps we need a new thread for this to try and get a definitive answer?

 

Perhaps we need a new thread for this to try and get a definitive answer? [/QUOTE]

I'm game. Artillery it is, right?

 

Almost everything which we have bee taught about comparing tanks on both fronts is completely wrong.
Firstly, go to wikipedia and add all the tank production of both countries. Guess what? They made the same number of tanks. When you count all tanks better than PzIII and T-34, they made the same number of tanks. The idea that the Russians outproduced the Germans is a fallacy. The US did not even produce as many tanks as Germany, in any year.
Secondly, the T-34 was not resistant to fire at all. The 50mm L/42 gun of the PzIIIG could penetrate the T-34 frontally at over 500m with normal pzgr.39 ammo. It could also penetrate the KV at over 500m frontally with tungsten pzgr.40 rounds. We have all heard the stories about T-34 and KV-1 taking down dozens of German tanks, but when you actually look into these stories, you find that the German tanks were no better than PzII or 38t. No Russian tank ever killed dozens of PzIII or IV in a single battle.
The T-34 was also vulnerable to the short 75mm L/24 of the IV and Stug, as they both had HEAT rounds capable of defeating the frontal armor of the T-34, and at any range. The rounds were not rare at all as many people try to make people believe, a stug captured in North Africa was found with over 30 HEAT rounds aboard, and their supply situation was even worse than in Russia.
The Russians did not have a huge tank force as people believe. In 1941 they started the year with roughly 1000 tanks. They ended the year with the same number they began, even though they produced over 15k tanks that year. The Germans managed to kill all 15k of them.
The T-34 was not the inspiration for the Panther, did not jump start the production of the Tiger, and the King Tiger was not a response to the IS-2.
If you read the book about the KT development by osprey, they have documents which authorize the production of a tank with the 88mm L/71 gun of the KT in march 1941, even before the invasion of Russia.
What does that mean? The KT was ordered before the T-34 was even known, let alone the IS-2. The IS-2 was actually did not even see combat until several months after the KT, so any story which says the KT was in response to it is completely false.
The same documents which authorize the production of the KT also refer to the prototype numbers of the Panther and Tiger, which were authorized before the invasion of France. The Tiger came about from a request of a tank using the shortened 88mm L/56 gun, while the Panther was a totally new design which was to be created from scratch using the most modern technology. The Tiger actually was based on a tank from 1938, which was roughly equivalent to the PzIVH, a tank which was far superior to the T-34/76 in armament and armor. Even this early Tiger prototype would have been invulnerable to the T-34/76 from the front, except for when it used tungsten rounds, which would have barely been effective at a few hundred meters.
When it comes to the German tanks, they were not at invulnerable as some believe. Many tanks were built with substitute armor, which led to far higher hardness and therfore less resistance to shells. A properly constructed panther could resist even the most powerful gun the west deployed, the 17 pounder (the 90mm was slightly less powerful), but many panthers which were made with substitute armor could be penetrated easily. If you look for penetrations of panthers with the 17 pounder, you can easily find images of rounds penetrating the glacis. Not only that, but the US 76mm could penetrate the turret mantlet at close range, and even beyond 600m with HVAP/APCR ammo. The quality of the panther armor is the reason why you see contradicting sources about the effectiveness of the Russian 122mm gun on the IS-2, as a properly contructed Panther with 280BHN armor is immune to the 122 from point blank, while the poorly made 350BHN panther can be penetrated cleanly through and out the back by the same 122mm rounds.
You will also see stories about how the KT was penetrated by the 122mm, and they are also true. Many KT had very poor armor of nearly 400BHN and were less protected than a properly constructed Panther. A properly made KT was immune to the 122mm from the front.

So what it comes down to is that the T-34 was an awful tank which was extremely ineffective, and the Germans had plenty of tanks. What the Germans did not have was fuel for those tanks, and so more than half of German tanks were destroyed by their own crews after running out of fuel, and many more were destroyed from the air in transit.

The truth about the effectiveness of air power is that only 5% of tank kills were from air strikes on deployed German tanks. Airstrikes on the supply lines caused the loss of far more tanks than direct attacks on them.
When it comes down to it, the stereotypical stories we hear about tanks in WWII are contradicted by every single piece of data I have seen. Even the most widely known pieces of information do not support the stories which the majority of people believe.