the early german successes

You made me curious about that Blitz Myth book, it may be rubbish but there may be a detail or two of interest...

Those figures I quoted are from Keegan's book, I haven't found any corroboration here at home yet, but that little conflict between Italy and France does not get much press anyway.

 

I have read that book and while some of his points maybe a little out there, I thought they were well discussed

 

OMFG! Moiser's book is absolutely the worst ever written on the subject. Here is a review: Note, I also wrote the man an told him his book was crap just so you know I didn't do this behind his back so to speak....

Moiser's The Blitzkrieg Myth can probably best be summed up by the heading of one of his own chapters; The Persistence of Failed Ideas. This in a nutshell, is this book.
Moiser starts off by discussing the underlying theories and development of military thinking up to the beginning of the war. He chooses just two primary theorists to base his case on; Fuller and Douhet. The problem here is that Moiser draws the conclusion that these two authors are archetypical of all strategic thought of the period as applied to land and air warfare. This can best be summed up in Moiser's words; "So far as ground warfare went, Fuller's ideas reigned supreme. All French and German theorists studied his writings carefully....But Fuller's Plan 1919 became the controlling paradigm for effective ground warfare" [pg 18]
Nothing could be further from the truth. Fuller was essentially ignored in Britain where both he and Liddell Hart were turned into pariahs by the Royal Army for their vitriolic views of the future of war.
In France, the Ecole Superieure de Guerre developed the doctrine of "methodical battle" totally independent of anything Fuller suggested. If anything, methodical battle advocated precisely the opposite of what Fuller wrote about. General Gamelin went so far as to order that all articles, lectures, books, etc. that French officers might write had to be approved by the high command before publication to ensure orthodoxy of thought on doctrine. DeGaulle remained a colonel for breaking this edict.
With the Germans, their doctrine was a logical progression from the stroßtruppen tactics of late WW I. They developed the deep infiltration battle as their view of what would win in future wars. This, in 1939 became popularized as the Blitzkrieg. It was hardly a reality of what Fuller envisioned.
Moiser then turns to technical topics: Fortifications and tanks. On the Maginot Line he waxes eloquent at length about its strengths. Yet, even during the 1940 campaign the Germans found it possible to defeat the line, in part in practice and, in part in theory, using direct fire from 88 and 105 mm AA guns. A later offensive operation during the French campaign against the Rhine defenses proved the viability of this technique, something the French had not thought of and did not design the Maginot Line to be proof against.
Moiser does get right that Hitler spent too much capital on fortifications of his own at the expense of other equipment. But, in tying German tank production to this he stretches at best. One need only look at the size of German tank factories to see that their production rate was small due to the small size of the plants producing them more than anything.
On the subject of tanks, Moiser sticks to basics when comparing vehicles: Armor, firepower, mobility. He brushes off such things as radios or lack thereof, crew efficiency or, visibility from the vehicle. The Tiger and Panther are characterized as failures. But, the Sherman is too for being unable to stand up to these vehicles. The T-34 is claimed to be the only really successful tank of the war, while the diminutive and cramped Hetzer is claimed to be the best tank destroyer.
On air warfare, Moiser derides the Allies for being overly focused on the strategic bombing of Germany to the detriment of tactical air support. He conveniently overlooks the contributions of the Allied Tactical Air Forces that rivaled the strategic bombing forces in size. With the Germans he claims exactly the opposite is true: That they ignored strategic bombing for tactical support. Neither is really the case but, this is never discussed. Moiser also overlooks the really minor role tactical close support played for the Germans both in Poland and France.
On the various campaigns Moiser's overall argument is that each (Poland, France, and the later Allied advances across France) were all broad front operations successful more by hard infantry fighting all along the front than anything due to narrow breakthroughs and fast armored columns advancing across the enemy rear. This ignores the effects of the breakthrough at Sedan, Saint Lo and, dozens of other such operations both in the West and East in the Second World War.
In between, Moiser hurls literary grenades at various generals, doctrines and, battles deriding all as failures to recognize the reality of warfare as he describes it in his book. The overall effect is amateurish. His bibliography, likewise, reflects a selection of generally popular sources that give no depth to his arguments.

Don't waste your money on this oinker. Get another book on the subject. May's Strange Victory is a readily available and decent one. Read it.

 

ok, ok, keep your pants up! I won't buy it

 

I severely doubt of this statement. One of the reasons the OKH (Army High Command) was so skeptical of Von Manstein's plan was because of fear of the furia française that had ruined German plans at the Marne and Verdun. Colonel general Von Bock laughed at the Ardennes offensive, claiming: 'As if the French are going to sit there and do nothing with our exposed 300km southern flank!'. Then, colonel general Von Rundstedt, who had lived in his own skin how demoralising could be a retreat just when the Eiffel tower was at sight in 1914, knew he had to be careful with his tanks at Dunkirk, because, he thought, he couldn't waste all his resources on defeating the BEF when the bulk of the French Armies were still fighting.

As were the four German cavalry divisions guarding the Soviet border... what's your point?

No. Many of the French tank designs were, in fact, in many technical aspects, far better than the Germans'.

No. The 'Maginot Line' was designed, in part, as a method to release reserves to hold the undefended Franco-Belgian border. In 1940, the strongest French Armies, along the BEF, were stationed in the border to advance into Belgian and the Netherlands in the event of a German attack.

Referring to this would be hi-jacking this thread... but I only have to mention that Maskírovka, operational art and the guts of the Iván did more to beat the Jerries than numbers... like at Stalingrad, where three Soviet soldiers with a machine gun, held three German battallions for almost 30 hours and caused some hundred casualties...

 

Okay,...I get the point

 

I can only really echo some of the points previously noted- early German successes were a combination of advantages the germans had and shortcomings in their enemies. Especially the "readiness" factor- the Germans not only wanted war, but they were also the aggressors- all their enemies were reacting to them.
The main things that caused the Germans to no longer enjoy such success was when enemies essentially "slowed them down". In the Battle of Britian, the Brits were able to make the air war into one of attrition, which slowed the germans and denied them the quick victory and expected British surrender.
Likewise in Russia- the massive distances and logistical difficulties along with the stubborn russian resistance turned a "lightning war" into a grinding war of attrition.

Like a couple people have noted in regards to the French campaign- there were plenty of French soldiers and units that fought well, but the overall pace of the battle negated those local efforts.

But really, I just wanted to note that TA used the "OMFG" phrase.

Having read many of his well-informed, detailed, and interesting posts.... I thought his use of that phrase should be noted for future reference.

 

I think,one reason why the Germans advanced so much from mid 1941 to end 1941 was because the SU wasnt quite ready for an attack from Germany.However I think it could of been a master plan for the SU retreating and letting the Germans advance proceed until winter.The reason being the SU knew that in winter the German advance toward moscow would stuggle making them weaker whilst the SU got stronger defending.

 

Even I have a point beyond which I have to resort to obvious hyperbole to ensure my point is made. As a general note to all, you all need be warned, the next time I am in Europe you all are going to be buying once I drink the lot of you under the table....

 

"OMFG" = "Oh, marvellous! Fried gizzards!"

I hope I'm right!

 

Correct.

Absolutely wrong. Doctrine demanded that the enemy would be met in place with the uttermost resistance, and thrown back where he had came from and defeated there! There was absolutely no way the Soviets would happilly trade ground for time, it was stubborn resistance everywhere.

 

Maybe not all wrong,then why didnt the SU put any real fight against the Germans until they got 100 miles from Moscow.Also what date did Stalin order a no fall back policy.?

 

Many Soviet formations of all size did try and put up resistance to the German invasion. The problem was most were very poorly organized, many were poorly or only partially equipped and, both the leadership and manpower were usually not up to the task.
As a semi-hypotheical scenario a tank division with 175 runners (mostly BT 7 with some T 26 and T 40 lights thrown in let's say) is ordered to attack a German panzer division and halt its advance. The Soviet unit has only 6 76mm field pieces available. There is no ammunition for their 152mm battery which also lacks tractors to move the guns. The infantry is on foot as the required trucks to move them never arrived. So, they will not be available for the attack.
Moscow demands an immediate attack with the forces at hand. The Soviet division commander complies and orders his tanks forward.
The Soviets attack basically with just their tanks. Because of a lack of radios what little artillery support there is never gets used. The tanks also are scattered in part due to communications problems and in part to their junior officer leadership not having maps (state secrets you know...so they were not issued) and having been poorly briefed.
The Germans initially are hit moderately hard just because of the numbers involved. But, they quickly recover and establish an anti-tank line that massacres the Soviet tanks as they blunder into it in small groups. The panzer regiment regroups and launches a counter attack crushing what remains of the Soviet unit. By the end of the day the Soviet division commander is being sacked for his failure and what little remains of his command is in full retreat to who-knows-where. These reminants will eventually form a core of a new tank brigade or corps but not for many months.

 

I hope you are not going to tell me the hundreds of thousand of German casualties (I'll get you the figure later) before the Moscow battle died of boredom.

Why don't you read something like this to get some more perspective on the subject (not precluding reading some actual books!)?

 

Awsome link ZA...thanks