The germans invented the nuclear bomb!

wow - pretty amazing story. I do remember how they had found it hard to have food as they had to watch out for the occasional German Patrol i think. I am guessing the members of the Gliders that survived were executed because of Hitlers No-Commandoes Policy?

 

Yes Beni, it was Hitler’s Commando Order which started to be issued the previous month. On 7 October it first appeared as a note written by Hitler himself in the Wehrmacht daily communiqué: “In future, all terror and sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices, who do not act like soldiers but rather like bandits, will be treated as such by the German troops and will be ruthlessly eliminated in battle, wherever they appear.”

On 18th October after much deliberation by High Command lawyers, officers and staff, Hitler issued the ‘Kommandobefehl’ in secret with 12 copies. The following day Army Chief of Staff, Jodl, distributed copies to Headquarters with his addition advising top secrecy and distribution protocol.

It wasn’t the only instance of such an order to murder specific personnel, there was also the “Commissar Order” and "Nacht und Nebel".

This raid and the way the men should have been better interrogated before being murdered was the subject of German communiqués which were presented and sited during the Nuremberg Trials.

Extract from Avalon: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/01-07-46.htm
"Beside the 17-member crew extensive sabotage material and work equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was absolutely proved. The 280th Infantry Division ordered the execution of the action according to the Fuhrer Order. The execution was carried out toward the evening of 20 November [1942]. Some of the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki

Page 447

Trial date 7 Jan. 46

uniforms which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their names, ranks and serial numbers."

“According to the last sentence of the Fuhrer Order of 18th October, individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being in order to keep them for interrogation. The importance of this measure was proved in the cases of the Glomfjord, 2-man torpedo Drontheim, and glider plane Stavanger, where interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge of enemy intentions. Since in the case of Egersund the saboteur was liquidated immediately and no clues were obtained; therefore, Armed Forces Commander refers to the abovementioned last sentence of the Fuhrer Order calling for liquidation only after a short interrogation."

8 Crash dead were buried on the spot by local civilians and German soldiers. 4 Injured were taken to Stavanger Hospital and then to the Gestapo where a doctor killed them by injections of morphine and air bubbles. The bodies were weighted with stones, taken a hour’s distance out in a fjord then thrown overboard – they were never recovered. 5 Crash survivors were taken to Grini Concentration Camp where they were interrogated under torture before having their hands bound behind them with barbed wire and shot.

Regarding the Wellington and glider that went down near Helleren, all 5 Australian bomber crew died in the crash and 5 were killed in the glider. 2 Men went for local help but together the survivors decided to surrender. The Germans took them to Egersund where they were all shot and their bodies put into a mass grave on the beach where 180 Norwegians and 25 Russians were also buried.

All bodies were recovered in 1945 and re-interred except the 4 men in the fjord.

The Norwegian Home Army stopped the Germans responsible leaving Norway at the end of the war and worked with locals and British Intelligence in discovering what had happened to the raiders. The head of the Gestapo committed suicide, one was found dying of cancer, and the others including the so called ‘doctor’ were shot – eventually.

No.9

[ 19. February 2004, 12:56 AM: Message edited by: No.9 ]

 

Were there any other cases of such brutality against 'bandits'? I cant think of another case where a raid failed - such as that one - and the commandoes were captured and exectued. Ignoring the PTO. I may be wrong, but i dont think there were that many raides like that to warrant Hitler issuing the order to kill all 'bandits'.

 

There were hundred’s of raids Beni, mounted mainly by Combined Operations, the SOE, Naval Intelligence and OSS. Only a few get much publicity as they weren’t grand, spectacular or involved personnel Hollywood could make a film about, i.e. there were few or no American’s involved. Everyone knows Normandy, D-Day, D-Day, D-Day etc, but how many appreciate that before the invasion the men of Combined Operations Pilotage Party, carried by X-Craft submarines, were on the beaches right under the German’s noses making measurements and plans and taking sand and soil samples?

The Nuremberg Trails sited 55 men as having been killed under the terms of Hitler’s Commando Order. We have to appreciated that 55 does obviously not represent the total number of people who surrendered or were captured in uniform and were then murdered. For example, this specific line of prosecution does not encompass the men massacred at Malmedy or the great number of combat Partisans. Also, the orders were not issued specifically in reply to a request for instructions in one instance only, they were issued as standing modus operandi for the duration unless and until counter orders were issued.

Many officers stated they did not agree with the Order and it was found to be the case that they did not enforce them, Rommel a well know senior example. However, examples of the Order being, at least, used as an excuse did persist. In December 1942 some men of the Royal Navy’s Boom Patrol Detachment who took part in Operation Frankton to kayak up the River Gironde and sink shipping at Bordeaux, fell into German hands and were executed though in uniform.

In many instances there appears to have been requests asking for clarification of clause 5 in the original Order:

5. This order does not apply to the treatment of those enemy soldiers who are taken prisoner or give themselves up in open battle, in the course of normal operations, large scale attacks; or in major assault landings or airborne operations. Neither does it apply to those who fall into our hands after a sea fight, nor to those enemy soldiers who, after air battle, seek to save their lives by parachute.

Clearly this is ambiguous but suggests to me that it was not designed to be an open ended licence to murder captives, but rather Hitler was not able to be universally specific to fit every situation. The officer in the field and the men under him therefore left open to make their own interpretation.

This clause was queried with the 1944 Normandy invasion. How do the Germans decide between men of a major airborne operation and men in a ‘commando’ type raid?

Position taken by Armed Forces Operational Staff: Extract http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/commando3.htm
1. The Commando order remains basically in effect even after the enemy landing in the west.

3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases enemy personnel who have fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD, upon whom it is incumbent to determine whether the commando order is to be applied or not.

It would appear the front line officers, who paid any attention to the Order in the first place, had an option to ‘pass the buck’? In connection with Overload a number of SAS and Jedburgh teams were injected into France and Belgium and some captives were executed under the Commando Order.

No.9

 

I would assume that during the time of the Airborne Operations into Normadny prior to the Naval Invasion could easily have been mistaken for Commando Raids. For starters, small pockets of Paratroopers were appearing all over, and not in any truly organised force or in a large number. Their jobs - along with Partisans - were to disrupt communication lines (and then more major objectives such as controlling a bridge etc) which would resemble a Commando raid. I am guessing that the front line soldiers and officers later realised the extent of the Operations as reports started coming in, and the obvious siting of the Naval Armada. By that time, the fighting in St. Mere-Eglise and other such places would have proven to be more then a Commando Raid and thus the front-line soldiers would had disguarded the clause as the true scope of the Paratroopers etc would have been known.
Well, thats my opinion at least. This is a very interesting topic indeed.

 

Raids took place throughout the better part of the war. Such evidence as there is strongly suggests Hitler had a particular dislike of Commando raids and took them and the Commando concept quite personally. With hindsight and knowledge I think it can be taken that Hitler was very upset by anything that didn’t fall into his perception that Armies, or at least Brigades, should be neatly mapped out and perform on a win/lose basis. Everyone should be in proper uniform and civilians should stay in doors and do whatever the military commander ordered.

The Commandos were called into being in ’40 at the time of Dunkerque to provide a force which would hit back at the enemy. This obviously started only in a very small way, but it was preferable to Britain sitting back with a purely defensive attitude, which Churchill particularly wanted to demote. The SOE had a similar origin but with a brief to develop and foster resistance and sabotage in occupied countries.

I have always found W.W.II an amazing conflict for ‘private armies’, with almost all tracing their origins back to the Commandos. Certainly if the founders were not actual Commandos in the first place, the Commandos provided the inspiration and blueprint. Though the word ‘commando’ was not invented in 1940, it was certainly established in world dictionaries with the meaning of a Special Forces operation or operative. It’s become a generic term as well as referring to a specific and formally named unit or person.

I would say Hitler was more preoccupied with types of assaults rather than specific unit terminology. My interpretation was that a ‘proper’ action was conducted by a force that intended to stay where it arrived and expand its gains from there, i.e. North Africa landings, Italy, Normandy. In this way a commander, i.e. Hitler, could engage in war games and plan ongoing strategies. What really got up his nose were hit and run missions, whether it was 4 men or 4’000, the essence was they had come for only a short time to inflict damage then evacuate – this was not the way Hitler wanted to play!

Hence you find Wilhelm Keitel, German Chief of Staff, stating that when at the Wolfs Lair with Hitler, Hitler was ranting and raving to the exclusion of discussing anything else, about the raid at Dieppe. This raid was a success for Hitler, all he lost was one battery while inflicting considerable casualties and took a great many prisoners. Hitler was ranting about the ‘Commandos’ when as we know it was far more than a Commando raid with the vast bulk of the land forces provided by Canadian Infantry and armour. However, in Hitler’s mind they were all ‘commandos’ because this was an operation when the force was to land, inflict damage and evacuate.

Prior to the Normandy invasion, which hopefully the Germans thought was going to be in Par de Calais, if, as a German commander, your men brought you 4 captives found behind their lines (i.e. most of Europe at that time), you had to decide what to do with them? If they were not in what you considered a national military uniform, you could designate them as Partisans or spys. If they were say in British uniform, then you had to decide if you’d process them as POW’s or follow the Commando Order?

During and after the invasion, how would you know if men were behind-the-lines commandos or were simply lost or the victims of an inaccurate parachute drop? However, if this officer is following the original concept, these uniformed men are part of the overall invasion force which they very likely stay to meet up with – hence in that sense they are not ‘raiders’? We now have the points raised at Nuremberg in respect of whether or not the German High Command ordered the continuance of the Commando Order and modified it accordingly – which the evidence produced showed they did.

No.9

 

I guess it was up to interpretation of the order in general then. Did Hitler have anything to say about the Italian Frog-Men? They are a true Commando force - small unit, behind enemy lines, hit-and-run - and on Hitlers side. Or did he not care about the Italians at all, as he had more troublesome problems to deal?

 

Hitler (and the KriegsMarine) had virtually no control over Italian Naval operations. The KM represenative to the Italian Navy was a mere Lieutenant for most of the war. The two (RM and KM) were essentially friendly enemies.

 

Hitler was not controlling the Italian Navy and did not have Italy in his initial plans as seen when Italy committed to the war on 10 June 1940. Mussolini’s declaration that he was going to assist by invading south east France was met with indifference by Hitler. Italy’s Navy was essentially at Taranto and nullified early on by the Swordfish raid in November 1940.

Decima Flottiglia MAS was Italy’s elite Naval force and certainly a seldom mentioned but very effective Special Force. Though most noted for its 2 man ‘torpedo’ raids, particularly Gibraltar and Alexandria, as an attack force it dated back to W.W.I with motor torpedo boats, hence the MAS tag. Motobarca Armata SVAN – Motorboat Armed ‘Societa Veneziana Automobili Navali’ manufacturers.

In W.W.II under Prince Junio Valerio Borghese the force had midget submarines operating out of La Spezia which were adapted to convey the SLCs ("Siluro a Lenta Corsa"), the two man ‘torpedo’ the operators dubbed "maiale" (pig), a comment on its ease of handling, or rather lack of it.

Borgese’s exploits were noted by Karl Donitz who had him train German Naval sabotage units. With the Italian armistice in 1943, the force split. Borghese took the name and his followers to join the Salo Republic and was placed under Wolff’s commands, part of the SS. Their complexion changes now and they become heavily involved with brutal land based anti Partisan activities and special operations against Allied land forces. They also established a spy unit in Switzerland working with the German SD. Borghese became a ‘grey’ character, as after the war his trial was, let’s say, ‘influenced’ as he was embroiled within the CIA, who wanted his services?

As for the other part of the 1943 split, they became the Mariassalto (Marine Assault Unit), and brought a wealth of technology and expertise to the British in terms of miniature submarines, 2 man torpedoes and operational practice. The British developed their own versions (X Craft) and the Italians served with the British underwater specialists such as the SBS, (who unknown to them, they provided the inspiration for!), and continue to conduct raids with distinction, but against the Axis!

No.9

 

That doesnt make sense. If Hitler was so against Commondoes, then why did he have German Commandoes? Thats like a contradicton of his satement.

Personally, i think every army should have a Commando Unit. I assume that pre-WWII they were treated much like Snipers (no sniper programme etc).

 

Hitler / Germany didn't ever have much in the way of "commandos" during WW II; certainly not on the scale of the Allies.
Aside from that, commando type units, along with a plethora of other 'unconventional' warfare units, have alot to do with national character I suspect.
That is, certain nations gravitate towards these things due to their social character and attitude. The US has always had specialized, elite, light infantry like the Rangers or Sharpshooter units but never in large quantities. The British have a penchant for 'private' units raised by prominant individuals like the SAS, Wingate's Chindits and the like.
The Soviets / Russians had the Redivecheki (spelling I know), Cossacks and, partisans.
The Germans never did go in for such stuff on any real scale. I suspect they were just too 'stiff' to allow, what most senior Heer officers would have seen as, such nonsense as units that didn't fight in a conventional way. Skorzeny met any amount of resistance in his efforts to put commando units together.

 

Beni there are so many books about Hitler’s rationale and why he did or didn’t do so many things. I have yet to discover text, (and would love to), specifically and accurately dealing with his concise opinion of commando forces?

In W.W.I Germany had "Sturmtruppen", (Storm Troopers), which were very effective and something, I would have thought, Hitler would have wanted to expand upon. In W.W.I they would penetrate behind enemy lines and cause as much mayhem and damage as possible. This however, was in tandem with a major assault made by regulars and served to disrupt the enemy line of command, supply and morale. This was employed as part of the excellent strategy to break the Italian line at Caporetto.

Arguably this was continued in W.W.II, for example the glider assault to break the Belgium defence, and in both cases the attack was part of a major assault and designed to help it succeed. The SS can be said to have been used in some similar roles and indeed there’s the examples of Otto Skorzeny. However, what didn’t happen was for Hitler to found a dedicated ‘regiment’ of raiders as the British did with the Commandos. Skorzeny remained technically a Waffen SS major but, could possibly have been used as a cornerstone to train and form a much larger specialist organisation?

Abwehr II formed, (re-established/developed from W.W.I), the Baulehr-Kompanie zbV 800 Deutsche Kompanie in 1939, usually termed as the Brandenburg Commandos. They were mainly recruited from foreigners, Volksdeutsche, as the intent was to provide intelligence and securing objectives behind enemy lines. There were conflicts of command between the Abwehr, whom they belonged to, and the Army who wanted to make increasing use of them. Also there was the potentially dangerous ‘private army’ element as the Abwehr was anti-Hitler!

They reached Division proportion by April 1943 and were put under control of the Army High Command. But, after the ‘July plot’ of ’44 and the end of Canaris, in the break-up of Abwehr influence they were down-categorised in September to motor infantry – the Panzer-Grenadier Division Brandenburg. Some 1500 reputedly volunteered to join Skorzeny in the SS. Meanwhile the Division were used in line infantry roles on the Russian Front, suffering considerable casualties, and ended the war as a form of Fire Brigade.

Britain had no such ‘Storm Troops’ in W.W.I and we know from various documents, the employment of such a unit was considered and rejected because it was not considered a proper way to conduct warfare. Of course the British has a Secret Service and they and Naval Intelligence got up to whatever, but, no one had a large or formal permanent commando type force. Churchill changed all this after Dunkerque and specifically said it was ‘time to change’. Right from the onset the smallest operation could comprise one man, but these men may combine ‘up to 10.000’, and their brief was ”to do whatever is required of them”.

This was not quite the same and a much wider brief than the Storm Troops or the Brandenburgers'. Operationally, though the first Commandos were selected from Army volunteers, the fell under the new office of MO9 of Army, Navy and Air Force composition, which quickly expanded and became Combined Operations. Another main point here is that the British Commandos were designed to be a permanent force during the war, and to expand and develop, certainly as long as Churchill remained in charge.

Not exactly a forerunner of the British Commandos, but perhaps a force closer to some of their concepts than the Germans’, were the Italian Arditi of W.W.I (Reparti d'assalto). Like the Commandos the Arditi were selected from Army volunteers and were a dedicated assault force. Benefits in pay and treatment were good but demands on training and performance were very high. Equipment was rifle, fighting knife and hand grenades with sections armed with sub-machineguns and flame throwers. They operated reconnaissance and prisoner capture raids, though their prime function was to advance with the artillery barrage and seize successive trenches and hold them until the main force arrived. Post war they were disbanded for their anti-Communist activities, then later ‘reformed’ in some ways under Mussolini in a civil control capacity. The name re-emerges in W.W.II for men in a parachute role, but the essence and esprit de corps was broken in 1919.

No.9

 

Wow. All this i did not know before. Commando's seem to be a very effective force, even effecting the moral of an Army. I know i wouldnt feel so safe if i knew that an enemy force could attack anywhere and at anytime with suprise.

How was it possible for the Shock-Troopers to get behind enemy lines in WWI? Trench Warfare is the only real sort of Warfare where the Front-Lines are known, and my understanding was that the Trench-lines were relatively unbroken. My understanding was that the Storm Troopers did much the same thing as that Italian unit you mentioned - creep up through No-Mans Land with the Artillery Barrage and be practically in the opposing trench by the time it lifted and before the enemy could re-man his positions. The 'shock' being that they struck fast and hard after the barrage and would catch the enemy unawares.

 

Re the Commandos, that was originally exactly what Churchill had it mind. His recorded statements of; ”to establish a reign of terror up and down the enemy occupied costs”, and, ”the steel claw from the sea”, “to butcher and bolt” was what he wanted. As such a force did not exist nor the tried and tested operational organisation, it took a while to become effective. Though various experiences and research were drawn upon, to the greater extent the Commandos were writing the book as they went along. Hence while early raids may not have achieved what was hoped for, all the time they were learning what did and didn’t work and many ideas were tried.

Re Shock Troops, in many cases the idea was to cross a trench at one narrow point and continue behind it and attack and disrupt the enemy in the rear. Hence when the main assault came the commanders would receive confusing reports that the enemy had ‘broken through’ and were ‘X’ distance behind them or in their midst. It was not a large or the main force but the Storm Troopers wanted to create this illusion. In real terms they would knock out a rear commando centre if they had the opportunity. The messages to the men on the front line would hopefully be that the line had been broken further along and the enemy was already behind them (in numbers) and they should withdraw to save being cut-off!

The Italians concentrated more on taking and clearing small sections of successive trenches to literally cut a path through the enemy’s defences. Their biggest dilemma appears to have been the danger to themselves in holding forward positions as they were not well disposed to resist counter attack.

In W.W.II the German Brandenburgers would often wear enemy uniform and impersonate enemy forces, hence why they wanted men who were multi lingual and preferably had lived in the enemy’s country before the war. What Skorzeny did at the Bulge was not a new concept for Germany, The Abwehr’s men had been doing this from the start of the war.

No.9

[ 23. February 2004, 01:58 AM: Message edited by: No.9 ]

 

Yeah - i recall seeing some movie (i forget the name) about the Battle of the Bulge (maybe that was the name?) where some German Commandos dressed up as US MP's and snuck in, misdirection traffic, and began wiring a bridge to blow it up. There one mistake was that they had the fuse in the ingition block before they had the the fuse connected to the 'explosives' (they werent supposed to blow the bridge - a German convoy was supposed to cross it to attack the allies) and a Tanker noticed this and killed the MPs (who were really Germans.)

 

I think Munken was confused in his original post. the U-boat was U-234 and she was bound for Japan, but still in the Atlantic on VE day. She surrendered 14 May 1945 at sea. She secretly put into Portland Maine shipyards according to environmental scientist Dr Velma Hunt where it appears U-234 disgorged some of it's cargo. That is because there was a 70 ton discrepancy in cargo weights between her German cargo manifest and the US Navy manifest (made after capture) She then sailed to Portsmouth New Hampshire and arrived there 17 May 1945. The US Navy records she had about 1,200lb of yellow cake Uranium oxide at Portsmouth. Her cargo was carried in large canisters stowed in 18 vertical mineshafts.

Dr Paul Harteck was linked with Degaussa a firm which was predecessor to IG Farben. Degaussa also helped Saddam Hussein acquire nuclear technology. Harteck developed the gaseous uranium centrifuge at Kiel in 1942. Hitler gave Degaussa a massive contract in 1944 to produce uranium centrifuges. It seems likey that some centrifuges were sent to Japan by U-boat or possibly even flown on Ju-290 aircraft from Bulgaria to an airfield 300nm west of Beijing.
Japan had it's own Atomic bomb project in WW2.

A book was published recently suggesting radioactive soil samples from Thuringia (eastern central Germany) and the Baltic Island of Rugen indicate evidence of Atomic bomb test blasts in March 1945. The Nazis had also developed three Ju-290-A7 aircraft specifically to be nuclear bombers.

U-234 was not the only U-boat to voyage to the Far East. U-boat flotilla 33 operated from Penang until October 1944 and then shifted to Singapore and Djakarta. U-219 and U-195 arrived at Djakarta in december 1944 with 12 dismantled V-2 rockets. Japanese records indicate some of the large I-boats which voyaged to France in WW2 returned with uranium cargo packed into mercury in their keel ducts. It is uncertain which of the U-boats and Italian subs which voyaged to Asia also carried uranium cargoes but these voyages apparently began before the Normandy invasion in 1944.

 

They might not have had enough to make a nuclear bomb but they still could have made a dirty bomb