John, Did we somehow loose a posting of yours in there ? At least until the Alzhimers sets in ... Sure there were anti-sabotage sentries at the US Army's CAC installations but most did not have full gun crews on site. Just a skeleton crew of sentries to prevent sabotage, not invasion. And as I have stated (and sourced) in past postings here, there were NO 240mm pieces installated in the field on Oahu on the night of Dec.6-7'41. Additional coinfirmation can be found in a Coast Defense Stugy Group (CDSG) Journal article from Volume 16, Issue #4 entitled , "240mm Howitzers on Oahu 1922-1944", written by one William C.Gaines. The real question is, can you remember exactly what you were doing and exactly where you were doing it for the entire month BEFORE and for the entire month AFTER Kennedy was shot ? Your source's account from memory DOESN't say that he was digging foxholes and stringing barbed wire ON Dec.7'41 but rather says that he had been doing so over several MONTHS previous. The print is NOT as you claim here. On the morning of Dec.7'41, the traumatic day according to you, he was getting ready to go on a nice truck ride, in fact. It doesn't matter. What would matter to a Japanese invasion force would be Yoshikawa's report at 1801 on Dec.6'41 via Tokyo, telling Nagumo that it was a typical peacetime Saturday night on Oahu and that as despite some sentries being posted to important buildings in downtown Honolulu, there were still NO American troop formations dug in and watching Oahu's east coast invasion beaches as of Saturday afternoon. Yeah but ALL of that only happened AFTER the Kido Butai's bombs/torpedos were ALREADY falling on Pearl Harbor. THREE HOURS LATER in fact. 0755 + 0300 = 1100 hours +/- Had the Japanese really been landing on Oahu before sunrise at 0606 as was their early war preference, they would have already been ashore for some hours and quite possibly in ambush positions which might have allowed them to prevent the American defenders from reaching their own assigned beach defense locations. 0930 + 0100 = 1030 ? An interesting but contradictory paragraph since a previous one at your same own source has already indicated that just 30 members Company B of the 65th Engineers were breakfasting at Kaneohe while the remainder were on leave in Honolulu. That paragraph sees them sent to Schofield Baracks while this one has then shifted to Fort DeRussy. So, which was it ? Schofield, DeRussy or ??? wtf. It seems that human memory from the time of great events is NOT as perfect as you seem to think. AS IS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED YOUR OWN CONTRADICTORY SOURCE. Perhaps we should examine your source a little more closely now ... From http://www.25thida.org/pearlharbor.html comes: Schofield Barracks was not a primary target. If the Japanese had intended to invade Oahu with ground forces on December 7, 1941, Schofield Barracks with its thousands of Soldiers whose mission was to defend Oahu would have had a much higher priority in Japanese planning. However Schofield was only lightly attacked which in retrospect indicated there would be no invasion that Sunday. 'Tis no wonder that the oft practised American deployments went so well when there was no invader trying to interfere with those deployments historically. However, on November 27 1941 reacting on messages from the War Department emphasizing the need to take careful precautions against sabotage and assuming there would at least four hours warning of an approaching attack force from the Navy, the commander of the Hawaiian Department ordered all Army units to Alert 1 status which was an anti-sabotage configuration. So the American defenders did beat their 4 hour warning window of getting to their beach defense positions by mostly getting there in 3, but without heavy weapons and ammunition which weren't deliverd in most cases until the end of that infamous day. And that was 3 hours AFTER being alerted to the historical Japanese attack, rather than Japanese beach landings which might have begun 4-5 hours prior to 0755. Tragically one of the Haleiwa P36 pilots who had shot down two enemy aircraft was inadvertently shot down and killed by ground fire as he flew low over Schofield. Enough said already. The Hawaiian Department went to Alert Level 3 as the attack occurred and as early as 0930 units of both divisions began quickly moving to their assigned defense sectors. So the official line is that US Army units BEGAN to move by 0930 when the historical Japanese attacks had begun at 0755, one hour and 35 minutes earlier. With the possibility of a Japanese invasion, the first order of business was to quickly construct permanent beach fortification including pillboxes and revetments as well as stringing thousands of yards of barbed wire on the beaches. Because a goodly portion of the defensive positions were on private land the Army had been unable to construct more permanent defensive fortifications at these locations. No such restrictions existed after the attack and an intense effort was undertaken to improve fortifications covering likely amphibious landing sites. YOUR OWN SOURCE says it quite clearly. No permanent beach fortification BEFORE the Dec.7'41 hisorical air attacks but lots of construction work AFTER. Had Japanese invaders come ashore near kaneohe/Bellows on the night of Dec.6-7'41, there would have been few defenses and no US Army troops there to stop them from getting inland. As described herein these Soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division were well trained to take defensive actions within the scope of the plans for defending Oahu against enemy ground forces landing on the beaches. Most of its members had served in the Hawaiian Division and had participated in frequent practice alerts. As it was a Sunday most were off-duty and some were off-post on pass or leave. All were totally surprised on this peaceful Sunday morning when the sounds and sights of war shattered the silence. Imagine how much more surprised and demoralized they would have been to discover that Japanese invasion troops had already been ashore for many hours and had been moving inland thru the darkness to block the very limited Oahu road and railway networks. Living in tents in the hills, building concrete machine gun emplacements, and spreading barbed wire for months prior to the attack is what heavy mortar section leader Sergeant Clem S. Seroski of Company H, 35th Infantry remembers doing. All part of a defensive strategy for Oahu focused on repelling an amphibious assault. This sounds to me to be a part of Short's month's long on-going training program rather than a part of the War Warning Alert Level #1 only just ordered on November 29'41. Some 10 days, not months, before. At 7:00 a.m. on the morning of the attack Seroski was preparing to go on an armed motor patrol with machine guns mounted on vehicles and live ammo. So, on that infamous morning, he WASN'T building bunkers, digging foxholes, stringing barbedwire nor laying beach mines. He was getting ready for a truck drive around Oahu's coastal highway. Most of the 25th Division Soldiers at Schofield Barracks had just finished breakfast or were in the chow line when Japanese planes attacked Wheeler Field and then swept over Schofield strafing the quadrangles and other facilities. Some of the men were still in their bunks, others were getting dressed, or shaving. Some were on there way to church services---the usual Sunday morning activities. No where was the element of surprise made any more vivid than it was at Schofield. Certainly your own source says it all too well. Just imagine the carnage had the japanese been attempting to invade instead of just allowing the US Army's two Hawaiian Divisions to deploy just like on parade day.. I'm not really interested in your "offhand" guesses. I seek the truth via relaible sources, instead. .