US Army National Guardsmen in World War 2

The size and composition of National Guard divisions changed greatly during the course of the war. By the time most Guard units saw combat, they had lost most of their state affiliation. The influx and outflow men due to changing needs saw to that.

Almost immediately upon mobilization in 1940, Guard divisions lost one of their four regiments do to a change in the higher level organization of the division. This change was made to reflect the alteration in operational needs of the division. Instead of four infantry regiments under two brigade HQs, the infantry component of the division became three regiments and the brigade level of command eliminated. You may read of this change being a conversion from a "square" division to "triangular" division. The brigade HQs were converted into other units, such as Recon Troop. This change was done to reflect the growing need for a more mobile, interchangeable division. WWI and interwar divisions were designed to provide massed firepower and manpower with less attention to mobility. The orphaned regiments often found themselves performing garrison duties, providing manpower for special projects and for manpower drafts to fill out other units. Three orphaned Guard regiments formed the nucleus of of the Americal Division in the South Pacific in 1942.

Artillery and other components of the prewar NG division were similarly affected. The unwieldy artillery regiments were broken up into separate battalions in an attempt to make them more modular. As mention, various divisional units were disbanded or given new jobs. Additional units were added to meet changed and the composition of existing units were changed, with men added or removed. Most Guard Divisions were dramatically altered during the mobilization and wartime preparations, such that many of them lost their state or regional focus.

Here is an example: A Company, 1116th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division mustered into federal service in 1940 with slightly under 100 men; almost all were from the same small, geographical area in Virginia and most were from the town of Bedford and surrounding areas. By the time A/116 assaulted Omaha Beach in June 1944, they numbered almost 200, with only around 45 or so still being from the Bedford area.

The man I wrote my book about (Marion Sanford) served in the 30th ID in the recon troop. Prewar, the division was stationed in Tennessee, and North and South Carolina. Mr. Sanford was from Alabama. His troop originally was the 59th Infantry Brigade HQ (30thID) and they carried the lineage of that unit. They were converted from an HQ unit to a mechanized reconnaissance unit, so most of the men who did not military specialties pertinent to recon found themselves in other outfits. By the time the 30th Recon landed in France in June, 1944, the CO was from the Midwest, the XO was a Virginian, most of the officers were from other areas of the country. The troop's first sergeant was from Georgia. In Mr. Sanford's section, there were a couple of men from Tennessee (same town) who were prewar guardsmen, but most of the men were from other states, such as Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Georgia and West Virginia.

Replacements for wounded came from anywhere. I have talked to recon men and/or their families who are from all over the States. As far as I can tell, no preference was given to a particular state when providing replacements for casualties in Guard units.

Wounded usually came back to the unit they served with when injured, but that was not a hard and fast rule. This was common practice whether Guard or otherwise.

Yes, it was possible for enlisted Guard men to become officers. Usually men who were promoted from the ranks were moved to another unit, often in the same battalion or regiment, considering the level of command he was offered.

 

Yes, that is correct. I was going on memory and conflated the triangularization dates of the armored and infantry divisions.

 

Related to this, here is an excerpt from a longer article by John B. Wilson concerning the changeover to triangular divisions :
The end result of this study was the replacement of the square division with a triangular one. An infantry division with three combat teams simplified command structure and provided more flexibility. The elimination of the brigade echelon for infantry and field artillery enabled the division commander to deal directly with infantry regiments and field artillery battalions. The artillery consisted of three direct support battalions of newly-developed 105-mm. howitzers and a general support battalion of 155-mm. howitzers. To assist in moving and operating on a broad front, a cavalry reconnaissance troop equipped with lightly armored cross-country vehicles was assigned to the division. Engineer, signal, quartermaster, military police, medical, and maintenance resources were organized to support the arms. Modern technology brought about significant changes in divisions, one of the more obvious being the elimination of all animal transport, except in a few specialized cases. The newly-developed airborne division was also based upon triangular structure, but fielded fewer men and lighter equipment to accommodate existing aircraft--a variation of the space, distance, and time factors.
The triangular division did not prove to be completely satisfactory during World War II because it lacked all the resources regularly needed to operate efficiently, particularly tank, tank destroyer, and anti-aircraft artillery battalions. Although the Army's goal was to pool these resources at corps level for attachment to division as required, shortages in tank and tank destroyer units made them unavailable to serve regularly with the same division. This resulted in considerable shuffling of attached units, which in turn diminished effective teamwork. Divisional reconnaissance suffered because the armored cavalry troop lacked sufficient strength and its vehicles were too lightly armored and armed for its mission.
The quick success of the German Blitzkrieg into Poland in 1939 had a profound effect on the adoption of a new type of division. Testing of mechanized cavalry and tanks had been ongoing throughout the interwar years on a limited level, but German successes and the U.S. Army maneuvers of 1939-40 resulted in the adoption of true armored divisions. The division was designed as a powerful striking force to be used in rapid offensive action, and its ability for sustained action was an important feature. The first concept saw the division divided into five elements: command, reconnaissance, striking, support, and service. Based upon combat experiences, it was reorganized in 1942 with two armored regiments under two combat commands, with a division artillery similar to that in the infantry division. Another reorganization in 1943 eliminated the two armored regiments, leaving it with three tank battalions and three infantry battalions. A third command was added to control the division reserve on the march, but eventually came to be a third combat command. The heavy division of 1942 was capable of more sustained action, but weak in infantry. The lighter division of 1943 was more balanced in infantry, but needed an additional rifle company to form balanced tank-infantry teams.
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/docs/influncs.htm