US Army Units use of captured German Artilley in Europe

As far as my knowledge takes me, the lack of deep water ports affected the Americans ability to keep up an avid supply of munitions at the closest supply dumps which resulted in scrounging of ammo and no more targets-of-opportunity. This resulted in captured artillery being repaired and used because it was the closest ammo to be found. I would imagine that American soldiers were all to happy knowing the terrifying reputation of some German artillery models.

 

The reason Normandy was selected to be the landing site, besides the advantage of gaining tactical surprise, is that it was roughly the mid-way point of the coastal ports of Northwestern Europe.

The original invasion plan called for the Americans to take in the west the Breton ports of Cherbourg and Brest, and the British to drive east along the Atlantic to capture the northern ports, including Antwerp, Europe's biggest.

The Allied crisis in logistics has two causes. Due to the fanatical resistance of the German defenders, the allies failed to open any of the major ports on schedual. Cherbourg was blown to bits. The fortress town of Brest defied all efforts until September, by which time the attack moved so far east that it was useless. The somewhat belated fall of Antwerp was easy, but the Scheldt Estuary, the choke of the port, was so heavily guarded that the port was inoperable.

At the same time, the effort to break the German MLR met complete and unexpected success, culminating in the wild charge through France. The liberation of France occurred 20 days ahead of schedual. SHAEF was only able to sustain the advance with adequate quantities of gasoline by decreasing the allocation of artillery ammunition, which was not as critical in exploitation and pursuit.

The attackers did not push fast enough. The Germans reinforced the triple defenses of the Sigfried, the Metz and Vosage, in some cases 24 hours after the spearheads made contact with the line. Caught in static war without shells, the Allies were stopped cold.

This became the prelude to the Battle of the Bulge.

 

I seriously doubt that the "terrifying reputation of some German artillery models" had anything to do with it at all . It was the availability of the captured weapons and amount of ammunition that was the major factor of them being used due to the ammunition shortage. From previous posts in this thread,

From myself

"Ammunition, particularly artillery ammunition, tended to be a much more pernicious problem. In the early stages of the Army's expansion there were plans calling for a high priority in the production of 105mm shells of all types, inasmuch as these were the standard, general-support divisional field piece. Ammunition for heavier guns was accorded a lower priority, under the assumption that mobile warfare would reduce the utility of large, unwieldy and relatively immobile large artillery pieces. Unfortunately, a number of factors then intervened. First, congressional criticism was raised over large over stocks of all types of artillery ammunition that had accumulated in Tunisia in 1943. The Army was pressured to scale back production, particularly of 105mm ammunition. Secondly, the perceived need for an expansion of the heavy and medium artillery was mirrored by an expansion of the production facilities for the heavier types of shells. The expansion in heavy shell production was facilitated by converting light ammunition production to heavy. Thus, by late 1943 priorities had shifted radically. Many plants were retooling for other production, while some 105mm plants were closed completely. Events in France and Italy in mid 1944 then changed all the assumptions again. The fierce German resistance in the bocage of Normandy and in the Appenine Mountains of Italy placed a premium on all types of ammunition - just as stocks of 105mm ammunition began to shrink. Rationing was instituted (and extended to most other types of mortar and artillery ammunition), and captured German weapons and ammunition were utilized against their former owners. By 1 January 1945 the entire ETO stock of 105mm ammunition was reduced to 2,524,000 rounds, a twenty-one-day supply according to War Department planning factors, which were widely acknowledged to be too optimistic. The poor flying weather encountered in Europe in the fall and winter exacerbated this near-disastrous situation: Allied airpower was not always available to take up the slack. Although emergency measures in theater and in the U.S. improved matters, artillery ammunition shortages were to remain a chronic problem until the end of the war in Europe.
Military History Online - US Army in World War II "

And from Carl W Schwamberger,

"The speed of advance was the second part of the ammo shortage of 1944. The logistics planners back in 1942-43 had thought the advance across France would be much slower. COSSAC had assumed a sensible conservative German defense which would slow the Allied advance from the coast to the German border to six or seven months. Assuming a landing in May Paris would be captured in September and Metz secured in November. Consequently the scehdule for delivering locomotives, rail cars, and heavy trucks did not bring the full complement from the US until it was estimated they would be needed - when the rail centers of France were captured between Spetember and October. When Hitlers high risk strategy for defending Fortress Europe collapsed in Late July and France was overrun in a single month the Allied logistics commands found themselves without the heavy transport they badly needed. The Red Ball Express and other emergency measures were helpfull, but not up to the requirements.

This transportation shortage was aggravated by the failure to rapidly open the ports. The German defense of Brest and Antwerp prevented the timely use of either and the through sabatoge did not help. It was fortunate the artificial harbors on the Channel coast exceeded expectations.

The third leg of the ammo problem was consumption. The original estimates had been based on the sucess of the untried US Army infantry and armor. The doctrine trained to had required much more out of the US infantry than they delivered. Army doctrine also expected the armored divsions to do a lot more exploitation and manuver than they actually did. For whatever reasons both the US infantry regiments and the armored divsions found themselves frequently stalled by skilled German defenses, and blasting them out with air and artillery fires proved the fastest solution. we were fortunate the US and British both had a artillery doctrine that fit the situation.

This led to large scale overdraws of ammo stocks in Britian. As early as June 1944 Bradley found his artillery was shooting out the ammo into the hedgerows of Normandy faster than it could be brought across from Britian. Revamping the shipping plan or schedule across the Channel helped some, but the siege of Cherbourg and later the siege of Brest increased consumption. When the borde battle begain in September the demand on the artillery increased again as the weather begain restricting air operations. "

 

German artillery was not all that impressive. It was one of the weaker links in their military machine and American artillerists held the Germans in contempt in terms of their command of fire plans. Too much plodding around, too little concentration, and no flexibility.

The pieces themselves weren't that important. American guns were in pretty good shape and there were no major difference in performance between German or American pieces. The Americans were running out of shells, and to fire German shells one needed German guns.

Artillery fire was essential to US tactics since the Americans put their offensive burden onto their infantry without giving them a corresponding capability in fire or durability. The triangular divisions favored by Gen. McNair had a low tooth to tail ratio and could not sustain combat for very long before its cutting edge had been blunted. In part, the Sherman and TD's came out of a cavalry mindset, in which armor became the stand-in for the cavalry's exploitation and pursuit roles, not the iron fist whose role tank formations everywhere found they must frequently assume.

There were also profound defficiencies in US infantry training in terms of assault against static lines. Not enough emphasis was put on infiltration tactics and ways of knocking out bunkers. Tactics must be improvised on the fly, which was costly, and on the meanwhile the artillery must do the job of keeping the Germans suppressed. Even after the US mastered infantry tactics, in sieges, formal assualts of fortifications, and combat against heavy, armor-tipped counterattacks, there was no substitute for real artillery firepower.

 

From what I have heard, some soldiers were more afraid of 88s then tanks.

Edit: Sorry, terrifieing wasnt the right word but the Germans did have a knack at having all the good cover zeroed in!

 

German Guns

 

Those Camo painted guns in the center look to be well taken care of, any idea where they are from?

 

21 December
Captured 88mm's being turned on the Germans near Gurnville, France, following capture of several of the guns.

 

This thread has served its purpose and will be closed. Thank you!