What if Hitler bypasses Stalingrad...

Found some more stats
1) From the AHF (with as source Ellis :Brute Force) Soviet oil production :
1940 :31 million tons
1941:33
1942:22
1943:18
1944:18
1945 :19
Total for 41-45 :110 million
2)For Azerbadjan (thus Baku) with as source:what did the war effort cost the Baku oil fields ? (by sultanov aziriland)
41:22 million
42:15
43:12.5
44:12
45:12
Total:73.5 million (the graphics in the picture is not very clear,thus it could be a few million more or less)
Whatever,Baku produced some 66 % of the Soviet oil in WWII.
Now,was Baku indespensable for the SU ?
Yes,and no .
Yes:without Baku,the SU would have only 36.5 million tons of ol in WWII
No :the oil production of Baku was down,almost 50 %,and,still,the Red Army conquered Berlin .
We also don't know how much of the 110 million tons of oil went to the army.Maybe(?) there was a "reserve" that was reserved for the civilian sector,and that could be given to the army if needed.
With 18 million of tons of oil,the Red Army expelled the Germans in 1944 from the SU .

 

"LJAd"; is this data split between the Baku I (west of Caspian) and Baku II (east of the Caspian), or are both considered the BAKU fields?

 

brndirt1, seeing as it states for Azerbadjan i would gather that it is ment for Baku I, Baku II was located i belive in present day Khazekstan.

Here is an interesting question, Assuming that the Caspian oil provided the army and or the civilian population along with Russias other oil fields. Seeing as the Soviet agricultural industry had become so reliant so fast on oil based vehicles, Had this source of fuel been cut off entirely what might have been the implications? In a time of war with so many mouths to feed, I dont see Russia being able to produce enought food. I may be wrong, so please feel free to correct me but if this was the case, What would Stalin do? Starve his people? make everyone go onto Rations? Would this cause civil unrest and greater disertions within the army?

Just an interesting little scenario that could play out if the Caucasus oil and that that came through the Persian pipelines was actually used within the civil and military area, especially the civil area.. What may have occured down the track... Another revolt like in 1917?

 

First off, the new Soviet was only recently adapted to "large collectives" as per farming since the late twenties, they were extremely inefficient as per product per acre compared to the old methods actually. Stalin had no qualms selling the grain to other nations (Mussolini's Italy purchased massive amounts of Soviet grain) in the thirties while starving his own populace.

While the new Soviet style of collectives required oil to fuel the engines, its lack would not cripple the food production as much since they were so "new" at this style of "factory farming". The most important thing imported to the Soviet during WW2 by Lend-Lease was food, grains, and fibers. The war material was not just an "also ran" it was of import only in the propaganda level.

In addition to military equipment, other commodities were sent from the US which were even more essential to the Soviet war effort. These included 2.3 million tons of high grade steel in sheets and ingots, 229,000 tons of aluminium billet, sheets, and ingots, 2.6 million tons of high grade petrol, and 3.8 million tons of processed food stuffs (tinned pork, fish, poultry, sausages, butter, and powdered eggs), not counting the millions of tons of raw wheat, barely, oats, and rye which the Soviets milled themselves.

The Soviet Union also received about 15 million pairs of boots and socks for the Red Army, made of American wool, cotton, leather and rubber. Not the "gee whiz" stuff or arms and weapons, but every bit as important to an all out war effort. Just a thought.

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Thanks brndirt1, Was just curious of the possible implications, And seems that i wouldn't have crippled the Soviet Union, Though if anyone has further information on statistics, Such as percentage of the agricultural industry that had become reliant on oil based machinery would be appreciated to understand the 'limited' possible troubles caused.

I know that over 5 million tons where sent through the Persian pipe line, But i don't know of what exactly.. Does anyone happen to have numbers of what was sent through there?

 

No,there is only mentioned oil production in Azerbadjan.The beams are further divided in pumps,gas lifts,gushers .
But,on Sturmvogel.orbat./Sovoil., 2nd Baku is mentioned :
2nd Baku (=what the Soviets called the Trans-Volga oilfields like Saratov and Kazan):1940 :3 million ;1945 :2.833.000

 

Meanwhile,I have found some more stats . on 2nd Baku in :
"Creating a second Baku at the expense of Baku's oilfields was a strategic wartime mistake " (also by Sultanov)
Oil production in Azerbaijan
1941:23,641 million
1942:15,709 million
1943:12,692 million
1944:11,839 million
1945:11,494 million
2nd Baku:
1941:1,952 million
1942:1,793 million
1943:1,948 million
1944:2,165 million
1945:2,833 million
IMHO,these figures are making the 3 million in 1940 for 2nd Baku (as mentioned by Sturmvogel) questionable .
I also have found figures for
Kuybishev:1940:0.2 million;1942:0.5 million
Kazakhstan:1940:0.697;1941:O.864;1942:0.866;1943:0.978
Sakhalin:1940:0.505;1942:0.627;1945:0.752
Buguruslan :1942:0.141

 

Considering how fast they where pumping out the oil in the Caucasus, Makes me wonder if it actually played a larger role in the war, It was only cut off for a relatively short time, And even with the poor maintenance i don't see it taking them long to restore the pipes that pumped the oil out of the Caucasus.

 

Found this from one older thread we had on this back on 2006...

" But by late July 1942, Hitler's quest for Baku seemed well on its way to achieving his goal. The Germans had already captured the city of Rostov and severed the oil pipeline from the Caucasus. On August 9, they reached Maikop, the most westerly of the Caucasian oil centers-which turned out to be quite a small source for the Germans. Even under normal conditions, Maikop's production was only one tenth that of Baku's. However, before withdrawing from the city, the Russians had thoroughly destroyed the oil fields and supplies and equipment, right down to the small incidental tools of the workshops. Consequently, by January 1943, the Germans were able to eke out no more than 70 barrels per day there (Yergin, 336-337)."

 

The Soviets didn't have a pipeline from west Baku north, they loaded the crude on tankers and barges and shipped it north up to a railhead on the northern Caspian coast.

 

Ok, thanks brndirt1, Been looking at how they did that. Did they manage to increase how much was shipped via the Caspian sea after the 10 million barrels shipped in '42?

Also, As for there being no land connection such as rail or pipe line, Ive come across a statement's that a new railway was built along the Caspian coast connecting Baku in Azerbaijan and Orsk in Russia.

 

Here is what I consider one of the best links concerning the Petroleum situation the Nazis faced in 1939. Scroll down to about the third section and you will discover a pretty in depth section on the Soviet oil production. It includes the interesting fact that even with being the world's second largest oil producer (USA was #1), and with a major rationing program even before the war started the USSR was importing some oil to meet demand.

Goto:

The Quest for Fuel in WWII

 

Hmm, So unless I've misunderstood the information and my conclusion is off, While Russia could survive with out large amounts of oil for a time, Im guessing had the war gone on longer, And had the Persian pipe line been severed that they would be unable to continue the war indefinitely?.

I know that Russia could still receive oil via the North Sea with L-L convoys, But I'm assuming that a logical leader (Hitler used to be logical, Knowing that he needed Russia's oil, But became an idiot) would realize that by securing one Flank and freeing up extra forces, They could then secure the other flank. Taking all of Karelia and Murmansk i would assume would allow for greater damage to be inflicted on such L-L convoys and onto Arkhangelsk directly.

 

The loss of oil was more important for Germany than for the Soviets. The longer the war went on, the worse it got for Germany petroleum-wise.

The greater amount (over 50 ? %) of L-L went by way of the Vladivostok port, and was never interfered with by Japan. Cutting off the Iranian or even the Murmansk route would hurt surly, but if oil was what was needed most the percentage of what went through Vladivostok might alter as well. And something else to keep in mind, the Soviet contribution to the west in the form of reverse L-L mostly came out of the Vladivostok link. Rare earths, raw bauxite, and the like. This came back to the US instead of filling the holds with simple ballast.

We (USA) needed their Wolfram (tungsten) for our alloy production as well, and I believe we also imported a lot of flurospar which we needed for atomic research (hexoflorine gas for the gaseous separation of uranium), making of high quality glass, and aluminium production. The only known deposits of this mineral (at the time) in the western hemisphere was in Newfoundland and a very small deposit compared to those in the Soviet Union.

 

The North Russia convoy route was cut off for much of the crucial period of the war as it was. It took the Germans a little while to figure out what the Allies were doing and deploy additional ships, subs, and aircraft to Norway; but after the debacle of convoy PQ-17 in July 1942 there were only five further convoys until November 1943: PQ-18 in September, which lost 1/3 of its ships, and JW-51A, -51B, -52, and -53 Dec '42-Feb '43. 18 of 41 Russia-bound convoys were from Nov '43 and later, after the tide had turned decisively in Russia's favor; ten of them were from August '44 on. I haven't compiled ship numbers but the early convoys were the smallest, several with fewer than ten ships.

 

Here is an interesting chart showing the millions of tons shipped by which route from the US to the USSR.

 

The 0 loss for the Soviet Far East route is a little optimistic; five Soviet-flagged ships were in fact sunk, in Japanese waters, by American submarines - oops! Possibly the cargo lost was less than 0.5% of the 8,244,000 ton total, so rounded down.

 

Too true, I suppose the five ships lost to "friendly fire" weren't included in the total "number" at all. I also wondered about the North Russia listing of 7%, and then I realized this was only (probably) counting American hulls? The Murmansk, route was one of the more perilous and 7% seems a bit "low". But if it excludes British hulls, or British shipping origins it might be on the money.

 

It's a valid point that the chart refers specifically to Lend-Lease, American cargo, presumably mostly in American ships; but our good friends at wiki say that 85 out of about 1400 merchant ships were lost, about 6% of ships, so a higher proportion of cargo is not suprising since the Germans concentrated on inbound convoys. I'm not aware of any major battles around the homebound empties, although at least two escorts - Trinidad and Somali - were lost on the way home.

A lot of the potential cargo was "interdicted" in the sense that the Allies didn't try to run convoys for much of the year, while daylight and the balance of forces favored the Germans. Even in 1944, when German strength in Norway had been reduced both by attrition and the demands of other fronts, there was a break in convoys from May-July - also when the RN was concentrating forces for Overlord. History tends to focus on the big battles like PQ-17 and -18 - which account for almost half the ships lost - but the first few convoys got through before the Germans realized what was happening, and about half the cargo was delivered after they were essentially defeated.

 

So any increased danger for convoys on the North Atlantic route or Persian pipelines been cut after from Germany reaching Iran and supporting them against the Russian and British aggression (Just playing it how the Germans would towards the Persian's) would more then likely just mean an increase in convoys via the Pacific?

They may have been able to knock off Persian and North Atlantic routes via securing strategic territory etc, But seems they would be unable to knock off the Pacific convoys. Japan was too busy to divert any ships to take them out, Only possible way of knocking off those convoys would be for Germany to send her own subs there, Though not so out the question if they had a safe port of harbor about 1/3-1/2 way through the journey (eg: In Iran) but supply would be another matter.