You seemed more well up this subject then me LjAd, so I will bow to your knowledge, what do you think about the failure to start the invasion much earlier ?, they had to postpone Barbarossa for about a month due to the Italian army being stopped in the Balkans. I no that how much you look at it the decision to invade Russia was a mistake by Hitler, but if he sat back and put all his forces on other regions would Stalin had took the fight to him ?, would he have expanded west and tried to push the Germans out of Poland and maybe into Germany.
I've seen a fairly strong case made that the postponement was due to the unusually wet spring and Balkan operations had only a minimal effect.
Thanks Lwd, is it true that the Germans were making good ground until the winter, and the apperance of the new Soviet tanks (KV-1s & T-34s) I wonder if they had pak 40s and up gunned PZ IVs (75mmL/43) they might of held there own, up to then the pak 36 anti-tank guns and PZ III (50mm/42) PZ IV (75mm/24) were at a disadvantage, they could make short work of the BT series of tanks but were soon on the back foot later. but they should off shortened there line and give there troops winter clothing, they died in there hundreds through the cold.
I'm not an expert but I seem to recall reading of a break in August while their log trains caught up with them. Then the October muds slowed them down a bit as well. Kind of depends on your view point and how you define "making good ground" I guess. Part of the problem was the plan called for winning during the first campaign season indeed I think it called for a win by September. Once it was clear that wasn't going to happen the Germans needed a new plan. Trying to hold extreme positoins and a log system that couldn't keep up with all the demands certainly didn't help but I'm not sure at that point the army could do enough to pull a victory out. A political solution was needed.
yes I agree Lwd, it was a big gamble by Hitler, he had to win quick but Russia is vast and its ok depending on Blitzkrieg tactics on a small front but from the Baltic to the Black sea is by any margin no Northsea to the Swiss border.
About the Italians and the Balkans:LWD has already answered,I will add the following,due to the late thaw,the rivers in Eastern Europe were still eddying masses;no possibility to put bridges over the rivers . about the decision to attack the SU being a mistake :very shortly :Hitler knew that against an alliance of Britain ,the UK and the SU,Germany could not win .He had to prevent the constitution of such an alliance ,by eliminating Britain(but that's was impossible) or preventing the US or the SU to ally with Britain .He could not do anything against the US,thus,remained the SU.And,this had to happen in 1941,before the SU became to strong,and before the US were entering the war .It was of course a desperate gamble,but,IMHO,the German situation was already desperate . About Stalin attacking Hitler ,the so called Suvurov theory:it never has been proved;if you will search on this forum,or on Wiki,you will notice that the overwhelming majority is devastating on Suvurow .
If I recall correctly it was also the Red Army doctrine to beat the enemy on the enemy´s area, not let them to your side. So you can always say that it was the defensive doctrine to push the enemy back into German area in case of an attack as soon as possiblw and beat them there, not on your side of the border.
Reference the Italians and the Balkans, operation Marita and operation Mercury and the influence of them to operation Barbarossa, i think the matter is a little bit complicated. maybe we need a separate thread to examine it. Kaitel during the trial at Nurberg said that if the German army did not delay in Balkans for 2 months the result of the war would be different and the prosecutors of the trial will be the accused! Hitler himself said same opinion to his friend film maker Leni Riefenstahl in 1943 and also inside his political testament/attestation.
Personally I think it wasn't a who but a what. I think the weather saved Moscow...and to me, the German army was not prepared for such harsh conditions.
Of course,Keitel was trying to blame the Italians ,as did Hitler (Victory has a lot of fathers,defeat is an orphan :Marshall Foch )
No single person can claim credit or blame other than perhaps Hitler himself. There was an oppertunity to seize the capitol, if it was the priority, but other goals were paramount and Germany ran out of time. There may have been some merit to what Keitel said, but not for the same reasons he used at Nuremburg. Italy certainly did Germany no favors as an ally. Consider in late may/early June Germany seems invincable and Italy attacks France so that they could have a seat at the peace table. Of course Italy embarress themselves and place a crack in the image of fascist invincability. Italy provides England a oppertunity to fight on nearly equal terms and soon gain the advantage. Germany is forced to send a panzer corps, one of their better generals and significant air assets to stabalize the situation. Assets Germany could have used in Russia. Italy then fails to reinforce its army in africa to attempt an invasion of Greece serving to widen the war for the Reich. Germany must now send an army into the Balkans to once again retrieve the situation. All on the hop while planning and deploying for Barbarossa. I won't argue that the lost time was the sole cause, but it certainly did nothing good for the outcome. Nor could the need to put togather a Balkan invasion plan help the effort for Germany's Barbarossa intel gathering and planning. While German losses were light, every man, plane and vehicle lost was one not available for Russia. Germany was forced to keep troops in the Balkans to occupy the area, and saw them slowly atritted in pointless combat that did not further the reich's war aims. Hitler had no great wish to have Italian troops as part of Barbarossa, but Mussolini insisted. They would have been better used closer to home attempting to hold back the western allies, not off in a far away land they were not prepared to fight a war in. A senior German in the first war commented that they were fighting a war shackled to a corpse (Austro-Hungary). Once again they were shackled to a corpse.
For sure defeat is an orphan but the fact is that Germans delayed 2 months. I think that the argument of the wet spring in central Europe and the rivers also which had too much water and make Wermacht to delay, is weak. If Wermacht suffered from the wet European spring...then what they could except from the Russian rainy autumn and the Moscow's and Volga's winter! Italians tried for 6 months, since 28 Oct. 1940, and the Germans involved only beginning of April.1941. So we need to specify about what we are talking about. If we speak about Italians, we are not speaking for a delay of 2 months. Italians had lost their campaign. When we speak for a Balkan campaign we must specify also about what we speak. The Balkans are Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece.The Balkans were Axis friendly, except Greece. Yugoslavia also was Axis friendly that is why Simowicz made the coup d'etat. The books says that after Simowicz finished the German friend king amd since the Italians lost from the Greeks. the Germans were forced to involved and need 10 days to defeat Yugoslavia and 2 months to defeat Greece and Creta, the last stand. The truth is, that the German strategy could not allow under enemy influence the south side of the Center Army and South Army while they marched to inner Russia. Balkans should be Axis allies, not even neutral. Since Greece was traditionaly England's friend , it was obligatory to be occupied. If Greece did not fight maybe the things will be different. That was what Kaitel and Hitler told. It was not only the time they lost, it was also the personell loses and the vehicles (normal and panzer) exhausting too. I leave the para troopers out of the discussion. Creta broke for well the victorious Eben Emael batallions and since then these elite forces is used only as elite infantry (i'm excepting Skortseny). The panzer and motorized divisions needed to get some rest after the Balkan campaign, mainly for the vehicles. For the men...they learned slow slow how to expand the limit of the normal human. So i'm starting to think that the role of the Balkan campaign in German's failure is underestimated from the historians.
I think the plan called for them to win before then as with the winter. Why send snow parkas when the fighting was suppose to be done before the snow fell.
No,it was not Marita(the invasion of Greece from Bulgaria)which caused the delay (Marita was planned before Barbarossa),but the extension of the operation against Yugoslavia which led to Hitler's improvised reallocation of German forces in southern Europe,with many logistic disadvantages .(Hitler's War P 82) The Germans could afford Marita at the same time of Barbarossa,but,they could not afford Marita + the attack on Yugoslavia while there was Barbarossa . Besides,even without Marita and the attack on Yugoslavia,Barb
when I read that the German recce units couls actually see Moscow in there field glasses, I dont know how close in miles or kilometers, it could only be down to three reasons. A: strong Russian defense B: the weather C: the German army was to worn out but it could have been a combination of all three.
Before on onset of winter, the Wehrmacht suffered 500k casualties... these were not caused by weather.