decisive battle debate

1)The Stalingrad casualties were not catastrophic and the Kursk casualties were minimal


2)Why is this clear ? Every month the SU became stronger and Germany weaker .

 

Combines with all the other casualties, they were.

 

"Serious historian", would of course, be those approved by LAd. (dixit Green Slime)


People as Newton,Zetterling and Frankson

 

LJAd said: "The Stalingrad casualties were not catastrophic, and the Kursk casualties were minimal."
I consider 1-2 million casualties to be catastrophic. And I do not exactly consider over 300,000 casualties to be minimal, as well as the number of tanks and armored vehicles that were destroyed.

LJAd said: "If Moscow was not decisive, then Stalingrad was not."

Please tell me your sources as well as why you believe that Stalingrad was not decisive.

LJAd said: "Besides, the aim of the battle 'of Moscow' was not the capture of Moscow."
What are you trying to say in this sentence. Hitler's Directive 35 made it clear that the purpose of advancing towards Moscow was Moscow, so whether you think the outcome would still be a German defeat in the end, which would still happen, Hitler made it clear that he wanted to take Moscow.

LJAd said: "Stalingrad: what would have changed if Stalingrad had fallen."
even though that Stalingrad was just a pile of ashes and rubble, if it was still taken they would acquire a major railroad junction and they would secure the German operations in the Caucasus.

 

Well, when someone suggests that the capture of Moscow would be inconsequential, then it's difficult to take seriously.

But he measures "decisive" based on it's ability to produce a definitively different ultimate outcome, without regard to space and time (the borders between East and West, the timing of the defeat), nor will grant the merest possibility any other political effects, nor that "decisive" may actually refer not only to the entire war, but to certain aspects of said war: the loss of (qualitive) material / (experienced) men, the psychological effect on the home fronts (both allied and axis), the loss of allies, the high tide (if you will), etc.

Coupled with a proven inability to correctly read what various authors/posters actually state, with a fascination of irrelevant numbers, and a belittling, unpleasant attitude towards fellow posters leave little room for sympathy from me.

Lastly, Z/Fs conclusion is really quite limited in scope - basically that it is not possible to conclude that Zitadelle was decisive in itself. This conclusion is implicitly accepted by Newton in his basic approach itself - since he considers it necessary to consider rather Zitadelle, Orel and Rumantsyev as a single whole. As one should.

 

German losses in the East in 1943 : 1.7 million men,of which 54000 for Citadel: catastrophic ? no

German losses during the encirclment of Stalingrad : 167000 men + 17000 wounded who were evacuated:catastrophic : no .

One should not consider Zitadelle,Orel and Rumantsyev as a whole : Zitadel was a German offensive,the others were Soviet offensives .

For the Germans,Stalingrad was a defensive operation,with as aim to secure the left flank of AG A,who would advance to the Turkish border .As AGA already had failed before the big fighting at Stalingrad,the capture of Stalingrad would not benefit the Germans . The assumption that the capture of the oil fields would be decisive/would help the Germans was also wishfull thinking ..Fall Blau was the chasing of a mirage .

For Moscow : already before the start of Typhoon the conclusion in Berlin was that the war could not be won in 1941,that a second campaign would be needed. Thus:the fall of Moscow decisive for the outcome of the war in the East ? NO .

 

About Weisung 35,:I have read this Weisung countless times,and,I am wasting my time by reading it again,although I know that a capture of Moscow is NOT mentioned : 2 times is mentioned the following : Verfolgung richtung Moskau,Angriff Richtung Moskau .

Translation : Pursuit direction Moscow,attack direction Moscow .

If the aim of Typhoon was the capture of Moscow, Hitler would have written this . It was not mentioned,thus the capture of Moscow was not the aim of Typhoon .

The aim of Typhoon was mentioned in the introduction of Weisung 35 : the destruction of AG Timochenko before the winter.

In German : Sie muss in der bis zum Einbruch des Winterwetters verfügbaren befristeten Zeit vernichtend geschlagen werden .


Typhoon was founded on the following hopes/assumptions,wishful thinking


The SU was on her last reserves

It would commit these for the defense of Moscow

Germany would eliminate these last reserves

This would be followed by the collaps of the SU which would followed by the fall of Moscow

Everything was founded on the first assumption = that the SU had only few remaining reserves ;the battle of Viazma debunked this assumption : at the end of 1941,the SU was stronger than at the start of the war and Germany was weaker .

 

One should because they were planned Soviet offensives precisely in answer to Operation Zitadel, about which they were forewarned. Had the Soviets not been forewarned, and anticipated Operation Zitadel to the degree they did, it would've been an entirely different series of events on the Eastern Front in 1943. Therefore, the planning, preparation and implementation for Operation Zitadel, by both sides, was indeed decisive for the war in 1943.

 

I do not think you are considering the fact that the Germans had a limited amount of manpower reserves. 1.7 million casualties as well as the over 100,000 casualties at Stalingrad were practically irreplaceable because the Germans reserves were being quickly depleted especially on the eastern front. Losing that many men in the course of that year and half was a major blow to the Germans.

 

"As a result, a gap of up to 500-kilometers wide had opened up in the strategic defense of Soviet forces on a front 800 kilometers long. There was nothing with which to close it, because the Stavka's main reserves had already been expended in order to rebuild fronts on the southwestern and Orel directions."

"In the second ten days of October, almost every route leading into the country's deep interior was open. The Mozhaisk line, the construction of which had started in July 1941 and was still unfinished, remained the sole obstacle on the Wehrmacht's path to Moscow."

"However, the Soviet command did not have enough troops to man the available fortifications adequately."

"The reconstitution of the Western Front had to begin from almost nothing. All of the troops operating on the Moscow axis had been consolidated into a new Western Front under General of the Army G.K. Zhukov's command on 11 October. He now faced the tall task of stopping the German offensive with all the forces he had at hand under his command. The stubborn resistance of the encircled forces at Viaz'ma and Briansk greatly contributed to the establishing of a new defensive front."

"An attempt to use the fresh forces arriving on the western axis to free the encircled armies at Viaz'ma had no chance for success. >snip< In this case, Moscow would have fallen."

The Viaz'ma Catastrophe, 1941
Lev Lopukhovsky

 

This is looking to only one side of the coin : in the second ten days of october,the Germans were not in Moscow,because they were to weak .

 

The point is that 54000 men lost during Citadel were only 3 % of the losses of 1943,thus they were not catastrophic,neither they were irreplaceable,the tank losses of Citadel were replaced very quickly .

 

Trained men are not easily replaceable, men without combat experience are more likely to get killed.

 

IYHSHO, or as Lev states, the resistence in the cauldrons prevented the speedy exploitation, and allowed time for the Soviets to recover. Something which you earlier said was not an issue.

 

:eatpopcorn:

 

Decisive "battles" for the eastern front were imho 3:

a) All Mussolinis attacks/offensives
b ) Rommels offensive in NA
c) High commands view Russia is a "house of cards"

More detail: Point a) and b): If these troops to help out the Italians would be send to the east in time it would make a difference. Also Barbarossa would have started maybe a month earlier. c) if Germans had better intel on the real Russian strength and better logistics they may have taken better measures in this campaign.

 

Still Hitler had to evacuate the Rzhev area to get the manpower for the Kursk offensive. Thus he gave a valuable piece of land and the stepping stone to Moscow away, which is pretty amazing when it comes to Hitler giving away a big chunk of land in the east.