Hitler's summer pause 1941

The obvious answer to your question about fighting on two fronts is a resounding no. It was clear once Mogliev and Gomel were taken Guderian was going to head south. As far as escape, if you have to, abandon equipment and start marching, the Germans were never able to close off pockets completely

 

Also the fighting in the south gave the Russians time to make a defensive line in front of Moscow, which actually was shattered when Guderian´s troops came from a surprise direction (?) and attacked the line´s flank...another massive pocket of troops surrounded in front of Moscow...

 

"... the real problem for Kriponos's South Western Front was strategic. His front had been under going encirclement since late August, and yet he was strictly forbidden to conduct a withdrawal of his forces, or even to redeploy them in such a way as to mitigate the danger. Zhukov, Vasilevsky, and Shaposhnikov had all, to varying degrees, attempted to intercede with Stalin and avert the looming disaster,but the Soviet dictator was determined to hold Kiev at any cost. From Kriponos's point of view the slow strangulation of his forces was the failure not simply of Stalin's astonishingly inept judgement, but also of the men within Stavka, who, in spite of well-founded fears for their personal well-being, were prepared to prioritize their obedience to Stalin over the loss of hundreds of thousands of men in a calamity without precedent."

Kiev 1941 by David Stahel

Each day with which the non-decision to not retreat was made, condemned tens of thousands of men.

Prior to the encirclement was complete, there existed the possibility to extract at least significant numbers via the same method with which they had aggregated in Kiev; Rail.

 

That's a rather novel theory, got anything to support it?

How are they going to persue any signifigant distance past Moscow without holding it? What would they do for supplies?

As usualy your interpretation is seen by you as fact and as questionable if not ourfight luducreous by the rest of us.


*** edit to fix typo ***

 

Got Stahel´s book and I like the picture it gives on the battles although it is a cruel picture.

 

All this is irrelevant : the decision of Stalin to hold Kiev at any cost was as valuable as the attempt of Kirponos to save the SWFront

Besides,AFTER the encirclment,it was possible to save a big part of the SWFront : the German claims of 750000 Soviet losses were only propaganda .

What was more important : Kiev or the SW Front ?

 

As usual,you are confounding the forum with your humble person,or maybe,you are using the pluralis majestatis .

 

How are they going to peruse any significant distance past Moscow by holding it ?

The divisions needed to encircle and storm Moscow could not peruse any significant distance past Moscow .: the choice was between conquering Moscow and advancing east of Moscow .

Besides,the divisions would be transported by truck and by rail,if Moscow was captured or not captured .

It is obvious that you have no understanding of the Barbarossa strategy,which was founded on the destruction of the Soviet army,and all the rest would result from this : the Soviet Army would not be eliminated if Moscow was conquered, but Moscow would be captured after the Soviet Army was eliminated .

Attentive readers will notice the difference between conquer and capture .

 

Sigh,sigh

Weisung 35 (september 6 1941):

Erst dann,wenn die Masse der Heeresgruppe Timoschenko in dieser scharf zusammen gehaltenen eng umfassenden Vernichtungsoperation geschlagen ist,wird die Heeresmitte zur Verfolgung Richtung Moskau-rechts angelehnt an die Oka,links angelehnt an die oberen Wolga-anzutreten haben .

Translation :

Only after the destruction of the Army group Timochenko,will AGC receive the order for a PURSUIT direction Moscow ,the left wing leaning on the Oka,the right wing leaning on the upper Wolga .

The key words are : pursuit and direction Moscow

Pursuit means a defeated enemy

Direction Moscow means no encirclment ,no storming of Moscow .

Encirclment and storming of Moscow would demand a lot of time and meanwhile the enemy would have time to recover .

On 14 november,Guderian gave the order to the commander of LIII Corps to advance with his 2 ID to Ryasan,Guderian did not give the order to go to Moscow .

Why should the Germans wast their time by going to Moscow?

Ryazan was located some 180 km south and some 200 km EAST of Moscow:if the Germans were going that far from Moscow,this meant that they would not go to Moscow .

 

You are rather alone (again...) in your view.

I never stated a number of 750,000, so where this number magically appears in response to my post is beyond me. It is, however undeniable, the the SW Front was all but destroyed, and had to be reformed. So such a terribly "big part" that was saved, it wasn't.

It wasn't just the refusal to withdraw. It was even a blank refusal to re-position troops, to counter the encirclement.

Given that the German's intention to encircle KIev was obvious already in August, yet troops were not even allowed to reposition to better defend Kiev, to keep Kiev in supply, by order of Stalin, KIev itself was far less important to Stalin, just as unimportant as the lives of the men, than being obeyed, and the appearance of being correct. Stalin's ineptitude turned the battle into a farce.

 

Coming from you, this is very rich.

 

Not really. Any objective reading of this thread clearly idicates that most if not all the rest of us have a pretty clear consensus on your beliefs, opinions, and cability as far as creating a reasoned argument go. We may differ in a few details but in the main we agree.

Not really. Of course my main point was that they weren't planning on assaulting Moscow as soon as they reached it. If they had got to the point where they invested/isolated it a number of options would have been available some of which may or may not have been mutually exclusive. Claiming that they would definitly have persued one without any thought of what the situation really was is ludicrous, yet you continue to do so.

It's pretty clear from the maps I've seen that Moscow was a road and rail nexus. I don't see much of a network existing that lets you avoid the city and still links up on opposite sides. How is your suggested log network going to work?

The guiding principle behind it was clearly voiced in Hitler's comment about kicking down the door and the whole structure collapsing. The strategy was to cause a Soviet Moral failure. Destroying the Red Army was seen as a way to achieve this. By fall of 41 it had yet to occur.

That may have been the plan in the Spring and even Summer of 41. By fall some reevaluation was certainly merited. Looseing Moscow would be a significant shock to the Soviet system. How much is not clear but if the Germans though it was enough to be worthwhile they would have done so. Also consider that in all likelyhood there would be significant Red army forces trapped in Moscow (if not then taking it would be easy and so it would still be worthwhile).

Actually no it doesn't. This describes maneuvers up to the point where they reached Moscow not what they would do when they got there.

And your point is? Numerous other cities were encircled and stormed were they not? The number that were left to "wither on the vine" is rather a short list isn't it?

Perhaps because he realized that they weren't capable of encircling Moscow at the time or perhpas this was to set the stage for it, maybe both. It certainly doesn't make much of a case for your position.

 

The farther the Germans would go from Moscow, the bigger would be the circumference of the circle ;if we use Weisung 35,the left wing would lean on the upper Wolga (Kalinin,which is now Tver) and the right wing on the Oka (Ryazan) .The distance between both is 373 km,which gives a circle with a circumference of (2PI R) = 373 km X 3.14 = some 1170 km: the Germans had not the means for an encirclment circle of 1170 km .

Besides: why would the Germans encircle Moscow:? There would be nobody left to defend Moscow . Weisung 35 said very clearly : after the destruction of AG Timochenko (the forces who defended Moscow from the west),AGC would pursue the defeated enemy direction Moscow .Thus,there was no need to waste manpower and TIME to encircle Moscow :the assumption was that after the destruction of AG Timochenko,the Soviets would be on the run,the regime would collaps and the Germans would pursue and advance to the east,as far as possible .

 

1) Some of which : which ones ?

2) Why would the Germans need a lot of supplies ? They would pursue a defeated enemy to the east (as were doing the Allies in the late summer of 1944)

3) Perhaps : coming from the person who is lecturing about reasonable arguments;this is a good one .

The Germans knew very well that to win the war in the east in 1941,2 (and only 2 things) were absolutely needed,

The destruction of Army Group Timochenko

which would result in the collaps of the regime.

All the rest was secundary,even superfluous

There was only one option available,all the rest would result in defeat .

 

Proof that there was a possibility to better defend Kiev,to keep Kiev in supply?

Proof that this possibility was vetoed by Stalin ?

Proof that it was obvious in august that the Germans planned to encircle Kiev?

Reason why the Germans failed to encircle Kiev in august 1941?

 

HAHA!!

Post 36 (repeated in post 47) : the German plan was to surround and invest the city before storming it .

I have asked a proof for this claim,but of course,you were wisely going of topic,as one could expect .

There is no proof that the Germans were planning to invest and surround the city,followed by a storming .

But,there are a lot of proofs that they did not plan to surround,invest and storm the city.they would have been very stupid to surround,invest and storm the city .

 

:eatpopcorn: (with a worried expression)

 

Thus you display the reading comprehension of someone with a single digit IQ. I'd really like to know if you are that incapble or are simply a troll although I guess both is a possibility. No way for me to be sure unfortunately.

 

LJAD, was Kiev saved from occupation by letting the SW front be destroyed??? Were Minsk, Smolensk or any other cities saved from occupation by allowing armies to be surrounded and destroyed???? I am completely baffled as to where you would get this absurd notion from. Did Hitler win ww2 by letting Berlin be surrounded?????. As far as Moscow, the Germans did not think there would be any Soviet troops after taking Smolensk, (Halder in his diary, believed the war was won after 9 days), based on this logic, Hitler believed destroying the SW front would remove the last main army left and allow him to occupy the Ukraine which had resources for the war against the US and Britain(since the US was already supplying Britain) HE was at odds with his generals who thought occupying Moscow would come after forcing the Soviets to commit their last troops which would be destroyed and allowing Moscow to be occupied. There were no plans to storm Moscow since Germany did not have the manpower, just like Leningrad was not stormed because of the lack of infantry.

 

Go read the book I referred to earlier, if the passage I provided was unclear for you.